Malebranche said, imagines the soul going out through the eyes and visiting the objects in the world? This would not even free us from the idea of synthesis since, for example, it is hardly sufficient "to visit" a surface in order to perceive it, for the moments of the journey must be retained and the points of the surface must be linked together. But we have seen that originary perception is a non-thetic, pre-objective, and preconscious experience. Thus, let us say *provisionally* that there is a matter of knowledge that is merely possible. Empty and determinate intentions emerge from each point of the primordial field; by actualizing these intentions, analysis will arrive at the object of science, at sensation as a private phenomenon, and at the pure subject who posits them both. These three terms lie only on the horizon of primordial experience. The reflective ideal of thetic thought will be grounded in the experience of the thing. Thus, reflection only fully grasps itself if it refers to the pre-reflective fund it presupposes, upon which it draws, and that constitutes for it, like an original past, a past that has never been present.

II

SPACE

[Introduction: *Is space a "form" of knowledge?*][1]

290 We have just recognized that analysis is not justified in positing a matter of knowledge as an ideally separable moment, and that this matter, the moment we set it up through an explicit act of reflection, is already related to the world. Reflection does not work backward along a pathway already traveled in the opposite direction by constitution, and the natural reference of the matter to the world leads us to a new conception of intentionality, since the classical conception[2] that treats the experience of the world as a pure act of constituting consciousness only succeeds in doing so to the exact extent that it defines consciousness as absolute non-being, and correspondingly pushes the contents back into an "hyletic layer" that belongs to opaque being. This new intentionality must now be approached more directly by examining the symmetrical notion of a form of perception and, in particular, the notion of space. Kant tried to draw a strict boundary between space as the form of external experience and the things given in that experience. Of course, it is not a question of a relation between a container and its content, since this relation only exists between objects, nor even of a relation of logical inclusion, such as the one that exists between the individual and the class, since space is anterior to its supposed parts, which are always cut out of it. Space is not the milieu (real or logical) in which things are laid out, but rather the

291 means by which the position of things becomes possible. That is, rather than imagining space as a sort of ether in which all things are immersed, or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic they would all share, we must think of space as the universal power of their connections. Thus, either I do not reflect, I live among things, and I vaguely consider space sometimes as the milieu of things, sometimes as their common attribute; or I reflect, I catch hold of space at its source, I think at this moment of the relations that are beneath this word, and I notice in this way that they are only sustained through a subject who traces them out and bears them; I pass from spatialized space to spatializing space. In the first case, my body and things, and their concrete relations according to up and down, right and left, and near and far, can appear to me as an irreducible multiplicity; in the second case, I uncover a unique and indivisible capacity for tracing out space. In the first, I am dealing with physical space and its variously qualified regions; in the second, I am dealing with geometrical space within which dimensions are substitutable, or I have a homogeneous and isotropic spatiality, and in this latter I can at least conceive of a pure change of place that would not modify the moving object in any way, and consequently I can conceive of a pure *position* distinct from the *situation* of the object in its concrete context. We know how muddled this distinction becomes, even on the level of scientific knowledge, in modern conceptions of space. We would here like to confront this distinction, not with the technical instruments adopted by modern physics, but rather with our experience of space, the ultimate authority (according to Kant himself) of all knowledge touching upon space. Is it true that we are faced with the alternative either of perceiving things in space, or else (if we reflect and if we wish to know what our own experiences signify) of conceiving of space as the indivisible system of connecting acts accomplished by a constituting mind? Does not the experience of space establish unity through a synthesis of an entirely different type?

