

1 Methodology

1.1 Polyphony

- bottom of p.163 « If I listened to the words of my mouth, I might say that someone else was speaking out of my mouth »
- 93 p.37 « One person might say » / « and another »
- **108 p.40** « I imagined »
- 110 p. « ... »

1.2 Contextualisation

- 49 p.21 « depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written »
- 122 p.42 « seeing connexions »
- Examples :
 - « red » 1 p.2; 239 p.74; 274 p.81
 - « go on » 151 p.51; 179 p.61; 323 p.89-90

1.3 Orientation

- **119 p.41** « head against the limits of language »
- 309 p.87 « fly-bottle »
- 123 p.42; 133 p.42; 203 p.61; 222 p.73; 232 p.44

1.4 Therapy

Cavell Stanley, « Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy », in *Must We Mean What We Say?*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 91.

the shortest way I might describe such a book as *Philosophical Investigations* is to say that it attempts to undo the psychologizing of psychology, to show the necessity controlling our application of psychological and behavioural categories; even, one could say, show the necessities in human action themselves. And at the same time it seems to turn all of philosophy into psychology - matters of what we call things, how we treat them, what their role is in our lives.

Bouveresse Jacques, *Le mythe de l'intériorité. Expérience, signification et langage privé chez Wittgenstein*, Paris : Minuit, 1976, p.11-12.

Pour Wittgenstein, croire qu'une phrase ne pourrait rien « dire » si son énonciation ne s'accompagnait pas chez le locuteur et chez le récepteur de processus psychiques caractéristiques, c'est un peu -toutes proportions gardées- comme croire qu'une phrase ne pourrait pas dire ce qu'elle doit dire si elle n'était pas imprimée à l'encre rouge plutôt qu'à l'encre bleue. Dans le maniement du langage, ce ne sont pas les « nuances » psychologiques qui doivent retenir l'attention du philosophe.

1.4.1 Philosophy as treatment of an illness :

- 254 p.77
- 255 p.77

1.4.2 Behaviourism

- 307 p.87 « *grammatical fiction* » > 251 p.76 not empirical; **295 p.85** & 371 p.98 « *Essence* is expressed in grammar. »
- 308 p.87 mental processes not to be denied
- 571 p. 128 « external reactions (*the behaviour*) »
- **244 p.75** pain-behaviour

1.4.3 Experimentations

- 330 p.91 « think the thought without words »
- 510 p.119 cold / warm
- 583 p.129 « *deep* feeling »

1.4.4 Way out : very last remark p.197

2 Language

2.1 (« Queer ») Connexion between words and world

- 12 p.6 handles
- 37-38-39 p.15-16 « when language goes *on holiday* »
- ostensive definition : 6 p.4 ; **293 p.85** (« beetle »)
- 39 p.17 word vs name « Excalibur is broken in pieces » ; 55 p.23 indestructible ; 57 p.24 « independent of the existence »
- 196 p.67 « queer *process* »
- **244 p.75** connexion word / sensation

2.2 Labels

Bergson Henri, *Laughter : an essay on the meaning of the comic*

In short, we do not see the actual things themselves ; in most cases we confine ourselves to reading the labels affixed to them. This tendency, the result of need, has become even more pronounced under the influence of speech ; for words – with the exception of proper nouns – all denote genera. The word, which only takes note of the most ordinary function and commonplace aspect of the thing, intervenes between it and ourselves, and would conceal its form from our eyes, were that form not already masked beneath the necessities that brought the word into existence. Not only external objects, but even our own mental states, are screened from us in their inmost, their personal aspect, in the original life they possess. When we feel love or hatred, when we are gay or sad, is it really the feeling itself that reaches our consciousness with those innumerable fleeting shades of meaning and deep resounding echoes that make it something altogether our own ? We should all, were it so, be novelists or poets or musicians. Mostly, however, we perceive nothing but the outward display of our mental state. We catch only the impersonal aspect of our feelings, that aspect which speech has set down once for all because it is almost the same, in the same conditions, for all men. Thus, even in our own individual, individuality escapes our ken.

- 15 p.6
- 26 p.11

2.3 From metaphysics to everyday use

- **116 p.41** « essence of the thing », « original home », « *we* », « everyday use »
- 120 p.42
- 121 p.42 « second-order philosophy »

2.4 « Universal medium », ineffability and relativity

Hintikka Jaakko and Hintikka Merrill. « Wittgenstein and language as the Universal Medium ». In *Investigating Wittgenstein*. Oxford : Blackwell 1986. pp. 1-29.

