1
Organism That Persons

Born into a new territory, and that territory is myself as organism. There is no place to go but here. Each organism that persons finds the new territory that is itself, and, having found it, adjusts it. This is so only if systematically organized events, fields in which relations among events have some degree of order, can count as territories. An organism-person-environment has given birth to an organism-person-environment.

The organism we are speaking of persons the world; other types of organisms dog, giraffe, or cockroach the world. While members of lower species routinely produce behavior that is true to type, the organism that persons, not always able to summon up all it must to produce a person, has a higher probability of failure. Various instances of an organism's having behaved as a person, many in succession, sum up as a person. It may seem that an organism has a person with which it is associated, but rather than actually having a person, an organism has a long-term association only with behaving as a person. Who has been accepted as a person by other persons is really nothing more than the set of ways an organism that persons behaves.

The momentum an organism is able to gain on being a person, or rather, on behaving as one—that set of conditions, born of actions taken, that makes person-formation possible— depends directly on how it positions its body. Surroundings invite, provoke, and entice persons to perform actions, and the enacting motions of these actions not only serve up alternate vantage points but also inevitably shift sense organs about. The shifting about of the sense organs naturally affects how a person fields her surroundings and has much to do with what

of the surroundings ends up standing for or approximating *the surroundings*.

This that is I—an organism behaving as a person—ascribes. I do so ascribe. Organisms deploy; (organisms behaving as) persons ascribe. Not enough information on what obtains between organism and person has been collected, and the ebb and flow of each entity of this dynamic two-in-one duo remains uncharted. Any term that purports to reveal the dynamics of person formation but which fails to suggest the body's intricate relation to the environment muddies the view. Terms such as *ego, consciousness,* and *psyche,* losing the body as they do, lack those air passages through which the body draws in atmospheric wherewithal.

Close observations have yet to be made of the effect of type of habitation on persons. Those who would minutely observe the effect of habitation on human beings must begin to discern how and why surroundings give or withhold from organisms of the type that can person the means to behave as persons. Even as the concept of person can stay put (everyone knows what a person is), it needs to be greatly dilated (particularly within a book entitled *Architectural Body*). We have adopted the admittedly clumsy term "organism that persons" because it portrays persons as being intermittent and transitory outcomes of coordinated forming rather than honest-to-goodness entities; now that we have launched the term, we use the following less cumbersome terms synonymously with it: body, body-proper, human being, organism, organism-person, person. When studying what goes on between the body-proper and its surroundings, it will be necessary to consider the extent to which persons are behavioral subsets of the organisms from which they emanate and out of which they compose themselves as agents of action. The organism that persons is the first step on the path to the architectural body.

Or neonates come equipped with set-to-go architectural bodies that their first movements activate and help shape—each newborn organism-person-environment an Atlas shouldering the world in its entirety. The toddler, taking its first steps as an organism that persons, drags its whole world along as pulltoy (architectural body).

Although finding where organism leaves off and person begins would seem an impossible task, keeping the question starkly unresolved will most likely provide the best view of what is in play. With less glossing and less generalizing going on, there are increases in both overall tentativeness of the situation and in a free-ranging on-the-spot observing that leads to direct mapping. Good scout that a human being is, ever bent on making do, on glossing interrupted melodies into tunes, she takes scattered moments of an organism's (herself) behaving as a person and smooths them into a whole, herself. D. W. Winnicott's principle of "good enough" holds not only for mothers (according to Winnicott, any mother who is genuinely able to be there for her baby is a "good enough" mother) but also for persons (as we see it, any organism that genuinely exhibits person behavior is a "good enough" person).