[A. *Up and Down.*][3]

[i. *Orientation is not given with the "content."*]

Let us consider this experience of space prior to any theoretical elaboration. Take, for example, our experience of "up" and "down." We cannot grasp this experience in the everyday course of life, for it is already

concealed beneath its own acquisitions. We must look to some exceptional case in which it breaks down and rebuilds itself before our eyes, such as in the case of vision without retinal inversion. If a subject is made to wear goggles that turn the retinal images upright, then the whole landscape at first appears unreal and inverted. On the second day of the 292 experiment, normal perception begins to be reestablished, except that the subject has the feeling that his own body is inverted.[4] During a second series of experiments lasting eight days,[5] objects initially appear inverted, though not as unreal as the first time. On the second day, the landscape is no longer inverted, but the body is sensed in an abnormal position.[6] From the third day to the seventh day, the body is progressively brought upright and appears to be finally in the normal position, above all when the subject is active. When he is motionless and stretched out on a couch, the body is presented again against the background of its former space, and, for the invisible parts of the body, right and left retain their previous localization throughout the experiment. External objects increasingly have an appearance of "reality." By the fifth day, gestures that were initially thwarted by the new mode of vision, and which needed to be corrected by taking into account the visual disruption, attain their goal without any error. The new visual appearances, which were initially isolated against the background of previously oriented space, soon become surrounded by an horizon that is oriented like them at first (on the third day) through a voluntary effort, and then later (on the seventh day) without any effort at all. On the seventh day, sounds are correctly located if the sonorous object is seen and heard at the same time. If the sonorous object does not appear in the visual field, its location remains uncertain (due to a double representation) or even incorrect. When the goggles are removed at the end of the experiment, objects do not, of course, appear inverted, but they do appear "strange,"[7] while motor reactions are reversed: the subject extends his right hand, for example, when the left one would be required.[8] The psychologist is at first tempted to say[9] that the visual world, after the goggles have been put on, is presented to him precisely as if it had pivoted 180 degrees and is *consequently* inverted for him. Just as the illustrations of a book appear to us as wrong side up if someone has playfully turned it "upside down" while we were looking away, the mass of sensations that constitute the panorama has been turned around and similarly placed "upside down." That other mass of sensations, namely, the tactile world, remains "upright" during this time; it can no longer coincide with the

visual world and, in particular, the subject has two irreconcilable representations of his body: one is given to him through his tactile sensations
293 and through "visual images" that he was able to retain from the time prior to the experiment, the other is that of his present vision, which shows him his body with his "feet in the air." This conflict of images only comes to an end if one of the antagonists disappears. Knowing how a normal situation is reestablished comes down to knowing, then, how the new image of the world and of one's own body can "weaken"[10] or "displace" the other.[11] It is observed that this displacement is more successful to the extent that the subject is more active, for example, as early as the second day when he washes his hands.[12] The experience of movement governed by vision, then, can teach the subject to harmonize the visual and tactile givens. He notices, for example, that the necessary movement for reaching his legs, and which was until then a "downward" movement, is represented in the new visual spectacle by a movement toward what was previously "upward." Observations of this type would at first allow the correction of the unsuitable gestures by taking the visual givens as simple signs to decipher and by translating them into the language of the previous space. Once they had become "habitual,"[13] they would create stable "associations"[14] between the previous directions and the new ones that would, in the end, suppress the former in favor of the latter, which are dominant because they are provided through vision. Once the "upper part" of the visual field, where his legs appear at first, has been frequently identified with what is "down" for touch, the subject soon has no more need of the mediation of a controlled movement in order to pass from one system to the other. His legs come to reside in what he called the "upper part" of his visual field; he does not merely "see" them there, he "senses" them there.[15] And finally: "What had been the old 'upper' position in the field was beginning to have much of the feeling formerly connected with the old 'lower' position, and *vice versa*."[16] As soon as the tactile body links up with the visual body, the region of the visual field where the subject's feet appeared ceases to be defined as "up." This designation returns to the region where the head appears, and the region containing the feet again becomes "down."