Dans le langage en tant que medium universel on ne peut en quelque sorte pas considérer le langage de l'extérieur, ni le décrire comme les autres objets auxquels on peut se référer dans le langage, qui peuvent y être déterminés, décrits, discutés et théorisés. Cette impossibilité est due au fait que l'on ne peut utiliser le langage pour parler de quelque chose que si l'on peut se baser sur une interprétation précise donnée, un réseau donné de relations signifiantes ayant cours entre le langage et le monde. L'on ne peut dès lors dire de manière signifiance et significative dans le langage ce que sont les relations signifiantes car, pour se

faire, on devrait les présupposer. Le point essentiel de cette conception du langage en tant que médium universel réside donc dans la thèse de *l'ineffabilité de la sémantique* car c'est précisément la sémantique qui s'occupe des relations langage-réalité.

Kienpointner M., « Whorf and Wittgenstein. Language, World View and Argumentation », *Argumentation* 10 : 475-494, 1996.

Whorf and Wittgenstein are perhaps the most famous names in linguistics and philosophy associated with the assumption that language plays a decisive role in shaping our view of reality. [...] To sum up, I would like to stress that it is not language as a system, but the use of language according to the rules of language games which connects language, thought and world view [...] Therefore, the strong influence of language on thought and world view assumed by Whorf cannot be denied, but 'language' in this context has to be understood in a different sense. It is not the language system, but the (group-specific or commonly established) use of language for which one of Wittgenstein's most famous claims is truly valid : 'the limits of my language are the limits of my world'

- *Tractatus* 5.6 "The limits of my language are the limits of my world"
- 119 p.41 « head against the limits of language »
- 329 p.90 « language is itself the vehicle of thought »
- 336 p.92 grammatical's order
- p.190 « If a lion could talk, we could not understand him »
- 135 p.44 define propositions by more propositions
- Lebensform : 19 p.7 ; 23 p.10 ; 241 p.75

2.5 Private language (243-315)

- 244 p.75
- 256 p.77-78
- 258 p.78 diary

3 Games : chess

Goffman Erwin, « Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organization of Experience ». In *Contemporary Sociology*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), p. 63.

Frames are a central part of a culture and are institutionalized in various ways. They are subject to change historically-a fact frequently noted in FA even though details of historical change weren't much given because of my own monumental ignorance in that connection. And occasionally one individual has some effect on a particular frame. But the individuals I know don't invent the world of chess when they sit down to play, or the stock market when they buy some shares, or the pedestrian traffic system when they maneuver through the streets. Whatever the idiosyncracies of their own motives and interpretations, they must gear their participation into what is available by way of standard doings and standard reasons for doing these doings.

Mandelbaum Maurice, « Language and Chess : De Saussure's Analogy ». In *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Jul., 1968), p.356.

It may be of interest to students of Wittgenstein to note the following passages in which Ferdinand de Saussure spoke of language as a game, comparing it with the game of chess.

- **31 p.13 rules**
- 47 p.19 « composite »
- 66 p.27 what is a game ?
- **197 p.68 day-to-day practice**
- 200 p.69
- 205 p.69
- 311

4 Identity

- 215 p.71-72 « *the same* the same »
- 216 p.72

5 Nonsense

Carroll Lewis, « Jabberwocky » (printed reversed, cf. p.169-

Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

Artaud Antonin, « Tentative antigrammaticale contre Lewis Carroll ». In *L'Arbalète* 12

Il était Roparant, et les Vliqueux tarands
Allaient en gibroyant et en brimbulkdriquant
Jusque-là où la rourghe est à rouarghe à ramgmbde et rangmbde à rouarghambde :
Tous les falomitards étaient les chats-huants Et les Ghoré Uk'hatis dans le Grabugeument

Deleuze Gilles, *Logique du sens*, confronts Artaud's interpretation of chapter VI from *Through the Looking-Glass* to the original version by Lewis Carroll.

Tautology may refer to : (1. logic), a statement of propositional logic which holds for all truth values of its atomic propositions ; (2. rhetoric), use of redundant language.

- *Tractatus* 6.54 « My propositions are elucidatory in this way : he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) »
- 13 p.6 « ohne Bedeutung », Lewis Carroll's poems
- 247-248 p.76 sinnlos, « One plays patience by oneself »

6 Representation (« Bild Theorie », Frege)

- 50 p.21-22 paradigm, last word
- 108 p.40 « crystalline purity »
- 115 p.41 « A *picture* held us captive »
- 199 p.68 « To understand a language means to be master of a technique »
- 301 p.86 « An image is not a picture »

Biggs Michael, « Why Study Wittgenstein's Diagrams? ». In Haller, R. and K. Puhl (eds.) *Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy : a reassessment after 50 years* 1, 2001, p.95-100

- How should the presence of drawings / illustrations / diagrams / representations / figures be interpreted? (p. 175-179)

7 Rules

7.1 And games

- 31 p.13 « One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without having learning or formulating rules »
- 197 p.68 « day-to-day practice of playing »

7.2 And identity

- 225 p.73 « rule » and « same » interwoven

7.3 And privacy

- 202 p.69 practice