An integrally intelligent whole, always capable of bringing conscious reflection into the mix, the organism-person feels and thinks its (way through an) environment. Upon its being granted that each person acts within her environment as a thinking body—nerve tissue can be found throughout the body, the neuromuscular system can coordinate itself to act thoughtfully, and each organ acts "knowledgeably" within its own domain—architecture then looms large as a great aid to critical thinking. Architecture's task is to mete out the world in such a way that it might be reflected on bodywide. And what does thinking—global, body-wide thinking—need? Thinking surely needs perseverance in the matter at

hand, the continual pursuing of that which perplexes, a coming at it and to it from all sides. And when it comes to a thinking that takes place in the round, to reflecting or musing *environmentally,* that would seem to require having something there to be returned to and entered at least twice, a stream (a host of streams) into which, as it flows fixedly as itself, one can set foot more than once. Heraclitus points out the impossibility of this. He correctly maintains that nothing stays in place as place but flux. No two moments have identical streams in which to rest a weary foot and wiggle one's toes. For that matter, no two moments offer up an identical foot for insertion into a cooling stream. Even so, for the figuring out of this or that conundrum, thinking does require there to be a fastening onto an area of consideration and a holding steady, a relative staying in place—and this is what we introduce the architectural body into the world to achieve.

A taking shape of surrounds and bodies and organisms and persons occurs intermixedly. Logic would want to get in there with a knife and cut them apart. Although we are utterly dependent on the force of logic prior to constructing the surrounds that will test our hypotheses, we will say no to logic and resist making incisions and separating the probably inseparable. All the linking and enclosing, an it (think of this as an autopoietic system if you like) that starts as enclosed and then goes about enclosing itself—all of that needs to be picked up as an organism-like whole, kicking and screaming, alive with process, emphatically, and urgently rushed into a supporting context of embedded procedures.

2
Landing Sites

Were nothing being apportioned out, no world could form. What is being apportioned out, no one is able to say. That which is being apportioned out is in the process of landing. To be apportioned out involves being cognizant of sites. To be cognizant of a site amounts to having greeted it in some manner or to having in some way landed on it. There is that which gets apportioned out as the world. There is an apportioning out that can register and an apportioning out that happens more indeterminately. A systematic approximating of how things are apportioned out should be possible.

The body is sited. As that which initiates pointing, selecting, electing, determining, and considering, it may be said to originate (read *co-originate*) all sites. Organism-person-environment consists of sites and would-be sites. An organism-person, a sited body, lives as one site that is composed of many sites. One can, for example, consider one's arms and legs to be part of a single site (the body) or elect them to be two sites (an upper-appendages realm and a lower-appendages one) or four (two upper and two lower appendages) or twenty-four or more sites (two arms having a total of ten fingers, and two legs with ten toes in all).

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"If persons are sited, why do philosophers inquiring into what constitutes a person, or, for that matter, into the nature of mind, rarely, if ever, factor this in?"

"Philosophers considering persons as sites would be obliged

to develop a person architectonics. They would, I am afraid, have to turn themselves into architects of sorts."

"First off, might not the world exist so that everyone may turn into an architect? Contemporary philosophers who insist on remaining within the narrow confines of their discipline risk not being able to frame questions as broadly as necessary and thus jeopardize the logical basis of their inquiry. Does anyone really believe that a person could ever be figured out as such in the abstract?"

∞

Designating the "coming alive" for sentience—as sentience?!—of anything whatsoever, including even the most fleeting sensations, a landing site is but a neutral marker, a simple taking note of, nothing more. When how the world is apportioned out is translated into landing sites, all stays the same, touched but untouched. A person parses the world at any given instant into particular distributions of landing sites, or better, an organism-person-environment can be parsed into these distributions; it is of great use, we hope to demonstrate, to think of the world as reduced to these distributions, these parsings, these arrays, and nothing more. This way what goes on as the world, the world taken all together, all inhabitants included, can be kept track of and looked into with a minimal amount of speculation as to what's in play. If we don't know what is being distributed, let us simply stay with the fact that distributions of some order are underway. We may not yet know how we are connected to the world, but we do know that we are. Let us be precise or suitably imprecise about what we do know so far.

Adopting as a theoretical posit the concept of a landing site, we seek to make and keep explicit an otherwise hidden-in-

plain-sight constant of awareness: all things and events have specific positionings. Intent on tracking a person's apportioning out of thinking-feeling to form a world that she then interacts with, and wondering whether it is at all valid to think of a "depositing" of sited awareness everywhere around one, we establish a schematic domain of *landing sites.*

A multiple, complex siting process or procedure would seem to be in effect as organism-person-environment; or posing it more neutrally, the world one finds in place lends itself to being mapped by means of a multiple, complex siting process or procedure. Human action depends on an attributing of sites and takes place in large part through sequences of sitings. In determining her surroundings, a person proceeds by registering a "this here" and a "that there" and a "more of this here" and a "more of that there." In fielding her surroundings, she makes use of cues from the environment to assign volume and a host of particulars to world and to body, complying with what comes her way as best she can. Her fielding of her surroundings never ceases, continuing even in sleep. Whatever comes up in the course of this fielding should be considered a landing site.