294 And yet, this interpretation is unintelligible. The inversion of the landscape followed by the return of normal vision is explained by assuming that up and down are confused and vary according to the apparent direction of the head and the feet *given in the image*, by supposing that they are,

so to speak, indicated in the sensory field by the actual distribution of sensations. But the orientation of the field cannot be given by the contents (head and feet) that appear in it – neither at the outset of the experiment, when the world is "inverted," nor at the end, when it "straightens itself up." For to be able to provide the field with an orientation, these contents would have to themselves have a direction. "Inverted" in itself and "upright" in itself clearly signify nothing. The response will be the following: after putting on the goggles, the visual field appears inverted in relation to the tactile and bodily field, or in relation to the ordinary visual field, of which we say, through a nominal definition, that they are "upright." But the same question arises with regard to these standard fields: their mere presence does not suffice in order to provide any direction whatever. Among things, two points are sufficient for defining a direction. Only we are not among things. We still have nothing but sensory fields, which are not agglomerations of sensations placed in front of us, sometimes "right side up," sometimes "upside down," but rather systems of appearances whose orientation varies over the course of experience, even when there is no change in the constellation of stimuli. And the question is precisely what happens when these floating appearances suddenly drop anchor and become situated within the relation between "up" and "down," either at the outset of the experiment, when the tactile and bodily field appears "upright" and the visual field "inverted," or in what follows when the former is inverted while the latter straightens up, or finally at the end of the experiment when both are more or less "upright." The oriented world, or oriented space, cannot be taken as given with the contents of sensory experience or with the body in itself, since experience in fact shows that the same contents can, one by one, be oriented in one sense or another, and that the objective relations, recorded upon the retina by the position of the physical image, do not determine our experience of "up" or "down." The question is precisely how an object can appear to us as "upright" or "inverted," and what these words mean.

[ii. *But neither is orientation constituted by the activity of the mind.*]*

This problem does not only arise for an empiricist psychology that treats the perception of space as our reception of a real space, and the phe-
295 nomenal orientation of objects as a reflection in us of their orientation

in the world; it also arises for an intellectualist psychology for which the "upright" and the "inverted" are relations and depend on the reference points to which one relates. Just as the chosen axis of coordinates, whatever it might be, is still only situated in space through its relations with another reference point, and so on and so forth, so too is the articulation of the world indefinitely deferred. "Up" and "down" lose all assignable sense, unless, through an impossible contradiction, we grant certain contents the power to set themselves up in space, which brings back empiricism and all of its difficulties. It is easy to show that a direction can only exist for a subject who traces it out, and although a constituting mind eminently has the power to trace out all directions in space, in the present moment this mind has no direction and, consequently, it has no space, for it is lacking an actual starting point or an absolute here that could gradually give a direction [*sens*] to all the determinations of space. Intellectualism, as much as empiricism, fails to reach the problem of oriented space because it cannot even ask the question; along with empiricism, the question was to determine how the image of the world that, in itself, is inverted, could straighten itself up for me. Intellectualism cannot even admit that the image of the world is inverted after the goggles are put on. For a constituting mind, there is nothing that distinguishes the two experiences before and after the goggles are put on; or again, nothing that makes the visual experience of the "inverted" body and the tactile experience of the "upright" body incompatible, since the mind does not consider the spectacle from *anywhere*, and since all of the objective relations of the body and the surroundings are preserved in the new spectacle. Thus, the problem is clear: empiricism would willingly assume, through the actual orientation of my bodily experience, this fixed point we need if we wish to understand that there are directions for us – but experience and reflection at once show that no content is in itself oriented. Intellectualism begins from this relativity between up and down, but cannot emerge from it in order to account for an actual perception of space. We cannot, then, understand the experience of space through the consideration of the contents, nor through that of a pure activity of connecting, and we are confronted by that third spatiality that we foreshadowed above, which is neither the spatiality of things in space, nor that of spatializing space, and which, as such, escapes the Kantian analysis and is presupposed by it. We need an absolute within the relative, a
296 space that does not skate over appearances, that is anchored in them and

depends upon them, but that, nevertheless, is not given with them in the realist manner, and that can, as Stratton's experiment shows, survive their upheaval. We must seek the originary experience of space prior to the distinction between form and content.

