

mutuality of all its elements as they enter into operative continuity with each other.

Stelarc and Paffrath, *Obsolete Body*, 153.

Ibid., 70.

Nicholas Negroponte, *Being Digital* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

Stelarc, "Portrait robot," 27, 26.

Ibid.

"Stumbod," Stelarc official Web site, www.stelarc.va.com.au.

Ibid.

5 On the Superiority of the Analog

1 Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation* (Paris: Éd. de la Différence, 1981), 15–18.

2 C. S. Peirce, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 2, 71–72, 246–68. See also Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 65–71, and Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 91, 140–42, 510–13.

3 See Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habbajram (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 17–18, 50–52, and *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 320–21.

4 René Thom, interview, *Le Monde*, 15549 (22–23 January 1995).

5 Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 73–81; Gilbert Simondon, *L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* (Grenoble: Millon, 1995), 263–68; Muriel Combes, *Simondon: Individu et collectivité* (Paris: PUF, 1999), 20–24.

6 In chapter 9 it will be argued, using an example from chaos theory, that no rigid distinction between the living body and inorganic matter is sustainable. Sensation is in the world, which carries its own charge of vitality. The difference between the sensitive capacities of organic and inorganic matter is of transductive mode and degree. It is not a difference in kind.

7 René Thom, interview.

8 In a similar vein, in chapter 8 (in the section entitled "The Argument from Inner Space") it will be argued that the solidity of actual matter and spaces is an emergent property of "a mutual holding in relational stability of incorporeal event spaces."

9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

10 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 406–407, 409–410.

11 Pierre Lévy, *Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age*, trans. Robert Bonnono (New York: Plenum, 1998).

12 William James, "The Feeling of Effort," *Collected Essays and Reviews* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), 151–219.

13 This account of reading is akin to Bakhtin's early account of poetic speech. The speaker, he writes, "sees, hears, evaluates, connects, selects even though there is no actual exertion of the external senses." All of this occurs in "nonactuality," with "only the tension corresponding to this movement." That movement is essentially the "feeling of the activity of connecting": "relational self-activity," "living self-sensation of activity." This expansive, living charge of nonactuality is enveloped in the actual "feeling of verbal activeness": the "feeling of generating the signifying sound." "Included here are all the motor elements—articulation, gesture, facial expression, etc." In reading, the motor elements are reduced to a minimum and short-circuited by being turned in on the body. Reading is prompted, suspended speech: a short-circuiting of communication. The suspension increases the degree of envelopment of the actual in the nonactual and vice versa (intensifies the connection with the virtual). The reader is drawn even further into Bakhtin's intensely activate "inner body" by dint of passivity. The "inner body" is what was termed the "body without an image" in chapter 2. Reading can be considered another way of "rigging" the body without an image. What is unique about developments like the World Wide Web is that they activate the body without an image in a way that intensifies *extensively*—in a manner that is *distributed* across the series of links. The hypertext reader doesn't tarry, she surfs, accumulating effects in the continual move from one to the next rather than by burrowing into the experience of any particular way station. A reader of a poem will tarry over a passage, furrowing his way into level after level of enveloped sense. In hypertext, those levels are laid out horizontally and their envelopmental layering is an effect of movement (dopplering). Digital technologies are capable of bringing the intensity of the virtual into extension: of *actualizing the virtual as such* to an ever increasing, and increasingly expansive, degree. (This is the "actuality of the excess over the actual" referred to at the end of chapter 4.)

Part of the uniqueness of digital technologies is their ability to make intensity *boring* (a potential inherent in extension, even extensions of the virtual). This is evident in video gaming: how more intensely boring can an activity get? What we are experiencing in this transitional period to fuller implantation of digital technology in the social field is the onset of the *everydayness of the virtual*. The banalization of what were once avant-garde artistic strategies is part of that transition. These include strategies of performance (art as event rather than enduring object) and accelerated image turnover and recombina-