

nine

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From the pastoral of souls to the political government of men. ~ General context of this transformation: the crisis of the pastorate and the insurrections of conduct in the sixteenth century. The Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation. Other factors. ~ Two notable phenomena: the intensification of the religious pastorate and the increasing question of conduct, on both private and public levels. ~ Governmental reason specific to the exercise of sovereignty. ~ Comparison with Saint Thomas. ~ Break-up of the cosmological-theological continuum. ~ The question of the art of governing. ~ Comment on the problem of intelligibility in history. ~ Raison d'État (1): newness and object of scandal. ~ Three focal points of the polemical debate around raison d'État: Machiavelli, "politics" (la "politique"), and the "state."

TODAY I WOULD FINALLY like to move on from the pastoral of souls to the political government of men. It should be understood, of course, that I will not try even to sketch the series of transformations that actually brought about the transition from this economy of souls to the government of men and populations. In the following lectures I would like to talk about some of the overall redistributions that confirmed this transition. All the same, since it is necessary to pay a minimum of homage to causality and the traditional principle of causality, I would just add that this transition from the pastoral of souls to the political government of men must be situated in a certain familiar context. In the first place, of course, the context was that of the great revolt, or rather the great series of pastoral revolts in the fifteenth century, and obviously especially in the sixteenth century, of what I call those "insurrections of conduct,"* the most radical form of which, and the form in which they were brought back under control, was the Protestant Reformation. So, there were these insurrections of conduct, whose history, what's more, it would be very interesting to trace.† If the main dimension of the great processes of political and social upheaval at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century was insurrections of conduct, we

* In inverted commas in the manuscript.

† Foucault adds: for after all there has not been ... [unfinished sentence]

should not forget that this dimension of the revolt of conduct has also always been present in upheavals and revolutionary processes with completely different objectives and stakes. This is still very evident, of course, in the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, in which the explosion of different forms of religious community and religious organization was one of the major axes and one of the great stakes of all the struggles. And still in the French Revolution there was an entire axis, a whole dimension of the revolt or insurrection of conduct, in which the clubs of course played an important role, but which undoubtedly had other dimensions. In the Russian Revolution of 1917 also, there was a whole aspect of insurrections of conduct, [of which]* the soviets, the workers councils, were one, but only one, expression. It would be interesting to see how these series of insurrections, these revolts of conduct, spread and what effects they have had on revolutionary processes themselves, how they were controlled and taken in hand, and what was their specificity, form, and internal law of development. Well, this would be an entire field of possible research. Anyway, I just want to note that this transition from the pastoral of souls to the political government of men should be situated in this general context of resistances, revolts, and insurrections of conduct.†

Second, we should of course recall the two major types of reorganization of the religious pastoral, either in the form of the different Protestant communities, or, of course, in the form of the Catholic Counter Reformation. Both the Protestant churches and the Catholic Counter Reformation re-integrated many of the typical elements of those counter-conducts I have talked about. Spirituality, intense forms of devotion, recourse to Scripture, and the at least partial re-qualification of asceticism and mysticism, are all part of a kind of re-integration of counter-conduct within a religious pastorate organized either in the Protestant churches or in the Counter Reformation. Certainly, we should also refer to the great social struggles that drove, sustained, and prolonged these pastoral

* M.F.: in which

† M.F.: at the origin of conduct

insurrections. The Peasants' War is an example of this.* We should also mention the inability of feudal structures, and of the forms of power connected to them, to cope with these struggles and put an end to them; and of course – this is all very well-known – we should talk again about the new economic, and consequently political relations for which feudal structures were no longer a sufficient and effective framework; and finally we should mention the disappearance of the two great poles of historical-religious sovereignty that dominated the West and promised salvation, unity, and the fulfillment of time, those two great poles of the Empire and the Church that represented a sort of great spiritual and temporal pastorate above princes and kings. The break up of these two great complexes was one of the factors of the transformation I was talking about.

Anyway – and I will bring this brief introduction to an end on this – I think we should note that the pastorate does not disappear in the sixteenth century. There is not even a massive, comprehensive transfer of pastoral functions from Church to state. What we see in reality is a much more complex phenomenon. On the one hand, we can say that there is an intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual forms, but also in its extension and temporal efficiency. The Reformation as well as the Counter Reformation gave the religious pastorate much greater control, a much greater hold on the spiritual life of individuals than in the past: an increase in devotional conduct and of spiritual controls, and an intensification of the relationship between individuals and their guides. The pastorate had never before intervened so much, had never had such a hold on the material, temporal, everyday life of individuals; it takes charge of a whole series of questions and problems concerning material life, property, and the education of children. So, there is an intensification of the religious pastorate in its spiritual dimensions and in its temporal extensions.

On the other hand, in the sixteenth century we also see a development of forms of the activity of conducting men outside of ecclesiastical authority, and here again in two aspects, or more exactly in a whole series of aspects that form a wide range, starting from the

* *Bauernkrieg* (1524-1526): the revolt of German peasants in Swabia, Franconia, Thuringia, Alsace, and the Austrian Alps. This movement, which, in the continuation of fifteenth century peasant revolts, were first of all directed against excesses of the corvée system, usurpation of outbuildings, and the abuse of seigniorial jurisdictions, took on a religious character at the beginning of 1525 under the influence, notably, of the Anabaptists of Müntzer (see above, lecture of 1 March, note 25). The repression undertaken by Catholic and Lutheran princes led to more than 100,000 deaths. See E. Bloch, *Thomas Münzer als Theologe der Revolution* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1960); French translation, *Thomas Münzer; théologien de la Révolution*, trans. M. de Gandillac (Paris: Julliard, 1964); K. G. Walter, *Thomas Muzer (1489-1525) et les luttes sociales à l'époque de la Réforme* (Paris: A. Picard, 1927); M. Pianzola, *Thomas Munzer, ou la Guerre des paysans* (Paris: Le Club français du livre, "Portraits d'histoire," 1958); and E. G. Léonard, *Histoire générale du protestantisme*, vol. 1, pp. 93-97.

development of specifically private forms of the problem of conduction: How to conduct oneself, one's children, and one's family? We should not forget that at this time we see the appearance, or rather reappearance, of the function that philosophy had in, let's say, the Hellenistic period, and which had effectively disappeared in the Middle Ages, that is to say philosophy as the answer to the fundamental question of how to conduct oneself. What rules must one give oneself in order to conduct oneself properly in daily life, in relation to others, in relation to those in authority, to the sovereign or the lord,* and in order to direct one's mind as well, and to direct it in the right direction, to its salvation, certainly, but also to the truth?† If Descartes' philosophy is taken as the foundation of philosophy, we should also see it as the outcome of this great transformation that brought about the reappearance of philosophy in terms of the question: "How to conduct oneself?"‡ *Regulae ad*

* Foucault adds: in order to conduct oneself also in an acceptable and decent way, properly.

† We should connect this periodisation of the history of philosophy with that set out by P. Hadot the previous year in his article "Exercices spirituels," *Annuaire de l'École pratique des hautes études, V^e section*, t. LXXXIV, 1977, p. 68, reprinted in P. Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et Philosophie antique* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1981), p. 56; English translation by Michael Chase, "Spiritual Exercises," in *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) p. 107: whereas in its original aspect philosophy appears as "a method for training people to live and look at the world in a new way (...) an attempt to transform mankind," it is in the Middle Ages, with its reduction "to the rank of a "handmaid of theology"" that it came to be considered as a "purely theoretical and abstract approach." We know the importance this re-reading of ancient philosophy in terms of spiritual exercises will have for Foucault's work from 1980.