[iii. *The spatial level, anchorage points, and existential space.*]

If a situation is constructed in which a subject only sees the room he is in through the intermediary of a mirror reflecting the room at a 45° angle from the vertical, then the subject at first sees the room as "oblique." A man moving through the room seems to lean to the side as he walks. A piece of cardboard falling along the doorframe appears to fall diagonally. The whole thing is "strange." After a few minutes, a sudden change takes place: the walls, the man moving through the room, and the direction of the falling cardboard all become vertical.[17] This experiment – which is analogous to Stratton's – has the advantage of revealing an instantaneous redistribution of up and down without any motor exploration. We already knew that there was no sense in saying that the oblique (or inverted) image brings with it a new localization of up and of down that we could gain knowledge of through a motor exploration of the new spectacle. But we now see that this exploration is not even necessary, and that consequently the orientation is constituted by an overall act of the perceiving subject. Let us say that perception accepts, prior to the experiment, a certain *spatial level*[18] in relation to which the experimental spectacle at first appears oblique, and that, during the experiment, this spectacle induces another level in relation to which the whole of the visual field can, once again, appear upright. Everything happens as if certain objects (the walls, the doors, and the body of the man in the room), determined as oblique in relation to the given level, aspired by themselves to provide the privileged directions, attracted the vertical to themselves, played the role of "anchorage points,"[19] and caused the previously established level to tilt.

We do not here fall into the realist error of assuming directions in space as given with the visual spectacle, since the experimental spectacle is only (obliquely) oriented for us in relation to a certain level, and since it does not itself give us the new directions of up and down. It remains to be shown precisely what this level is that always precedes itself, every constitution of a level presupposing another preestablished level, pre- 297
cisely how the "anchorage points" invite us to constitute another space in

the midst of a certain space to which they owe their stability, and finally, precisely what "up" and "down" are, if not simple names for designating an orientation of sensory content in itself. Rather, our claim is that the "spatial level" does not merge with the orientation of one's own body. Although the consciousness of one's own body undoubtedly contributes to the constitution of the level – one subject, whose head is tilted, places a string on an angle that he had been asked to place vertically[20]– it is, in this function, in competition with the other sectors of experience, and the vertical only tends to follow the direction of the head if the visual field is empty, and if the "anchorage points" are absent, such as when one moves about in the dark. As a mass of tactile, labyrinthine, and kinesthetic givens, the body has no more precise an orientation than other contents, and it itself receives this orientation from the general level of experience. Wertheimer's observation shows precisely how the visual field can impose an orientation that is not the orientation of the body.

But even if the body, considered as a mosaic of given sensations, does not trace out any direction, the body as an agent, on the contrary, plays an essential role in establishing a level. Variations in muscular tonus, even with a full visual field, modify the apparent vertical to the extent that the subject leans his head in order to place it parallel to this altered vertical.[21] We might be tempted to say that the vertical is the direction defined by the axis of symmetry of our body, considered as a synergetic system. But my body can nevertheless move without dragging along with it the orientations of up and down, such as when I lie on the ground, and Wertheimer's experiment shows that the objective direction of my body can form an appreciable angle with the apparent vertical of the spectacle. What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal "place" is defined by its task and by its situation. My body is wherever it has something to do. The moment that Wertheimer's subject takes up a place within the apparatus prepared for him, the area of his possible actions – such as walking, opening an armoire, using the table, or sitting – sketches out
298 in front of him a possible habitat, even if his eyes are closed. At first, the mirror image presents a differently oriented room, that is, the subject is not geared to the utensils it contains, he does not inhabit the room, he does not live with the man he sees moving about. After several minutes, and provided that he does not reinforce the initial anchorage by glancing