We start off by thinking of world-construction as involving three different ways to land as a site. Every landing-site configuration—that is, every instance of the world—involves all three ways of landing as a site. A *perceptual landing site* lands narrowly as an immediate and direct response to a probable existent, a bit of reporting on what presents itself. An *imaging landing site* lands widely and in an un-pinpointing way, dancing attendance on the perceptual landing site, responding indirectly and diffusely to whatever the latter leaves unprocessed. Apeing a perceptual landing site's direct response to a probable existent, it keeps faith with and firms up a reporting impetus underway. Usually this mimicking landing

site, a gloss instrumental in its coming to seem that nothing has escaped attention, simply goes about indirectly coming up with more of the same, making it appear that direct responding to probable existents covers a wider area and has a longer-lasting effect than it actually does. But an imaging landing site can also, absent perceptual landing sites, when a sensory modality has closed down, suggest itself to be a direct response that initiates a report, thus turning itself for all intents and purposes into a perceptual landing site (witness the Karl Dahlke report a few pages further along). Imaging landing sites can also, in response to an indeterminate probable existent, simply come forward as a portion of sited awareness that remains diffuse, thus presenting areas of world without mimicking anything at all; to demonstrate this look off into thin air. A *dimensionalizing landing site* lands simultaneously narrowly and tightly and widely and diffusely, combining the qualities of a perceptual landing site with those of an imaging one, coupling and coordinating direct responses with indirect ones, the formed with the formless. Attaching a grappling hook of a perceptual landing site to a vaguely sketched-in rope of an imaging landing site, a dimensionalizing landing site, in landing, hooks onto the environment to gain traction on it. With the hook-and-rope ensemble flung out and an availing surface caught hold of, there comes to be an as-if-tugging-back-to-the-body that conveys a sense of (kinesthetic) depth.

Defining features (perceptual landing sites), plus all the imaging that bounces off that which surrounds a person (imaging landing sites), plus guesses and judgments as to how elements of the surroundings are positioned (dimensionalizing landing sites) fabricate a world or suffice to map one. Landing sites dissolve into each other, or abut, or overlap, or nest within one another.

Every square foot or every square nanometer of organism-person-environment occasions a landing site. Surroundings are for a person what comes of her ubiquitous siting; that is to say, they exist as a result of her having dispersed landing sites ubiquitously within a circumscribed area, leaving no square nanometer uncovered. Fielding the surroundings, distributing sentience in specific ways to do this, one lets loose ubiquitous sitings or landing-site configurations which permeate and supplant one another in rapid succession. Every surroundings elicits from those within it a characteristic series of ubiquitous sitings or landing-site configurations.

Landing sites abound within landing sites. Anything perceived can count as both a landing site in and of itself and as part of a larger landing site. The corner of a desk can be taken as a full-fledged landing site, even while subsisting as part of the landing site holding and portraying the desk as a whole. The taking of a particular expanse or event to be a landing site happens in a flash; over in a flash; these events that are decision-like but far from being decisions yield to whatever can come next. A bit of substance, a segment of atmosphere, an audible anything, a whiff of something, whatever someone notices can be declared either a whole landing site or part of one, or both of these at once. Through landing-site configurations, organism-person-environment takes hold and holds forth.

Accepting that the world can be sorted out, at each instant, into only a limited number of landing sites that can readily be kept track of and maneuvering with this information without trying to overreach it amounts to taking a neutral stance. A landing-site configuration can, then, be thought of as a heuristic device with which to leaf through the universe, never mind that it is unpaginated. This heuristic device, a set of apportionings-out capable of reading what else has been and is being apportioned out, leafs through the universe to determine its arrangement and its contingencies. Leafing through a universe turns it into the world.