‡ On this reading of the Cartesian meditations, see "Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu" (1972), *Dits et Écrits*, 2, pp. 257-258; English translation by Geoff Bennington, "My Body, This Paper, This Fire" *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984. Volume Two: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1998) pp. 405-406 (Cartesian meditation as an exercise modifying the subject himself) and *L'Herméneutique du sujet*, pp. 340-341; *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, p. 358: "(...) this idea of meditation, not as the game the subject plays with his thought but as the game thought plays on the subject, is basically exactly what Descartes was still doing in the *Meditations*." In 1983, in his long interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress" (in *Essential Works of Foucault, 1*), Foucault no longer considers Descartes as heir to a conception of philosophy founded on the primacy of the conduct of self, but rather as the first to break with this conception: "(...) we must not forget that Descartes wrote "meditations" – and meditations are a practice of the self. But the extraordinary thing in Descartes's texts is that he succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of knowledge for a subject constituted through practices of the self. (...) In Western culture up to the sixteenth century, asceticism and access to truth are always more or less obscurely linked. (...) After Descartes, we have a nonascetic subject of knowledge" pp. 278-279; French translation by G. Barbedere and F. Durand-Bogaert, "À propos de la généalogie de l'éthique: un aperçu du travail en cours," *Dits et Écrits*, 4, pp. 410-411.

directionem ingenii,* *meditationes*,† are categories, forms of philosophical practice that reappeared in the sixteenth century as a result of this intensification of the problem of conduct, of the reappearance of the problem of conducting/conducting oneself as a fundamental problem, or at any rate as a result of it taking a form then that was not specifically religious or ecclesiastical.

The theme of conduction also appears in what I will call the public domain. The opposition between the private and the public is still not really pertinent, although it is no doubt the problematization of conduct and the specification of different forms of conduct that begins to establish the opposition between private and public in this period. Anyway, in the public domain, in what will later be called the political domain, the problem also arises of how and to what extent the exercise of the sovereign's power can and must take upon itself these previously unacknowledged tasks of conduction. The sovereign who rules and exercises his sovereignty now finds himself responsible for, entrusted with, and assigned new tasks of conducting souls. So there was not a transition from the religious pastorate to other forms of conduct, conduction or directing. In fact there was an intensification, increase, and general proliferation of this question and of these techniques of conduct. With the sixteenth century we enter the age of forms of conducting, directing, and government.

You will see why there is a problem here that assumed an even greater intensity than others in this period, probably because it was precisely at the point of intersection of these different forms of conduction: conduction of oneself and one's family, religious conduction, and public conduction through the concerns or under the control of government. This is the problem of the education of children. The pedagogical problem of how to conduct children – how to conduct them so that they are useful to the city, so that they will be able ensure their salvation, and so that they will be able to conduct themselves – was probably surcharged and over-determined by this explosion of the problem of conduct in the sixteenth century. The education of children

* *Regulae ad directionem ingenii/Les Règles pour la direction de l'esprit*, was written by Descartes in 1628 and published after his death in Amsterdam in 1701 (after the appearance of a Flemish translation in 1684) in *R. Descartes opuscula posthuma*. The standard modern edition is that of Ch. Adam and P. Tannery, *Œuvres de Descartes* (Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1908) vol. X, pp. 359-469 (reprinted Paris: Vrin, 1966); English translation, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, trans. Dugald Murdoch, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) Vol. 1, pp. 7-78

† *Meditationes Metaphysicae* (or *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in qua Dei existentia et animae immortalitas demonstrantur*) (Paris: Michel Soly, 1641); French translation by the Duc de Luynes, *Les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes* (Paris: V^o J. Camusat & Le Petit, 1647); Adam and Tannery, *Œuvres de Descartes*, 1904; English translation by John Cottingham, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) vol. 2.

was the fundamental utopia, crystal, and prism through which problems of conduction were perceived.*†

Obviously, I do not want to talk about all of this but about the particular point I have touched on, namely: **To what extent must whoever exercises sovereign power now be responsible for the new and specific tasks of the government of men?** There are two problems straightaway. First, **according to what rationality, calculation, or type of thought can one govern men within the framework of sovereignty?** So this is a problem of the type of rationality. Second, there is a problem of the domain and objects: **What are the specific objects and domains of application of a government of men that is not a government of the Church, of the religious pastorate, and is not government in the private domain, but which is the task and responsibility of the political sovereign?** That is to say, according to what rationality must the sovereign govern? And to speak Latin, because you know that I really

* Maybe we should see in this exposition an allusion to the works of Philippe Ariès, *L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Plon, 1960; republication, Paris: Seuil, "L'univers historique," 1973; abridged edition, "Points Histoire," 1975); English translation by Robert Baldick, *Centuries of Childhood* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), who wrote the preface to *La Civilité puérile d'Erasmus* (Paris: Ramsay, "Reliefs," 1977) situating the text in the tradition of manuals of courtesy: "These manuscripts of courtesy are in the fifteenth century, for the way of conducting oneself, the equivalent of the compilations of customs for the law; in the sixteenth century they are compilations of customary rules of behavior ("codes of behavior" say R. Chartier, M.-M. Compère, and D. Julia in *L'Éducation en France du XVI^e au XVIII^e* [Paris: Sedes, 1976]), which defined how each should conduct himself in every circumstance of everyday life" (p. x). The text by Erasmus in this volume is preceded by a long note by Alcide Bonneau, taken from the edition of Isidore Lisieux (Paris: 1877), on "books of civility since the sixteenth century". See also, on the sources and posterity of the work of Erasmus, N. Elias, *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen* (Berne: Francke, 1939); French translation, *La Civilisation des mœurs*, (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1973; republished, Le Livre de Poche, "Pluriel," 1977) pp. 90-140; English translation by Edmund Jephcott, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, revised edition). In the article devoted to Ariès after his death in 1984, "Le souci de la vérité" *Dits et Écrits*, 4, Foucault wrote: "Max Weber was interested above all in economic conducts; Ariès was interested in conducts that concern life" p. 647.