away from the mirror, that miracle takes place: the reflected room conjures up a subject capable of living in it. This virtual body displaces the real body, so much so that the subject no longer feels himself to be in the world he is actually in, and that, rather than his genuine legs and arms, he feels the legs and arms required for walking and acting in the reflected room – he inhabits the spectacle. And this is when the spatial level shifts and is established in its new position. The spatial level is, then, a certain possession of the world by my body, a certain *hold* my body has on the world. In the absence of anchorage points, and so projected solely by my body's attitude (as in Nagel's experiments), and determined solely by the demands of the spectacle when the body is inattentive (as in Wertheimer's experiment), the spatial level normally appears at the intersection of my motor intentions and my perceptual field, that is, when my actual body comes to coincide with the virtual body that is demanded by the spectacle, and when the actual spectacle comes to coincide with the milieu that my body projects around itself. It sets itself up when, between my body as the power of certain gestures and as the demand for certain privileged planes, and the perceived spectacle as the invitation to these very gestures and as the theater of these very actions, a pact is established that gives me possession[22] of space and gives to the things a direct power upon my body. The constitution of a spatial level is only one of the means of the constitution of an integrated world. My body is geared into the world when my perception provides me with the most varied and the most clearly articulated spectacle possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they anticipate from the world. This maximum of clarity in perception and action specifies a perceptual *ground*, a background for my life, a general milieu for the coexistence of my body and the world.

With the concept of the spatial level, and that of the body as the subject of space, phenomena that Stratton described but did not explain can now be understood. If the "straightening up" of the field resulted from a series of associations between the new and the former positions, how could the operation appear to be systematic, and how could entire sections of the perceptual horizon come to be connected, all at once, to the objects already "straightened up"? If, however, the new orienta- 299
tion resulted from an operation of thought and consisted in a change of coordinates, how could the auditory or tactile fields resist this transposition? The subject would have to be, by some miracle, divided with himself and capable of ignoring here what he is doing elsewhere.[23] If the

transposition is systematic, and yet partial and progressive, this is because I go from one system of positions to the other without having the key of either and in the manner that a man without any musical knowledge sings a tune he has heard at a different pitch. The possession of a body brings with it the power of changing levels and of "understanding" space, just as the possession of a voice brings with it the power of changing pitches. The perceptual field rights itself and at the end of the experiment I identify it without any reflection because I live within it, because I carry myself into the new spectacle entirely, and because I locate my center of gravity, so to speak, within it.[24] At the beginning of the experiment, the visual field appears simultaneously inverted and *unreal* because the subject does not live in this field and is not geared into it. An intermediary phase is observed during the experiment in which the tactile body appears inverted and the landscape upright because, since I am already living within the landscape, I thereby perceive it as upright, and because the experimental perturbation is shifted onto one's own body which is thereby not a mass of actual sensations, but rather the body that is required for perceiving a given spectacle. Everything points to the organic relations between the subject and space, to this gearing of the subject into his world that is the origin of space.

[iv. *Being has sense only through its orientation.*]

But one will want to push this analysis further. Why, it will be asked, are clear perception and confident action only possible in an oriented
300 phenomenal space? This is only evident if one imagines the subject of perception and of action faced with a world in which there are already absolute directions, such that he has to adjust the dimensions of his behavior to the dimensions of the world. But we are placing ourselves within perception, and we are wondering just how it could gain access to absolute directions; and so we cannot assume that they are given in the genesis of our spatial experience.