Perceptual Landing Sites

Theoretically, what counts as the world might be divided into an infinite number of specific locatings or focal areas of awareness, but various studies have shown that, at any given moment, the world consists, for a person, of only a limited number of activated regions or focal hubs of activity.* The continual, albeit episodic, designating of this or that as here or there is not routinely included in this small limit-group of focal notings, but inasmuch as we have in this the originator, or more accurately co-originator, of all regions and hubs, it—this that apportions out—merits inclusion as a member. In any event, one finds a constant selecting of discrete groups of designated areas, with yet other groups in the offing. All points or areas of focus, that is, all designated areas of specified activity, count as perceptual landing sites (visual, aural, tactile, olfactory, proprioceptive, kinesthetic, somaesthetic [pain]).

Perceptual landing sites occur always in sets—a flock of birds flying in formation. With every move she makes, a person disperses her perceptual landing sites differently. Resting within or overlapping one another, they are hard to pin down as to size. Should, however, there be a fairly continual distinguishing of a focal area of activity, a definite size might provisionally be accorded a member of the set. Upon this happening, there would surface the illusion that one had met with that rare, nonexistent bird: the lone perceptual landing site.

Perceptual landing sites pop up on demand, converging upon whatever is around to be landed on. All singled-out elements of surrounding surfaces: perceptual landing sites. Even a mere intimation of a singling-out equals having been landed

*George A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," *Psychological Review* 63 (1956): 81–97; Zenon W. Pylyshyn, "Visual Indexes, Preconceptual Objects, Situated Vision," *Cognition* 80 (June 2001): 127–58.

on and sited. Repeated singlings-out bring the world into existence in all its features. I assign a perceptual landing site to this. Or does it take shape by means of many sites of this type? A shape may be formed first as one perceptual landing site and then considered to be defined by ten, after which it might be judged to have been defined by one hundred or any number of such sites, landing sites that are "direct hits." Because sites abound within sites, and because any X that is not a site is a would-be one, the assigning of perceptual landing sites can only be carried out hazily and tentatively. That it is not possible to determine the number of perceptual landing sites involved in something's coming to be perceived may be viewed as a drawback to the system we propose, yet it need not be a matter of great concern. Regardless of the softness of numbers assigned, despite the inevitable imprecision, perceptual landing sites, whatever their number, always, by definition, register accurately enough features and elements of the circumstances they have been dispersed to record.

Were there no perceptual landing sites, there could be no organism-person that is a body. Perceptual landing sites serve up the initiating site of all sites, the basically fixed but constantly changing kinesthetic-proprioceptive schema of body that keeps a person always kinesthetically grounded and figured and configured. Nothing happens without kinesthetic instigation, corporeal proddings. All events have palpably active starts, stops, and turnabouts and kinesthetic repercussions. A mobile and sculpted medium of locatings or of events composed of kinesthetic- and proprioceptive-perceptual landing sites animates the show from within and in great measure runs it.

Imaging Landing Sites

To honor and mark that it is unquestionably the case that landing-site dispersal occurs within the context of an imaging

capability, as well as to account for this capability within the information management system that landing-site theory, still in its infancy, apparently engenders, we have taken to referring to ubiquitous emissaries of this capability as imaging landing sites. An area not captured by perceptual landing sites, accorded no points of focus or touchdown points of awareness, does not simply go blank or vanish; instead, it—a looming non-focused-upon area—far from bowing out of the picture or leaving great gaps in it, gets continually supplied, or roughed in, or approximated, by imaging landing sites.

Imaging, integral to a person's forming of the world, gets staked out and maintained by landing sites that fill in gaps in the world or "generalize" it. Imaging landing sites hover around, pick up on, and emulate qualities or features that perceptual landing sites highlight. Taking off from perceptual landing sites (actual points of focus), imaging landing sites (generalizing factors) extend and diffuse surfaces and volumes. Imaging landing sites enlarge the areas over which qualities hold sway. In the course of producing what they produce, they bruit this about: "Have there be more of this here and around here." The picture that emerges is a far cry from the mosaic of empiricists, with its standard same-sized tiles of sensation. Instead of a mosaic of registerings, we have a shifting-about patchwork quilt of registerings and quasi-registerings. We have a patchwork quilt that never stays the same. Palimpsests of quilts of patchworked registerings and quasi-registerings on the move; registerings and quasi-registerings slipping under and over one another, replacing one another. Imaging landing sites: quasi-registerings.