† Foucault omits here a long passage from the manuscript (pp. 4-6):

"Lay stress on the fact that these counter-conducts did not have as their objective how to get rid of the pastorate in general, of any pastorate, but rather: how to benefit from a better pastorate, how to be guided better, more certainly saved, maintain obedience better, and approach truth better. Several reasons. This: that the pastorate had individualizing effects: it promised the salvation of each and in an individual form; it entailed obedience, but as an individual to individual relationship and it guaranteed individuality by obedience itself; it allowed each to know the truth, better: his truth. Western man is individualized through the pastorate insofar as the pastorate leads him to his salvation that fixes his identity for eternity, subjects him to a network of unconditional obedience, and inculcates in him the truth of a dogma at the very moment it extorts from him the secret of his inner truth. Identity, subjection, interiority: the individualization of Western man throughout the long millennium of the Christian pastorate was carried out at the price of subjectivity. By subjectivation. To become individual one must become subject (in all the senses of "subject"). Now, to the same extent as the pastorate was a factor and agent of individualization, it created a formidable appeal, an appetite for the pastorate: [some illegible words] how to become subject without being subjected? Enormous desire for individuality, well before the bourgeois consciousness and radically distinguishing Christianity from Buddhism (absence of the pastorate/mysticism [an illegible word], de-individualization). The great crisis of the pastorate and the onslaughts of the counter-conducts that fuelled this crisis did not lead to an overall rejection of all forms of conduct, but to an increased pursuit of being conducted, but properly and appropriately? Hence the increase in "needs of conduct" in the sixteenth century."

like speaking Latin, I will say: What must be the *ratio gubernatoria* as distinct from the *ratio pastoralis*?*

Good, governmental reason then. In order to try to explain this a little, I would like to return for a moment to scholastic thought, and specifically to Saint Thomas and the text in which he explains the nature of royal power.† It is important to remember that Saint Thomas never said that the sovereign was only a sovereign, that he only had to rule and governing was not one of his tasks. On the contrary, he always said that the king had to govern. He even gives a definition of the king: the king is “he who governs the people of a single city and a single province, and who does so with a view to the common good.”‡ The king is the one who governs the people. But what I think is important is that according to Saint Thomas, the monarch’s government has no specificity with respect to the exercise of sovereignty. There is no discontinuity, no specificity, and no division between the two functions of being sovereign and governing. On the other hand, Saint Thomas draws support from a whole series of external models, which I will call analogies of government, to define what is comprised by this government that the monarch, the sovereign, must ensure.

What is meant by analogies of government? Insofar as he governs, the sovereign does nothing other than reproduce a model [that] is quite simply that of God’s government on Earth. Saint Thomas explains: In what does the excellence of an art consist? To what extent is an art excellent? An art will be excellent insofar as it imitates nature.§ Now nature is ruled by God, for God created nature and continues to govern it all the time.** The king’s art will be excellent insofar as it imitates nature, that is to say insofar as it operates like God. And just as God created nature, the king will be the founder of the state or city, and just as God governs nature, the king will govern his state, city, or province. So, the first analogy is with God.

* Foucault adds: Those who know Latin ... [*end of sentence inaudible*]

† Saint Thomas Aquinas, *De regno*, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 42 (Rome: 1979) pp. 449-471; English translation by R. W. Dyson in *Saint Thomas Aquinas Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2002).

‡ Ibid. Book I, ch. 2, p. 10: “(...) a king is one who rules over the community [*multitudo*] of a city or province, and for the common good”.

§ Ibid. Book I, ch. 13, p. 36: “And because it is true that art imitates nature ... it would seem best to infer the duties of a king from the forms of government which occur in nature. Now among natural things there is found both a universal and a particular form of government. The universal form is that according to which all things are contained under the government of God, Who governs all things by his Providence”.

** Ibid. Book I, ch. 14, p. 37: “Now God’s work in relation to the world must be considered under two general aspects. First, He made the world; second, He governs the world that He has made.”

The second analogy, the second continuity, is with nature itself. There is nothing in the world, Saint Thomas says, or at any rate no living animal, whose body would not be exposed to loss, separation, and decomposition, if there were not some vital, guiding force within it holding together the different elements of which living bodies are composed and ordering them in terms of the common good. If there were not a living force, the stomach would go its way and the legs another, etcetera.* The same applies to a kingdom. Each individual in a kingdom would strive for his own good, since one of one of man's characteristics, one of his essential features, is precisely that he strives for his own good. Everyone would strive for their own good and thus neglect the common good. Therefore there must be something in the kingdom that corresponds to the vital, guiding force in the organism, and this is the king, who turns each individual's tendency back from his own good towards the common good. "As in any multitude," says Saint Thomas, "a direction is necessary that is responsible for regulating and governing."† This is the second analogy, the analogy of the king with an organism's vital force.

Finally, the third analogy, the third continuity is with the pastor and the father of a family, for, Saint Thomas says, the final end of man is evidently not to be rich, nor even is it to be happy on Earth, or in good health. Ultimately, man strives for eternal bliss, the enjoyment of God. What, then, is the royal function? It must procure the common good of the multitude in accordance with a method that can obtain for it heavenly blessedness.‡ To that extent the king's function is not substantially different from that of the pastor with regard to his flock, nor even of the father with regard to his family. In his terrestrial and temporal decisions he must act in such a way that not only is the individual's eternal salvation not compromised, but also that it is possible. With the analogy with God, the analogy with nature, and the analogy with the pastor and father of a family, there is a sort of theological-cosmological continuum in the name of which the sovereign is authorized to govern and which provides models in accordance with which he must govern. If the sovereign can and must govern in the extension and uninterrupted continuity of the exercise of his sovereignty, it is insofar as he is part of this great continuum extending from God to the father of a family by way of nature and the pastors. There is no break therefore. This great

* Ibid. Book 1, ch. 1, p. 7: "the body of a man and of any other animal would fall apart if there were not some general ruling force to sustain the body and secure the common good of all its parts."

† Ibid. p. 8: "(...) in every multitude there should be some ruling principle."

‡ Ibid. Book I, ch. 16, p. 43: "And because the end of our living well at this present time is the blessedness of heaven, the king's duty is therefore to secure the good life for the community [*multitudo*] in such a way as to ensure that it is led to the blessedness of heaven"

continuum from sovereignty to government is nothing else but the translation of the continuum from God to men in the – in inverted commas – “political” order.

In the sixteenth century this great continuum in Saint Thomas’s thought, which justifies the king’s government of men, is broken. By this I do not want in any way to say that the relationship of the sovereign, or of person who governs, to God, to nature, to the father of a family, and to the religious pastor is broken. On the contrary, we constantly see [... *]. And we will find them laid down all the more precisely inasmuch as they undergo re-evaluation and are established on a different basis and according to a completely different system, because a characteristic feature of political thought at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century is precisely the pursuit and definition of a specific form of government with respect to the exercise of sovereignty. Briefly, standing back a bit by means of some grand fictions, let’s say that there was a sort of chiasmus, a sort of fundamental crossover. Basically, the astronomy of Copernicus and Kepler, Galileo’s physics, the natural history of John Ray,[†] the Port Royal grammar[‡] ... well, one of the major effects of all these discursive practices, all these scientific practices – I am only talking about one of the innumerable effects of these sciences[§] – was to show that ultimately God only rules the world through general, immutable, and universal laws, through simple and intelligible laws that are accessible either in the form of measurement and mathematical analysis, or in the form of classificatory analysis in the case of natural history, or in the form of logical analysis in the case of general grammar. What does it mean to say that God only rules the world through general, immutable, universal, simple, and intelligible laws? It means that God does not “govern”^{**} the world; he does not govern it in the pastoral sense. He reigns over the world in a sovereign manner through principles.

What is it to govern the world in a pastoral sense? If we refer to what I was saying two weeks ago concerning the specific economy of pastoral power,^{††} the specific system bearing on salvation, obedience, and truth, and if we apply this schema to God, then God’s pastoral government of the world meant that the world was subject to an economy of salvation, that is to say that it was made in order for man to earn his

* Some inaudible words.

† See lecture of 25 January, note 34.

‡ See lecture of 25 January, note 48.

§ Foucault adds: one of the effects of these new configurations of knowledge (*savoir*).