—This objection amounts to saying what we have been saying since the beginning: that the constitution of a level always presupposes another given level, that space always precedes itself. But this comment is not the mere observation of a failure. It teaches us the essence of space and the only method that allows us to understand it. Space is essentially always "already constituted," and we will never understand space by withdrawing into a worldless perception. We must not ask why being is oriented, why existence is spatial, why (in the language used above) our body is not geared into the world in all of its positions, and why its coexistence with the world polarizes experience and makes a direction appear suddenly. The question could only be asked if these facts were accidents that befall a subject and an object that were themselves indifferent to space. Perceptual experience shows us, however, that these facts are presupposed in our primordial encounter with being, and that being is synonymous with being situated. For the thinking subject, a face seen "right side up" and the same face seen "upside down" are identical. For the subject of perception, the face seen "upside down" is unrecognizable. If someone is stretched out on a bed and if I look at him while standing at the head of the bed, for a moment the face is normal. There is, of course, a certain disorder in its features, and I have difficulty understanding the smile as a smile, but I sense that I could walk around the bed and I see through the eyes of a spectator placed at the foot of the bed. If the spectacle continues, it suddenly changes in appearance: the face becomes monstrous, its expressions become frightening, the eyelids and eyebrows take on an air of materiality that I had never before found them to have. For the first time I genuinely see this inverted face as if this were its "natural" position. I have before me a pointed and hairless head, bearing on its forehead a blood-red orifice, full of teeth, and where the mouth should be, two moving eyeballs surrounded by glossy hairs and underlined by heavy brushes. It will probably be objected that the "upright" face, among all the possible aspects of a face, is the one that is given most frequently and 301
that the inverted face surprises me because I only see it rarely. But faces are rarely presented in a rigorously vertical position, the "upright" face enjoys no statistical advantage, and the question is precisely why, under these conditions, it is presented to me more often than another. If it is granted that my perception privileges it and refers to it as if to a norm for reasons of symmetry, then the question arises as to why, beyond a certain angle, the "straightening up" does not work. My gaze, which scans the face and which has its preferred directions of moving, must only recognize the face if it encounters the details in a certain irreversible order; the very sense of the object – in this case, the face and its expressions – must be connected to its orientation, as is shown clearly enough through the double meaning of the word *sense* [*sens*].[25] Turning an object upside down strips it of its signification. Its being as an object is thus not a

being-for-the-thinking-subject, but rather a being-for-the-gaze that encounters it from a certain angle or otherwise fails to recognize it. This is why each object has "its" top and "its" bottom, which for a given level indicate its "natural" place, the place that it "should" occupy. To see a face is not to form the idea of a certain law of constitution that the object would invariably observe in all possible orientations. Rather, it is to have a certain hold on it, to be able to follow a certain perceptual itinerary along its surface, with its ups and its downs. And if I take this route in the reverse direction [*sens*], it is just as unrecognizable as is the mountain up which I just struggled when I turn to descend with long strides.

In general, if the subject of perception were not this gaze that only has a hold on things for a particular orientation of things, then our perception would not be composed of contours, shapes, backgrounds, and objects, consequently it would not be perception of anything and, in short, it would not exist at all. An orientation in space is not a contingent property of the object, it is the means by which I recognize the object and by which I am conscious of it as an object. Of course, I can be conscious of the same object in different orientations, and, as we said above, I can even recognize an inverted face. But this is always on condition of adopting a definite attitude in thought when confronted with the face, and sometimes we even adopt this attitude in reality, as when we tilt our head in order to see a photograph held up by someone sitting next to us. Thus, since every conceivable being relates directly or indirectly to the perceived world, and since the perceived world is only grasped through
302 orientation, we cannot dissociate being from oriented being; there is no reason to "ground" space or to ask what is the level of all levels. The primordial level is on the horizon of all of our perceptions, but this is an horizon that, in principle, can never be reached and thematized in an explicit perception. Each level in which we live in turn appears when we drop anchor in some "milieu" that is offered to us. This milieu is itself only defined spatially for a previously given level. Thus, each of our experiences in sequence, back to and including the first, passes forward an already acquired spatiality. Our first perception in turn could only have been spatial by referring itself to an orientation that preceded it.