Amorphous accordings of more information than is directly supplied, imaging landing sites exist as even less discrete patches of world than perceptual landing sites. Blending the surroundings and blending into the surroundings, they have hardly any shape at all and perhaps had best be spoken of as shapeless; even so, they help define the shapes of the objects

of the world. Imaging landing sites are not even of an indeterminate size; they are, instead, possibly without scale. This does not mean that they have no part in recording scale. They fall in line with whatever perceptual landing sites (and dimensionalizing landing sites) determine the measure of things to be. What they mete out in this regard gets abundantly meted out in the spirit of a grand, continual, cooperative gesture toward getting a world to form (out of the universe).

And where might imaging landing sites lie? Where do any landing sites lie? Might not all landing sites lie within (or throughout) an imaging domain of sorts? If so, how what transpires originates in imaging has yet to be determined. Surely imaging capability derives from a mobile and sculpted medium of locatings composed, for a start, of kinesthetic and tactile landing sites, the human body. In any event, a part of the whole exists as imaging. Imaging landing sites eventuate not only in patches that fill in and finish the world but also in all manner of figural event. We believe that the resolving of these matters requires the construction of complex measuring and tracking devices, constructions by which to gain perspective on human functioning and separate out its component factors.

Persons, then, field their surroundings kinesthetically, tactilely, visually, aurally, olfactorily, and gustatorily all at once, with each modality having a direct or perceptual component and an indirect or imaging one. For example, within the perceptual array, objects that are not touched have no immediate tactile component; these might be said to have, instead, a mediate one, a tactile-*imaging* component that portrays how objects are *likely to feel* to the touch. Tactile-imaging landing sites confer on the world a sense of texture or of nascent texture. All perceptual landing sites have corresponding imaging landing sites; visual landing sites have corresponding sets of visual-*imaging* landing sites, aural landing sites have corresponding sets of aural-*imaging* landing sites, and so on. We have taken

to referring to kinesthetic-*imaging* landing sites as ambient-kinesthetic landing sites or as ambient kinesthesia. We plan to study in a later work the extent to which sited awareness is imbued with an ambient kinesthesia.

Not only do imaging landing sites extend perceptual landing sites, continually providing "more of the same" as they hover about them and emulate qualities and features they incarnate as or capture, they can unprompted imitate these direct responses to probable existents well enough to act as stand-ins for them. Although much about the following account remains unresolved, it being after all an isolated case, anecdotal and un-followed-up-on, we present it here for three reasons: it demonstrates well the stand-in capacity of an imaging landing site; it has something to contribute to our difficult-to-put-together concept of a dimensionalizing landing site; and it gives an undistorted view of imaging capacity, leaving it untouched, an open question, even as it shows how in some way all depends on it.

Recounting how he was able to perform the amazing feat of solving the polyomino puzzle, a mapping puzzle about bordering territories that had gone unsolved for several decades, Karl Dahlke, the blind mathematician, reviewed the steps he had taken. He remembers having cut a piece of cardboard into twenty identical pieces, polyominos, and then having spent time positioning them in relation to one another. Next, he left off working with the physical pieces and began instead to

POLYOMINO PUZZLE

visualize a large, brown board that stood right in front of him ready to have shiny, white polyominos placed upon it. Choosing a corner from which to begin, he affixed piece after piece to the board, finding how best to position each one so as to come up with a solution; he continued doing this until the number of pieces affixed to the board exceeded his capacity to remember—that is, until he began, as he put it, "to run out of memory"—at which point, using Lego blocks, he constructed a model of what he had visualized. When questioned about the elements of his visualization, he replied as follows:

Come to think of it, the puzzle pieces were three-dimensional or had some three-dimensionality to them . . . and this was so despite the fact that I was seeking to solve a puzzle of two-dimensional space. This is a false artifact, I guess, having to do with the way my touch can be of use in positioning pieces. Memory also plays a part in it. My early memories of three-dimensionality during the years when I still had sight. . . . And you ask about the density of the visualized pieces? I would say they have the same density in the visualization as I feel them to have when I touch them—now that of the cardboard pieces and now that of the Lego blocks, at times turning out to be a mixture of the two. And how thick is the board to which I affix the puzzle pieces? It needs to be as thin as possible, for it is there only as a . . . what shall I say, I put it to use only as a memory expander. But I cannot repeat often enough: Choosing carefully the corner from which to begin is critically important.*

Dahlke recalls having spent hour upon hour placing shiny, white polyominos into position upon a thin, brown board. Working in this way, he could try polyominos out in various

*Karl Dahlke, interview, April 21, 1989.

positions within the group he had assembled, even while he was strolling across campus, soaking in a tub, or resting in bed. He would go on deliberating and, in his words, "seeing-touching along," until he grew tired, at which point he would promptly shut off the lights as it were and go to sleep. Remarkably, when he awoke, the puzzle pieces were exactly as he had left them. The puzzle was always there as he had thus far worked it out.

There can be no doubt that Dahlke's picturing of the polyomino puzzle involves no visual perceptual landing sites. He is certainly not issuing direct responses to probable existents. Even so, puzzle pieces need to be given definite shapes and precisely positioned, and both these tasks are, by definition, specific to perceptual landing sites. This leads us to conclude that imaging landing sites act, for Dahlke, as stand-ins for visual perceptual ones. We find these mimics keying polyominos or salient features of polyominos into position in ways more in keeping with events and actions of a seen world than an imaged one. How do Dahlke's imaging landing sites succeed in plausibly presenting themselves as direct responses to puzzle pieces?

It is only in special circumstances that an imaging landing site can take on all of, or nearly all of, the characteristics of a perceptual landing site, and Dahlke would seem to have instinctively arrived at having fashioned such circumstances for himself. One thing we can be certain of is that Dahlke's imaging landing sites that parade as perceptual landing sites could never field the external world as the latter do. Nonetheless, he is able to sharpen their focus and get them to deliver up to him results most people can only get from perceptual landing sites. He does this, we believe, by being willing to reduce the whole of his surroundings down to a thin, brown board—a focused-in world to which to attend. He reduces ambient light and air and the whole field of probable existents

to but a single object with minimal breadth and expanse that has been, it appears, apportioned out to hold precisely twenty polyominos of a particular yet hard-to-specify size. Dahlke puts this object, which we would be tempted to call a critical holder (see chapter 8), in place as a memory expander. Is it only in a context as limited as this, one as pointedly reined in as this, that imaging landing sites can perfectly mimic perceptual ones?

When Dahlke reduces his surroundings, at least as far as visual perception is concerned, to a thin, brown board, what makes his imaging landing sites able to come alive as perceptual ones? An imager of a puzzle or of, for that matter, anything at all usually has a wide-open choice as to where within sited awareness to place what is imaged. Imaging thus comes with a whole host of would-be sites to be imaged. The more ambiguous the surroundings, the greater the number of imaging landing sites that will be needed for making determinations and giving things shape. Ambiguous surroundings tap an imager's resources or energy supply on two counts: first, because a large number of imaging landing sites will need to be churned out, and second, because a great deal of short-term memory will have to be used to keep track of what these landing sites have surfaced as.

While for computers—and Dahlke's term, "memory expander," does seem to have originated in computer lingo—memory expansion can be effected through the deletion of data, the insertion of additional hardware for increased storage capacity and more processing power, or the swapping out of different storage or processing areas; in human beings, memory (short-term) expansion can be effected only through a provisional striking out of data that translates into a freeing up of memory space, that is through reducing memory requirements for one task so that the requirements of another task can be met. A certain over-allness, what might otherwise

be seen to take up most of short-term memory, and which even in ordinary circumstances must be seen to put an enormous strain on imaging or generalizing power, has been cut short, reduced back to a thin, brown board—a board that conveniently stays parallel to the imager's forehead no matter which way he moves. Now Dahlke can concentrate on imaging-remembering what polyominos he put where. A great reduction in one area has made it possible for there to be a great expansion (of imaging power) in another.*

When queried further, Dahlke does admit there to be a bit of ambient distance between the part of himself that initiates the thing-like events he uses as puzzle pieces, his landing sites, and the board upon which he will, by means of imaging landing sites, place polyominos and to which he will find himself, again by means of imaging landing sites, frequently returning. He also remembers there to have been now and then a vague hand-like event affixing the pieces to the board.