** In inverted commas in the manuscript, p. 10.

†† See above, lecture of 22 February, p. 167 sq.

salvation. More precisely, it meant that the things of the world were made for man and that man was not made to live in this world, at any rate not definitively, but only in order to pass into another world. The world governed in a pastoral fashion according to a system of salvation was [therefore] a world of final causes that culminated in man who had to earn his salvation in this world. Final causes and anthropocentrism was one of the forms, one of the manifestations, one of the signs of God's pastoral government of the world.

[Second,] pastoral government of the world meant that the world was subject to a system of obedience. Whenever God, wished to intervene in the world for any particular reason – for you know that pastoral obedience fundamentally takes the form of the individual relationship – whether with regard to someone's salvation or loss, or in a particular circumstance or conjuncture, he intervened according to the system of obedience. That is to say, he forced beings to show his will through signs, prodigies, marvels, and monstrosities that were so many threats of chastisement, promises of salvation, or marks of election. A pastoral government of nature was therefore a nature peopled by prodigies, marvels, and signs.

Finally, third, a world subject to pastoral government, as in the pastorate, was a world in which there was an entire system of truth: truth taught, on the one hand, and truth hidden and extracted on the other. That is to say, in a world subject to a pastoral government there were forms of teaching. The world was a book, an open book in which one could discover the truth, or rather in which truths taught themselves, and they taught themselves essentially in the form of their reciprocal cross-references, that is to say, in the form of resemblance and analogy. At the same time it was also a world in which it was necessary to decipher hidden truths that showed themselves by hiding and hid by showing themselves, that is to say, it was a world that was filled with ciphers to be decoded.

An entirely finalist world, an anthropocentric world, a world of prodigies, marvels, and signs, and finally a world of analogies and ciphers,* constitute the manifest form of God's pastoral government of the world. This is what disappeared. When? Precisely between 1580 and 1650, at the same time as the foundation of the classical *episteme*.† This is what disappeared, or, if you like, the unfolding of an intelligible nature in which final causes gradually disappear and anthropocentrism is called into question, of a world purged of its prodigies, marvels, and signs, and of a world that is laid out in terms of mathematical or

* On this description of the medieval and Renaissance cosmos, see *Les Mots et les Choses*, ch. 2, pp. 32-46; *The Order of Things*, pp. 17-45.

† *Ibid.* pp. 64-91; *ibid.*, pp. 58-77.

classificatory forms of intelligibility that no longer pass through analogy and cipher, corresponds to what I will call, in short – please excuse the word – a de-governmentalization of the cosmos.

Now in the same period, from 1580 to 1660, the following, completely different theme is developed. The sovereign's exercise of sovereignty over his subjects is not distinguished simply by his extension of a divine sovereignty over Earth that would somehow be reflected in the continuum of nature: he has a specific task to perform that is no-one else's. His task is not that of God in relation to nature, or of the soul in relation to the body, or of the pastor in relation to his flock, or of the father in relation to his children. His task is absolutely specific: it consists in governing, and its model is found neither in God nor in nature. At the end of the sixteenth century, the emergence of the specificity of the level and form of government is expressed by the new problematization of what was called the *res publica*, the public domain or state (*la chose publique*). The sovereign is required to do more than purely and simply exercise his sovereignty, and in doing more than exercise sovereignty he is called upon for something other than God's action in relation to nature, the pastor's in relation to his flock, the father's in relation to his children, or the shepherd's in relation to his sheep. In short, in relation to his sovereignty, and in relation to the pastorate, something more is demanded from him, something different, something else. This is government. It is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which must find its model, is the art of government. When we have found the art of government we will know the rationality in accordance with which we will be able to carry out this operation that is neither sovereignty nor the pastorate. Hence the point at issue, the fundamental question at the end of the sixteenth century: What is the art of government?

Let us summarize all this. On the one hand we have a level at which* nature is severed from the governmental theme. There is now a nature that no longer tolerates government and that only allows the reign of a reason that is ultimately the common reason of God and men. This is a nature that only allows a reason that has fixed once and for all – what? We would not say “laws,” (well okay, we see the appearance of the word “law” when we adopt a juridical-epistemological point of view), it is not yet what are called “laws”, [but] “principles,” *principia naturae*. On the other hand there is a sovereignty over men that is required to take upon itself something specific that is not directly contained in it, which conforms to another model and another type of rationality, and this something extra is government, the government that must seek out its

* These three words – *niveau par lequel* – are barely audible.

reason. So, on the one hand *principia naturae*, and, on the other, the reason of this government – you are familiar with the expression – *ratio status*. This is *raison d'État*. Principles of nature and *raison d'État*. And since the Italians are always one step ahead of us, and of everyone, they were the first to define *raison d'État*. At the end of the sixteenth century Botero writes*: “The state is a firm domination over peoples” – you see that there is no territorial definition of the state, it is not a territory, it is not a province or a realm, it is only peoples and a firm domination – “The state is a firm domination over peoples.” *Raison d'État* – and he does not give it the narrow definition that we now give it – “is the knowledge of the appropriate means for founding, preserving, and expanding such a domination.” However, Botero adds (we will come back to this later), “this *ragion di stato* embraces preserving the state much more than its foundation or expansion, and its expansion more than its foundation strictly speaking.”† That is to say, he makes *raison d'État* the type of rationality that will allow the maintenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its everyday management. With *principia naturae* and *ratio status*, principles of nature and *raison d'État*, nature and state, the two great references of the knowledge (*savoirs*) and techniques given to modern Western man are finally constituted, or finally separated.

A purely methodological comment. You may say that it's all very well to point to the appearance of these two elements, their correlation, crossover, and the chiasmus that takes place, but you do not explain it. To be sure I do not explain it, for a whole range of reasons. Except, I too would like to put a question. If explanation means that I am asked to exhibit the single source from which nature and the state, the separation of nature and the state, and the separation of the *principiae naturae* and the *ratio status* would supposedly stem, if in short I were asked to find the one that divides into two, I would immediately give up. But are there no other means for constituting the intelligibility that we need to establish or maybe should establish in history? Must intelligibility arise in no other way than through the search for the one that splits into two or produces

* Giovanni Botero (1540-1617), *Della ragion de Stato libri dieci* (Venice: Giolitti, 1589; 4th enlarged edition, Milan: 1598); French translation, *Raison et Gouvernement d'Etat en dix livres*, trans. G. Chappuys (Paris: Guillaume Chaudière, 1599). There have been two recent editions of the work, one edited by L. Firpo (Turin: UTET, “Classici politici,” 1948), the other by C. Continisio (Rome: Donzelli, 1997). Reference below is to the latter edition.