Thus, our perception must already find us at work in a world. Nevertheless, this could not be a *particular* world, a *particular* spectacle, since we have placed ourselves at the origin of everything. The first spatial level could not find its anchorage points *anywhere*, since these would have

needed a level before the first level in order to be determinate in space. And since, nevertheless, it cannot be oriented "in itself," my first perception and my first hold on the world must appear to me as the execution of a more ancient pact established between X and the world in general; my history must be the sequel to a pre-history whose acquired results it uses; my personal existence must be the taking up of a pre-personal tradition. There is, then, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists before I am there, and who marks out my place in that world. This captive or natural mind is my body, not the momentary body that is the instrument of my personal choices and that focuses upon some world, but rather the system of anonymous "functions" that wraps each particular focusing into a general project. And this blind adhesion to the world, this prejudice in favor of being does not merely occur at the beginning of my life. It gives every subsequent perception its sense, and it is started over at each moment. At the core of the subject, space and perception in general mark the fact of his birth, the perpetual contribution of his corporeality, and a communication with the world more ancient than thought. And this is why they saturate consciousness and are opaque to reflection. The lability of levels gives not merely the intellectual experience of disorder, but also the living experience of vertigo and nausea,[26] which is the consciousness of, and the horror caused by, our contingency. 303
The positing of a level is the forgetting of this contingency, and space is established upon our facticity. Space is neither an object, nor an act of connecting by the subject: one can neither observe it (given that it is presupposed in every observation), nor see it emerging from a constitutive operation (given that it is of its essence to be already constituted); and this is how space can magically bestow upon the landscape its spatial determinations without itself ever appearing.

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[B. Depth.]

[1. Depth and breadth.]

Classical conceptions of perception agree in denying that depth is visible. Berkeley shows that depth could not be presented to vision for lack

of being able to be recorded, since our retinas only receive a markedly flat projection from the spectacle. If one objected to Berkeley that after the critique of the "constancy hypothesis" we can no longer judge what we see by what is portrayed on our retinas, he would surely respond that, whatever the case may be with the retinal image, depth cannot be seen because it is not spread out before our eyes and it only appears to us through foreshortening. For reflective analysis, depth is in fact invisible for an *in principle* reason: even if it could be inscribed upon our eyes, the sensory impression could merely offer a multiplicity to be surveyed and in this way distance, like all other spatial relations, only exists for a subject who synthesizes it and who conceives it. As opposed as these two doctrines are, they imply the same repression of our actual experience. In both cases, depth is tacitly assimilated to *breadth considered in profile*, and this is what makes it invisible. If made fully explicit, Berkeley's argument is more or less this very argument. What I call depth is, in fact, a juxtaposition of points comparable according to breadth. Only I am poorly situated to see it. I would see the depth if I were in the place of a lateral spectator, who can see at once the series of objects arrayed before me, whereas for me they conceal each other – or who is in a position to see the distance between my body and the first object, whereas for me this
304 distance is condensed into a point. What makes depth invisible for me is precisely what makes it visible for the spectator under the aspect of breadth: the juxtaposition of simultaneous points along a single direction, namely, the direction of my gaze. The depth that is declared invisible is thus a depth already identified with breadth, and without this condition, the argument would not have even a semblance of consistency. Similarly, intellectualism can only make a thinking subject who accomplishes the synthesis of depth appear in the experience of depth because it reflects upon an actualized depth, upon a juxtaposition of simultaneous points, which is not depth as it presents itself to me, but rather depth for a spectator placed laterally, or, in other words, breadth.[27] By immediately assimilating depth and breadth, both philosophies assume as self-evident the result of a constitutive labor whose phases we must, on the contrary, retrace. In order to treat depth as a breadth considered in profile and to arrive at an isotropic space, the subject must leave his place, his point of view upon the world, and conceive of himself in a sort of ubiquity. For God, who is everywhere, breadth is immediately equivalent to depth. Intellectualism and empiricism do not give us an account of a

human experience of the world; they say of human experience what God might think of the world. And surely it is the world itself that invites us to substitute dimensions and to think of it from nowhere.