The external world, which is always there to supply what one might otherwise feel obliged to remember, and thus frees memory for matters other than keeping track of the immediate surroundings, might qualify as a memory expander for the sighted. Memory is freed up when one no longer needs to remember what is perceived because one is simply able to revisit it, and this, by most accounts, is what the external world has to offer. Upon entering a room, a person begins dispersing perceptual landing sites to record its features. One may not know what one first noticed, where one's reading of one's surroundings began, but one of course must and does begin somewhere. It is, in any event, in the nature of actions within surroundings to have beginning, middle, and end points and

*For more on how reduction leads to expansion, see Arakawa and Madeline Gins, "Expansion and Reduction—Meaning of Scale," subdivision no. 6 of *The Mechanism of Meaning* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988).

for chosen beginning, middle, and end points to be places that are stable enough to invite return visits. That it is able to be returned to makes something's existence more probable. Hence, Dahlke speaks of how critically important choosing where to begin is. His careful constructing of a starting point would seem to be a way for him to transform his drastically reduced surroundings into an as-if external world. We think this would remain true even if upon further questioning Dahlke were to reveal that it was not the whole setup for the polyomino puzzle but the puzzle itself that required a focused beginning. We can unhesitatingly assert this because we have come to see that to carry imitating of a perceptual landing site to exquisite lengths, that which disperses mimicking sites needs first of all to mimic a probable existent on which to land; if he is to make his world be as-if external, endowing it with probable existence, Dahlke must boldly mark a beginning place that can be revisited.

It is fair to say that Dahlke has never seen a polyomino. It should probably be assumed that for the solving of this puzzle he "sees" the polyomino in whatever form it is most convenient for him to have it. It is a compromise solution whose startling accuracy is sufficient to allow the puzzle to be solved. He manufactures polyominos out of the whole cloth of his sited awareness; we will bring up more of what goes into their manufacture when, in the next section, we discuss dimensionalizing landing sites; neither we nor anyone else is prepared at this time in history to go into the whole of this whole cloth. But what are these polyominos? What is a polyomino of Dahlke's manufacture made of? An imaging landing site that suddenly has a sharp face, a face suddenly in focus, all of a sudden a new facet? Or is this polyomino that he can affix to the board a sculpted flake of the crust of some cloud that has grown to be bread-like? Whatever else this is, it is a class of long-lasting imaging landing site able to remain in place

long enough for other imaging landing sites to visit it. When Dahlke thinks he has solved a section of the puzzle, say, one-fourth of it, that group of polyominos, those several imaging landing sites parading as perceptual ones, coalesce into a single larger imaging landing site that can, in its guise of probable existent, be revisited. We leave it to the reader to imagine the sound with which imaging landing sites assume their positions upon the thinnest of thin boards to which they flock even as their source models perceptual landing sites.

The most highly probable existent or landing site in all that Dahlke recounts would have to be Dahlke himself. In any event, although Dahlke's marvelously intensified or souped-up image, his precise picturing of the polyomino puzzle, a special order of precision-held image that marvelously permits shiftings-about and change, takes place through imaging, and can therefore be said to exist in the realm of imaging, it certainly cannot be said to be completely without perceptual landing sites. In addition to having locatings and notings throughout his body (kinesthetic perceptual landing sites) and sounds and odors coming at him from every direction (aural and olfactory perceptual landing sites), Dahlke feels feet in shoes and shoes on terrain, clothing wherever it touches his skin; sitting upon a chair, he feels it along his back and arms and across his bottom, or lying upon a bed, his head upon a plumped pillow, he feels the cushioning surface along his back, neck, and head, or along the front of his body, or along one side of his body (tactile perceptual landing sites all). Any tactile landing site stirs up around itself kinesthetic flickerings, nudgings, and push-pull-cracklings. Dahlke's precisely positioned puzzle that would seem to be all made of imaging landing sites has, then, a firm basis in perceptual landing sites as well. Never to be overlooked: there is a great deal more to imaging than imaging alone.