† Botero, *Ragion di stato*, p. 7: “Ragione di Stato si è notizia de' mezzi atti a fondare, conservare e ampliare un dominio. Egli è vero che, sebbene assolutamente parlando, ella si stende alle tre parti sudette, nondimeno pare che più strettamente abbracci la conservazione che l'altre, e dall'altre due più l'ampliazione che la fondazione”; French translation, p. 4: “Estat est une ferme domination sur les peuples; & la Raison d'Etat est la cognoissance des moyens propres à fonder, conserve, & agrandir une telle domination & seigneurie. Il est bien vray, pour parler absolument, qu'encore qu'elle s'estende aux trois susdites parties, il semble ce neantmoins qu'elle embrasse plus estroitement la conservation que les autres: & des autres l'estendue plus que la fondation.”

the two? Could we not, for example, start not from the unity, and not even from this nature-state duality, but from the multiplicity of extraordinarily diverse processes in which we would find precisely these resistances to the pastorate and these insurrections of conduct, in which we would find urban development, the development of algebra, experiments on falling bodies [... *]? This would involve establishing the intelligibility of the processes I am talking about by showing phenomena of coagulation, support, reciprocal reinforcement, cohesion, and integration. In short, it would involve showing the bundle of processes and the network of relations that ultimately induced as a cumulative, overall effect, the great duality, both breach and symmetry, of, on one side, a nature that cannot be understood if one assumes it is governed, a nature therefore that can only be understood if we relieve it of pastoral government and, if we want to direct it, in which we recognize only the sovereignty of some fundamental principles, and, on the other side, a republic that can only be maintained if it is endowed with a government, and with a government that goes well beyond sovereignty. At bottom, maybe intelligibility in history does not lie in assigning a cause that is always more or less a metaphor for the source. Intelligibility in history would perhaps lie in something that we could call the constitution or composition of effects. How are overall, cumulative effects composed? How is nature constituted as an overall effect? How is the state effect constituted on the basis of a thousand diverse processes, some of which I have simply tried to point out to you? The problem is discovering how these two effects are constituted in their duality and in terms of the essential opposition between the a-governmentality of nature and the governmentality of the state. There is the chiasmus, the crossover, and the overall, global effect, but this global character is only an effect, and it is on this composition of cumulative effects that historical analysis should be put to work. I do not need to tell you that in all of this, in these few barely sketched methodological reflections, as well as in the general problem of the pastorate and governmentality I have been talking about, I have been inspired and owe a number of things to the works of Paul Veyne – whose book, *Le Pain et le Cirque*,[†] you know, or anyway you really should know – whose study of the phenomena of euergetism in the

* Two or three inaudible words.

[†] P. Veyne, *Le Pain et le Cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique* (Paris: Le Seuil, "L'Univers historique," 1976; republished, "Points Historie," 1995); (Abridged) English translation by Brian Pearce, *Bread and Circuses. Historical Sociology and Political Pluralism* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1990).

ancient world is currently the model that inspires my attempt to talk about these problems of the pastorate and governmentality.*

So, let's talk about this *raison d'État*, this *ratio status*. Some preliminary remarks. *Raison d'État*, in the full, broad sense that we see emerging in Botero's text, was immediately perceived as an invention, or as an innovation anyway, which had the same sharp and abrupt character as the discovery of heliocentrism fifty years earlier and the later discovery of the law of falling bodies. In other words, it really was seen as something new. This is not a retrospective view, of the kind that one might say: Ah, something finally happened then that is undoubtedly important. No. The contemporaries themselves, that is to say, everyone at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century saw that there was a reality, or at any rate something, a problem, that was absolutely new. In an absolutely fundamental text by Chemnitz – under the pseudonym of Hippolite a Lapide, Chemnitz published a text that was actually intended for those negotiating the Treaty of Westphalia,[†] and which dealt with the relations between the German Empire and the different states (the historical background of all this, one of the essential historical backgrounds, is the problem of the Empire and its

* It may seem strange that Foucault renders homage here to a book that is explicitly inserted in the sphere of influence of historical sociology according to Raymond Aron and of which its author avows that he would have written it completely differently if he had then understood the meaning of Foucault's methodology (see, "Foucault révolutionne l'histoire" p. 212; "Foucault Revolutionizes History" p. 154: "(...) I once believed and wrote, wrongly, that bread and circuses were aimed at establishing a relation between the governed the governors, or that they were a response to the objective challenge constituted by the governed"). According to Veyne, to whom I put the question, we should take Foucault's humor into account in his reference to his book. Nevertheless, it is clear that the analysis of euergetism put forward by Veyne ("gifts from an individual to the community" p. 9, or "private liberality for public benefit" p. 20), his distinction between free and statutory forms of *euergesia*, the link established between different practices (patronage, generosity *ob honorem*, and funerary liberalities) and social categories or actors (notables, senators, emperors), and the prominence given to multiple motives (piety, desire to be honored, patriotism), and so forth, could, in Foucault's eyes, constitute the model of a historian's practice which is hostile to a causal type of explanation and concerned with individualizing events. See P. Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire* (Paris: Le Seuil, "L'Univers historique," 1971) p. 70; *Writing History*, p. 91: "The problem of causality in history is a survival of the paleoepistemological era." As D. Defert notes, the nominalist theses developed by Paul Veyne in "Foucault révolutionne l'histoire" (but already present in *Comment on écrit l'histoire*) were discussed by Foucault with the group of researchers who met in his office "during the two years he was dealing with governmentality and liberal political reason" ("Chronologie," *Dits et Écrits*, 1, p. 53).

[†] On this treaty, or rather these treaties, which mark the birth of modern political Europe, see below lecture of 22 March, note 9.

administration),* – and in this text, which appeared in Latin with the title *Ratio status* and was translated into French much later, in 1711 or 1712, so in a different historical context and still concerning the Empire, with the title *Les Intérêts des princes allemands* (the translation seems a distortion, but actually it is not; the *ratio status* is in fact the interest of the German princes), Chemnitz writes, during the peace of Westphalia, 1647-48: “Every day we hear an infinite number of people speaking of *raison d’État*. Everyone joins in, those buried in the dust of the schools as well as those with the responsibilities of public office.”† So in 1647 it was still something new, a fashionable novelty. A false novelty, some will say, because, in fact *raison d’État* has always been at work. You only need to read the historians of Antiquity to see that it was only ever a question of *raison d’État* at that time. What does Tacitus talk about? *Raison d’État*.‡ Of what does he show the operations? *Raison d’État*. Hence that extraordinary re-investment of political thought in historical material – [in] the Latin historians and especially Tacitus – in order to see whether one could really find in them a model of *raison d’État* and whether one could extract from these texts a little known, buried secret that was forgotten throughout the Middle Ages and which a good reading of Tacitus would restore to us. Tacitus as the bible of *raison d’État*. Hence the formidable return to history in these years.

* Son of a high German functionary, Martin Chemnitz, who had been chancellor of two princes of the Empire, Bogislaw Philipp von Chemnitz (1606-1678) studied law and history at Rostock and Jena. It was in this university that he came under the influence of the Calvinist jurist, Dominicus Arumaeus (1579-1637), considered to be the creator of the science of German public law, the school of which played a determinant role in the critique of the imperial ideology. Having interrupted his studies around 1627, for reasons that remain obscure, Chemnitz served as an officer in the Dutch army, and then in the Swedish army where he followed his army career until 1644, and became the historian of Christine of Sweden. The *Dissertatio de ratione status in Imperio nostro Romano-Germanico* appeared in 1640 under the pseudonym of Hippolithus a Lapide. (The date of publication is in dispute and may be 1642 or 1643. See R. Hoke, “Staatsräson und Reichsverfassung bei Hippolithus a Lapide” in R. Schnur, ed., *Staatsräson. Studien zur Geschichte einen politischen Begriffs* [Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975] pp. 409-410, n. 12 and p. 425; M. Stolleis, *Histoire du droit public en Allemagne, 1600-1800*, p. 303, n. 457 on the state of the discussion). There have been two French translations of the work, one by Bourgeois du Chastenet, *Interets des Princes d’Allemagne*, 2 volumes (Freistade: 1712), based on the first edition dated 1640, and the other, more complete, by S. Formey, *Les Vrais Intérêts de l’Allemagne*, 3 volumes (The Hague: 1762) based on the second, 1647, edition. Foucault, who here mixes up the dates of the two editions, refers to the first translation. A new edition of the work, by R. Hoke, is in preparation for the “Bibliothek des deutschen Staatsdenkens” edited by H. Maier and M. Stolleis (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag).

