

ars, let alone singularities. It targets only the general level, applying not to the event but only to an averaging of the mass of events. It concerns laws of large numbers.

Potential doesn't "apply" to the event either: it makes it. Potential was described in the last chapter as a multiplicity of possibilities materially present to one another, in resonance and interference. Their coming-together is singularly, compulsively felt, so intensely that the sensation cannot be exhausted in one go. Potential strikes like a motor force, a momentum driving a serial unfolding of events. The immanence of that forcing to each event in the series was termed a virtual center. The virtual center is like a reserve of differentiation or qualitative transformation in every event. It is the sufficient reason of the series. The virtual center never appears as such. It is insensate. It cannot be felt. It appears only in the potentials it drives and the possibilities that unfold from their driving: un-felt, it cannot but be felt in its effects. Each event in a serial unfolding is sensible analog of that unexpressed effecting: its sensible (embodied) concept.

Both quantification and qualitative transformation, or analog series formation, involve a deactualization. Deactualizations are modes of thought, defined in the last chapter as a processual excess over the actual. They are not deactualizations in the sense that they erase or replace the actual. Rather, they double and redouble it: augment it. Quantification participates in the mode of thought commonly called instrumental reason (the thinking out of possibilities). Qualification is addressed by what was characterized in the last chapter as operative reason (the tweaking of potential). When most attentive to the virtual, qualification deforms into the topological exercise of *coningent reason* (thought bending back to participate in its own emergence from sensation; imagination, or intuition in Bergson's sense).

The actual occurs at the point of intersection of the possible, the potential, and the virtual: three modes of thought.⁸ The actual is the effect of their momentous meeting, mixing, and re-separation. The meeting and mixing is sensation. Sensation stretches on a continuum from the absolute immanence of virtual center to the far end of potential, where it just extends into possibility. No actuality can be fully imaged, since it emerges from, projects into, and recedes into inactuality. Bodies and objects, their forms and contents, do not account for all of it. They do not catch the momentum. To look only at bodies and objects is to miss the movement.

An image of the movement of the actual's appearing—its driving, dynamic excess over itself—is an image of thought.⁹ An image of thought is an imaging of the imageless. In other words, it is necessarily analogic, incomplete at any and every particular conjunction, complete only in its openness: its continuing. Topology, as a modeling of continuous transformation, can be taken as an image of thought. (For more on topology and the virtual, see chapter 8 below.)

There is another deactualization process in addition to quantification and qualification: *codification*. The digital is a numerically based form of codification (zeros and ones). As such, it is a close cousin to quantification. Digitization is a numeric way of arraying alternative states so that they can be sequenced into a set of alternative routines. Step after ploddingly programmed step. Machinic habit.

"To array alternative states for sequencing into alternative routines." What better definition of the combinatoric of the possible? *The medium of the digital is possibility, not virtuality*, and not even potential. It doesn't bother approximating potential, as does probability. Digital coding per se is possibilistic to the limit.

Nothing is more destructive for the thinking and imaging of the virtual than equating it with the digital. All arts and technologies, as series of qualitative transformations (or in Deleuze and Guattari's involuted evolutionary vocabulary, "machinic phylums"),¹⁰ envelop the virtual in one way or another. Digital technologies in fact have a remarkably weak connection to the virtual, by virtue of the enormous power of their systematization of the possible. They may yet develop a privileged connection to it, far stronger than that of any preceding phylum. But that connection has yet to be invented or, at best, is still an inking. It is the strength of the work of Pierre Lévy (against Baudrillard) to emphasize the participation in the virtual of earlier technologies—in particular writing—and (following Deleuze) to insist on a distinction between the possible and the potential as an integral part of any thinking of the virtual.¹¹ The meeting, mixing, and re-separation of the virtual, the possible, and potential concern the appearance of the actual—its emergence from an imageless interrelating. The actual is an appearance in the sense that its perception (its extension into possible action) is an effect of a process that is itself imperceptible and insensate (but moves through sensation). Equating the digital with the virtual confuses the really apparitional with the artificial. It reduces it to a simulation. This forgets intensity, brackets potential, and in