Dimensionalizing Landing Sites

Acknowledging that a person experiences not only sites but also depths, we posit a composite landing site (a landing-site "molecule" formed of the two landing-site "atoms" we have named perceptual and imaging). A dimensionalizing landing site registers location and position relative to the body. Building, assessing, and reading volume and dimension, dimensionalizing landing sites "engineer" depth and effect the siting of sites. These sites register and determine the bounds and shapes of the environment.

A chair as pictured or held in place by perceptual landing sites (direct perception) with the assistance of imaging landing sites (indirect or imitative perception) has for its perceiver a distinct position in relation to everything else in the room—the work of dimensionalizing landing sites (part direct, part indirect perception).

Think of the part that judgments of dimension play in Dahlke's surprisingly precise picturing of the polyomino puzzle. He uses tactile and kinesthetic perceptual landing sites to add depth to a visualized image. Transposing how, in sum, the puzzle pieces felt to his touch as he held them at various angles and moved his fingers over them, he endows the imaged pieces with some solidity, a burgeoning hint of three-dimensionality. Dimensionalizing is conducted cross-modally, as are all the actions of a person. It has been shown that the illusion generated by the Ames room—giant boy, tiny adult—vanishes when the viewer, armed with a stick so as to probe the room's interior, learns tactilely and kinesthetically that the floor slopes, and gathers that what she has imaged to be an ordinary room is anything but ordinary.

The best way to get a sense of how dimensionalizing landing sites function is to think of what happens when they are

missing or insufficiently arrayed. Everyone has had the experience of feeling like an idiot when stubbing her toe. The necessary dimensionalizing landing sites were not in place, depth was not inserted where it needed to be.

A Neutral Zone of Emphasis

Think of a nod of recognition to position and substance, a nod that recognizes where and what and nothing more. A dispersion of landing sites: a scattering of nods that everywhere notes positionings. A landing-site configuration forms, as a heuristic device, when the continual symbolizing of a symbolizing creature—when that which can, in effect, make a metaphor or symbol of anything—becomes slightly muted or is put on hold for a bit; the symbolizing creature becomes a landing-site coordinating creature. The tense of landing sites holds as that split second of muting whose instantaneous time span lasts only long enough for basic positionings to be registered. Providing a neutral zone of emphasis, landing sites simply bypass subject-object distinctions. Landing site: a muted symbol, or one—but inseparable from all others—event-marker in and of the event-fabric that is organism-person-environment.

A neutral stance asks that nonresolvable issues be kept on hold—fluidly and flexibly on hold—right out there in the world where they occur; it asks as well that they be held open and be made to open still further to yield additional information about what is at issue. Landing sites deliver an on-the-spot data management system. Information management—that is what landing sites are set up to do. On-the-spot data managing is now within everyone's reach.

3
Architecture as Hypothesis

Here is what architecture means to us: *a tentative constructing toward a holding in place*. Walk into this building and you walk into a purposeful guess. The built world floats a hypothesis or two as to how and by what the apportioned out comes to be everywhere, the everywhere.

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ARAKAWA: Here is the house we were telling you about.
ANGELA: I don't see any house here.
GINS: Granted this is not what in our time most people dream of coming home to.
ROBERT: This heap?
GINS: Yes, a low pile of material that covers a fairly vast area.
ANGELA: Are we at a dump? This low pile covering a vast area.
GINS: What you take to be a pile of junk ranges in height from three to eleven inches. It measures close to 2,400 square feet—or 2,900 square feet if you include the courtyard.
ROBERT: Courtyard?
GINS: The shining part in the middle that has a lot of green around it.
ANGELA: That's hilarious. Your house is shorter than its shrubbery.
ARAKAWA: [Laughs] I myself find that surprising. Shall we take a walk around it?
ROBERT: Go around it? Why bother? I can see everything I need to from here.
GINS: Isn't it wonderful that you can see all of it at once—as if you were looking at it in plan?