† *Dissertatio*, vol. 1, 1712 ed., p. 1 (1647 Latin ed., p. 1). Cited by E. Thuau, *Raison d’État et Pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966; reprinted, Paris: Albin Michel, “Bibliothèque de l’évolution de l’humanité,” 2000) pp. 9-10, n. 2. This is the first sentence of the *Dissertatio* which opens the work (“General considerations of *Raison d’État*”). The translator, however writes: “la poussière de l’école” [in the singular] (*in pulvere scholastico*), an expression directed against the Aristotelianism then dominant in German universities.

‡ See E. Thuau, *Raison d’État et Pensée politique*, ch. 2: “L’accueil à Tacite et à Machiavel ou les deux raisons d’État,” pp. 33-102. For a problematization of the relations between Tacitus, Machiavelli, and *Raison d’état*, see A. Stegman, “Le tacitisme: programme pour un nouvel essai de définition,” *Il Pensiero politico*, II (Florence: Olschki, 1969) pp. 445-458.

Others, on the other hand, said: No, there is something new, a radical novelty, and if we want to know what is happening we should not be looking in the historians, but well and truly around us, or in foreign countries; it is the analysis of contemporary reality that will allow us to determine how *raison d'État* functions [...*] Here we should cite Chemnitz, because he really is one of the most interesting, the one who clearly saw the relationship between, or at any rate envisaged an analogy between what was taking place in the domain of the sciences and what was taking place in the domain of *raison d'État*. He says: Certainly, *raison d'État* has always existed, if by this we understand the mechanism by which states can function,† but an absolutely new intellectual instrument was needed to detect and analyze it, just as we had to wait for the appearance of certain instruments and telescopes before we could see stars that existed but had never been seen. “With their telescopes,” says Chemnitz, “modern mathematicians have discovered new stars in the firmament and spots on the sun. With their telescopes, the new *politiques* have discovered what the Ancients did not know or which they carefully hid from us.”‡

Raison d'État is an innovation, therefore, which is immediately perceived as such; it is an innovation and scandal, and just as Galileo's discoveries – there is no point returning to this – provoked the scandal in the field of religious thought that you all know about, so too, in the same way, *ratio status* caused at least as great a scandal. Certainly, the real historical and political functioning of this scandal was completely different inasmuch as behind it all was the problem of the division between the Protestant and Catholic Churches and the problem of the management of states, like France, with sovereigns claiming to be Catholic but in which there was tolerance. What's more, the fact, in France at least, that the most rigorous and ardent supporters of *raison d'État* were people like Richelieu and Mazarin, who maybe were not intensely pious but were at least draped in the purple, meant that the religious scandal provoked by the appearance of the notion, the problem, the question of *raison d'État* was completely different from the case of Galilean physics. There was scandal anyway, to the point that pope Pius V said that the *ratio status* is not at all *raison d'État*; *ratio status* is *ratio*

* Some inaudible words.

† *Dissertatio*, vol. 1, 1712 ed., p. 6 (1647 ed. p. 4): “The cause and origin of *Raison d'État* are those of the state itself where it has taken birth.”

‡ *Ibid.* pp. 6-7 (1647 ed., p. 4).

diaboli, the devil's reason.* In France, there was a literature opposed to *raison d'État* which was inspired, on the one hand, by a sort of, I was going to say, fundamentalist Catholicism, anyway by an ultramontane, pro-Spanish Catholicism, and, [on the other], which was opposed to Richelieu's politics. This series of pamphlets has been organized and studied in depth by Thuau in his book on political thought under Richelieu.† I refer you to it and I have just taken from it this quotation of a reverend father Claude Clément, who I think was a Jesuit and linked, but I do not know how far and to what extent, with the Spanish – did he go to Spain, was he just a Spanish agent, I do not know – in any case in 1637 he writes a book entitled, *Machiavellianism's throat cut (Le Machiavélisme égorgé), Machiavellismus jugulatus*, in which he says, at the start: “Reflecting on the sect of the *Politiques*, I do not know what I should say about it, about what I should keep silent, and by what name I should call it. Shall I designate it as a Polytheism? Yes, no doubt, because the *Politique* respects everything and anything only through political reason. Shall I call it Atheism? This would be just, because the *Politique* has a respect for command that determines the sole *raison d'État*; he changes his color and skin and is capable of more transformations than Proteus. Shall I name it [still this sect of the *Politiques*; M.F.] Statolatry? This would be the fairest name. If in his general indifference the *Politique* respects something, it is in order to give men over to I know not what divinity, God, or Goddess that the ancient Greeks invoked with the name of City, the Romans with the name of Republic or Empire, and people today with the name of State. This is the only divinity of the *Politiques*, this is the most just name by which to designate them.”‡ There is an immense literature and again you will find it in Thuau, and I will give you just the title of a later text, from 1667, which was written by Raymond de Saint-Martin. The title is simply this: *The True Religion in its true light against all the contrary errors of the atheists, libertines, mathematicians and all the others*§ who establish

* Pius V (1504-1572) was elected pope in 1566. The phrase is attributed to him, from the end of the sixteenth century, by many authors. See notably Girolamo Fracetta, *L'Idea del Libro de' governi di Stato e di guerra* (Venice: Damian Zenaro, 1592) p. 44b: “*Ragion di stato* (...) was justly called by Pius V of happy and holy memory, Reason of the Devil.” Other examples are given by R. De Mattei, *Il Problema della “ragion di stato” nell'età della controriforma* (Milan-Naples: R. Ricciardi, 1979) pp. 28-29.

† E. Thuau, *Raison d'État et Pensée politique*, See ch. 3: “L'opposition à la “raison d'enfer”” pp. 103-152.

‡ R. P. Claude Clément (1594-1642/43), *Machiavellismus jugulatus a Christiana Sapientia Hispanica et Austriaca* [The throat of Machiavellianism cut by the Christian Wisdom of Spain and Austria] (Compluti: apud A. Vesquez, 1637) pp. 1-2; quoted by E. Thuau, *Raison d'État et Pensée politique*, pp. 95-96. Foucault slightly modifies the end of the text, which appears in this form: “(...) that the Greeks invoked as the City, the Romans as Republic and Empire, and people today as the State.”

§ Original title: *or others* (instead of “and all the others”).

*Destiny and Fatality, the pagans, Jews, Mohammedans, heretical sects in general, schismatics, Machiavellians and politiques.**

I would like to hold on to three words in these diatribes. First, the word “Machiavelli,” second, the word “*politique*,” and third, of course, the word “state.” Machiavelli first of all. In a previous lecture[†] I tried to show you that the art of government that was so eagerly sought after in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not be found in Machiavelli for the excellent reason that it was not there, and it was not there precisely because Machiavelli’s problem is not the preservation of the state in itself. I think this will be clearer next week when we tackle this problem of *raison d’État* internally. What Machiavelli sought to save, to safeguard, is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which he exercises his domination, that is to say it is a matter of saving the principality as the Prince’s relation of power to his territory or population. So it is something completely different. I do not think there is an art of government in Machiavelli. It remains the case that Machiavelli is at the center of the debate, and my earlier statement that Machiavelli was ultimately rebutted at the time of the art of government should be considerably qualified; things are more complicated and this was ultimately false. He is at the center of the debate with different, sometimes negative, sometimes positive values. In actual fact, he is at the center of the debate throughout this period from 1580 to 1650-1660. He is not at the center of debate insofar as it takes place because of what he said, but insofar as the debate is conducted through him. The debate does not take place because of what he said, and an art of government will not be found through or in him. He did not define an art of government, but an art of government will be looked for in what he said. This phenomenon in which one searches in a discourse for what is taking place, while actually only seeking to force it to say something, is not unique. From this point of view, Marx is our Machiavelli: the discourse does not stem from him, but it is through him that it is conducted.

Well, how is the debate conducted through him? The adversaries of *raison d’État*, the pro-Spanish, anti-Richelieu Catholics, say to the supporters of *raison d’État* and those who are looking for the specificity of an art of government: You claim there is a really autonomous and specific art of government that is different both from the exercise of sovereignty and from pastoral management. But if you take a look, this art of government that you claim exists, that must be found, that is rational, organized for the good of all, and of another type than the laws of God or nature, in actual fact does not exist, it has no substance. At the

* R. P. Raymond de Saint-Martin’s book was published at Montauban in 1667. See E. Thuau, *Raison d’État et Pensée politique*, p. 92 and p. 443.

† See above, lecture of 1 February, pp. 91-92.

most it can only define the Prince's whims or interests. However thoroughly you examine your idea of a specific art of government, you will only ever find Machiavelli. You will only find Machiavelli, that is to say the whims or laws of the Prince. Outside of God, outside of his laws, outside of the great models given by nature, that is to say, ultimately, by God, and outside of the principle of sovereignty, there is nothing, only the Prince's whim, only Machiavelli. At this point Machiavelli plays the role of the counter-example, of critique, of the example of the reduction of the art of government to nothing other than the salvation, not of the state, but of the principality. Governmentality does not exist. This is what the adversaries of *raison d'État* mean when they say: You are only Machiavellians. You will not find this art of government. And on top of all that (this is what Innocent Gentillet, about whom I have already spoken, says*), we can even say that employing Machiavelli's principles is not only not on the track of an art of government, but it is a very bad instrument for the Prince himself who will risk losing his throne and his principality if he applies them.† So, Machiavelli not only allows the reduction of what is being sought in the specificity of *raison d'État*, but he also shows that it is immediately contradictory and harmful. And then, even more radically, there is another argument that consists in saying: Where in fact will we end up when we do without God and the fundamental principle of God's sovereignty over the world, nature, and men in order to seek out a specific form of government? We will end up with the Prince's whims, as I have [already] said, and then also with the impossibility of justifying any form of higher obligation. If you remove God from the system and tell people that one must obey, and that one must obey a government, then in the name of what must one obey? No more God, no more laws. No more God, no more obligations. And there is someone who said: "If God does not exist, everything is permitted." This is not who you think it is.‡ It is the reverend father Contzen in the *Politicorum libri decem*, the *Book of les politiques*, of 1620.§ In 1620 he said**: If God does not exist, everything is permitted. You can see how the appearance of the questions of the state, of governmentality, in mid(-

* Ibid. p. 90.

† E. Thuau, *Raison d'État et Pensée politique*, pp. 62-65.

‡ Foucault is alluding to the famous expression of Ivan Karamazov in Dostoyevski's novel, *The Brothers Karamazov* (1879-80), English translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Farrar, Straus and Gioux), Book 5, ch. 5, "The Grand Inquisitor" p. 263 (see also p. 69).

§ R. P. Adam Contzen, S.J., *Politicorum libri decem, in quibus de perfectae reipublicae forma, vitutibus et vitiis tractatur* (Maguntiae: B. Lippius, 1620) p. 20: "Si Deus non est aut non regit mundum, sine metu sunt omnia scelera" (quoted by E. Thuau, *Raison d'État*, p. 94).

** Foucault adds: in terms [*inaudible word*], since it was in Latin.

nineteenth)* century Russia did not provoke the same question, the same problem† . If God does not exist, everything is permitted. So, God really must exist [... ‡].

As for the supporters of *raison d'État*, some will say: In actual fact, we have nothing to do with Machiavelli. Machiavelli does not give us what we are looking for. Machiavelli is actually no more than a Machiavellian, someone who calculates solely in terms of the Prince's interests, and we deny this and him. So you can see that the objection to Machiavelli comes from two sides. It comes from those who criticize *raison d'État* by saying that in the end it is nothing but Machiavelli; and it comes from the supporters of *raison d'État* who say: What we are actually after has nothing to do with Machiavelli; he can be thrown to the dogs. Among the supporters of *raison d'État*, however, some will pick up the challenge and say: Well yes, Machiavelli, at least Machiavelli of the *Commentaries*,§ if not of *The Prince*, may actually serve us insofar as he tried to identify, without any natural model or theological foundation, the necessary relationships between governors and governed intrinsic to the city. This is the form in which you find some apologists for Machiavelli, obviously not among the adversaries of *raison d'État*, but in some, and only some, of those who are in favor of *raison d'État*. There is Naudé, Richelieu's agent, for example, who writes a work in which he praises Machiavelli,** and there is also, in a paradoxically Christian sense, a book by someone called Machon,†† who explains that Machiavelli is in

* M.F.: seventeenth

† Foucault adds: the same [*inaudible word*]

‡ The end of the sentence is inaudible (last word: a State).

§ Foucault designates by this, of course, Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy* (manuscript, p. 19: "Machiavelli (at least the Machiavelli of the *Commentaries* on T.L.) sought the autonomous principles of the art of government").

** Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653), secretary of the cardinal de Bagni at Rome from 1631-1641, was recalled to France by Richelieu on the latter's death, then became Mazarin's librarian until 1651. Foucault refers to the *Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État*, published under the author's name ("by G. P. N.") in 1639 (reprinted, Hildesheim: Olms, 1993, with introduction and notes by F. Charles-Daubert). This first edition, limited to a dozen copies, was followed in the seventeenth century by several posthumous editions: in 1667, without indication of place ("on the copy of Rome"); in 1673 at Strasbourg, under the title *Sciences des Princes, ou Considérations politiques sur les coups d'État*, with commentaries by Louis De May, secretary of the Elector of Mainz; in 1676 at Paris (republished Bibliothèque de philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen, 1989), etcetera. The 1667 text has been re-edited by Louis Marin (Paris: Éditions de Paris, 1988) with an important introduction, "Pour une théorie baroque de l'action politique." See E. Thuau, *Raison d'État*, pp. 318-334.

†† Louis Machon (1603-?), "Apologie pour Machiavelle en faveur des Princes et des Ministres d'État," 1643, definitive version 1668 (manuscript 935 of the Bibliothèque of the town of Bordeaux). This work, composed in the first place under the impulse of Richelieu, remained unpublished, apart from a fragment representing the first third of the final text, published according to a 1653 manuscript in the introduction to the *Œuvres complètes de Machiavel* by J. A. C. Buchon in 1852 (Paris: Bureau du Panthéon littéraire). See E. Thuau, *Raison d'État*, pp. 334-350 (biographical note, p. 334, n. 2); G. Procacci, *Machiavelli nella cultura europea*, pp. 464-473.

complete conformity with what is found in the Bible.* He does not seek to show that the Bible is full of horrors, but that even in the people led by God and his prophets, there really is an irreducible specificity of government, a certain *ratio status*, a *raison d'État* that functions for itself and outside of any general laws given by God to the world or nature. So, that's it for Machiavelli.†

Second, the word “*politique*.” You have seen that in these diatribes against *raison d'État* we [find] the word “*politique*.” You will have noticed, [first of all], that the word is always used negatively, and [then] that it does not refer to some thing, domain, or type of practice, but to people. These are “*les politiques*.” The *politiques* are a sect, something that smells of or verges on heresy. The word “*politique[s]*” appears then to designate people who share a particular way of thinking, a way of analyzing, reasoning, calculating, and conceiving of what a government must do and on what form of rationality it can rest. In other words, it was not politics (*la politique*) as a domain, set of objectives, or even as a profession or vocation that first appeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth century West, but the *politiques*, or, if you like, a particular way of positing, thinking, and programming the specificity of government in relation to the exercise of sovereignty. As opposed to the juridical-theological problem of the foundation of sovereignty, the *politiques* are those who try to think the form of government rationality for itself. And [it is] just in the middle of the seventeenth century that you see the appearance of politics (*la politique*), of politics understood then as a domain or type of action. You find the word “politics (*la politique*)” in some texts, in particular in the marquis du Chastelet,‡ and also in Bossuet. And you can see that politics is certainly no longer a heresy when

* “My first intention concerning this *Apologie* was to place the text of our *Politique* [Machiavelli] on one side of this book, and those of the Bible, of the doctors of the Church, and of the canonists (...) on the other; and to show, without further reasoning or artifice that this great man wrote nothing that may not be drawn word for word, or at least that may not correspond to all that these learned persons have said before him or approved since (...)” L. Machon, *Apologie*, 1668 texts, pp. 444-448, quoted by K. T. Butler, “Louis Machon’s “Apologie pour Machiavelle”” *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, vol. 3, 1939-40, p. 212.

† The manuscript (p. 20) gives here an exposition on the theory of the contract as a means of “stopping Contzen’s insidious question”: “Even if God does not exist, man is obliged. By whom? By himself.” Taking Hobbes as an example, Foucault adds: “The sovereign instituted in this way, being absolute, will not be bound by anything. He will therefore be able to be fully a “ruler” (*gouvernant*).”

‡ Paul Hay, marquis du Chastelet, *Traité de la politique de France* (Cologne: Pierre du Marteau, 1699). This work, which strongly displeased Louis XIV, was constantly republished until the end of the seventeenth century and was one of the main sources of inspiration for Vauban’s *Dime royale* (1707). Hay du Chastelet defined politics (*la politique*) in this way (enlarged 1677 edition, same editor, p. 13): “*La Politique* is the art of governing states, the ancients said that it was a royal and very divine science, the most excellent and mistress of all the others, and among the practical disciplines they gave it the same advantage that metaphysics and theology have among the speculative disciplines.”

Bossuet speaks of “politics drawn from Holy Scripture.”* Politics ceases being a way of thinking or particular way of reasoning peculiar to some individuals. It really has become a domain, and one that is positively valued insofar as it is fully integrated at the level of institutions, practices, and ways of doing things within the system of sovereignty of the French absolute monarchy. It is precisely Louis XIV who introduces the specificity of *raison d’État* into the general forms of sovereignty. What fixes the absolutely singular place of Louis XIV in this history is precisely that he succeeded in showing, at the level of his practice as well as at the level of the manifest and visible rituals of his monarchy (I will come back to this next week†), the bond and connection between sovereignty and government, and at the same time their specificity and the difference of their level and their form. Louis XIV really is in fact *raison d’État*, and when he says “The State is me,” it is precisely this stitching together of sovereignty and government that is being put forward. At any rate, when Bossuet says “politics drawn from Holy Scripture,” politics thus becomes something that has lost its negative connotations. It has become a domain, a set of objects, a type of organization of power. [Finally], it is drawn from Holy Scripture, which means that reconciliation with the religious pastoral or, at any rate, the modality of relations with the religious pastoral has been established. And if we add that in Bossuet this politics drawn from Holy Scripture leads to the justification of Gallicanism, that is to say that *raison d’État* can be used against the Church, we can see what reversals have been carried out between, on the one hand, the time when anathemas were thrown at the *politiques*, associating them with Mohammedans or heretics, [and], on the other, the bishop of Tours drawing from Holy Scripture the right of Louis XIV to have a politics governed by *raison d’État* that is consequently specific, different from, and indeed opposed to that of the absolute monarchy of the Church. The Empire is indeed dead.

Finally, third, after Machiavelli and politics, the state. (I will be very brief, because I will talk about this at greater length next week.) Obviously, it would be absurd to say that the set of institutions we call the state date from this period of 1580 to 1650. It would be meaningless to say that the state was born then. After all, big armies had already emerged and been organized in France with Francis I. Taxation was established before this, and justice even earlier. So, all these apparatuses

* Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (bishop of Meaux, 1627-1704), *Politique tirée des popres paroles de l’Écriture Sainte* (Paris: Pierre Cot, 1709; critical edition by J. LeBrun, Geneva: Droz, “Les Classiques de la pensée politique,” 1967); English translation by Patrick Riley, *Politics drawn from the Very Words of Holy Scripture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

† Foucault adds: we will try [some inaudible words]

See his comments in the next lecture on the political role of the theater under Louis XIV.

existed. But what is important, what we should hold on to, and what is at any rate a real, specific, and incompressible historical phenomenon is the moment this something, the state, really began to enter into reflected practice. The problem is knowing when, under what conditions, and in what form the state began to be projected, programmed, and developed within this conscious practice, at what moment it became an object of knowledge (*connaissance*) and analysis, when and how it became part of a reflected and concerted strategy, and at what point it began to be called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated. In short, it is the entrance of the state into the field of practice and thought that we should try to grasp.

What I would like to show you, and will try to show you, is how the emergence of the state as a fundamental political issue can in fact be situated within a more general history of governmentality, or, if you like, in the field of practices of power. I am well aware that there are those who say that in talking about power all we do is develop an internal and circular ontology of power, but I say: Is it not precisely those who talk of the state, of its history, development, and claims, who elaborate on an entity through history and who develop the ontology of this thing that would be the state? What if the state were nothing more than a way of governing? What if the state were nothing more than a type of governmentality? What if all these relations of power that gradually take shape on the basis of multiple and very diverse processes which gradually coagulate and form an effect, what if these practices of government were precisely the basis on which the state was constituted? Then we would have to say that the state is not that kind of cold monster in history that has continually grown and developed as a sort of threatening organism above civil society. What we would have to show would be how, from the sixteenth century, a civil society, or rather, quite simply a governmentalized society organized something both fragile and obsessive that is called the state. But the state is only an episode in government, and it is not government that is an instrument of the state. Or at any rate, the state is an episode in governmentality. That's it for today. Next week I will talk more precisely about *raison d'État*.