Indeed, everyone concedes the equivalence of depth and breadth without the least hesitation; it belongs to the intersubjective evidentness of the world, and it is what allows philosophers, just like other men, to forget the originality of depth. But we do not yet know of anything about the world or about objective space; we are attempting to describe the phenomenon of the world, that is, its birth for us in this field into which each perception puts us, where we are still alone, where others will only appear later, where knowledge and particularly science have not yet reduced and leveled out the individual perspective. We must gain access to a world through this individual perspective, and by way of it. Thus, this must first be described. Depth, more directly than the other dimensions of space, obliges us to reject the unquestioned belief in the world and to uncover the primordial experience from where this prejudice springs forth. Of all the dimensions, depth is, so to speak, the most 305
"existential," because – and this is what holds true in Berkeley's argument – it is not indicated upon the object itself, it clearly belongs to perspective and not to things. It can, then, neither be extracted from the perspective, nor even placed there by consciousness. It announces a certain indissoluble link between the things and me by which I am situated in front of them, whereas breadth can, at first glance, pass for a relation between things themselves in which the perceiving subject is not implicated. By uncovering the vision of depth, that is, a depth that is not yet objectified and constituted of mutually external points, we will again overcome the classical alternatives and clarify the relation between the subject and the object.

[ii. *The alleged signs of depth are in fact motives.*]

Here is my table, and *further away* is the piano, or the wall; or again, a car parked in front of me is started up and *moves away*. What do these words mean? In order to reawaken perceptual experience, let us begin from the superficial account of this experience given to us by the thinking that remains obsessed with the world and with the object. These words, it says, signify that between the table and myself there is an interval, and between the car and myself an increasing interval that I cannot see from

where I am, but that is indicated to me through the apparent size of the object. It is the apparent size of the table, the piano, and the wall that, compared to their real size, organizes them in space. When the automobile slowly rises toward the horizon while simultaneously diminishing in size, in order to account for this appearance I construct a change of place according to breadth such as I would perceive it were I to observe it from above in an airplane, and this is what the full sense of depth ultimately consists in. But I have additional signs of distance. As an object approaches, my eyes, which focus upon it, converge more and more. The distance is the height of a triangle whose base and the angles formed at the base are given to me and, when I say that I see at a distance, I mean that the height of the triangle is determined by its relations with these given sizes.[28]

According to classical theories, the experience of depth consists in decoding certain given facts – the convergence of the eyes, the apparent size of the image – by putting them back into the context of objective relations that explain them. But if I can work back from the apparent size to its signification, this is only on condition of knowing that there is a world of unchanging objects, that my body is before this world as if before a mirror, and that, like the mirror image, the image that is formed
306 upon the body-screen is exactly proportional to the interval that separates it from the object. If I can understand convergence as a sign of distance, this is on condition of imagining my gaze being like the blind man's two canes, as more inclined toward each other insofar as the object is closer;[29] in other words, on condition of inserting my eyes, my body, and the external world into a single objective space. The "signs" that, by hypothesis, should have introduced us to the experience of space can thus only signify space if they are already caught up in space and if space is already known. Since perception is the initiation to the world and since, as has been insightfully put, "there is nothing prior to perception that could be called mind,"[30] we cannot import objective relations into perception that are not yet constituted at its level. This is why the Cartesians spoke of a "natural geometry." The signification of apparent size and of convergence, that is, distance, cannot yet be spread out and thematized. Apparent size and convergence themselves cannot be given in a system of objective relations. "Natural geometry" or "natural judgment" are myths in the Platonic sense, destined to represent the envelopment or the "implication" of a signification in signs (of which neither is yet

posited or conceived), and this is what we must come to understand by returning to perceptual experience. Apparent size and convergence must be described, not as they are known by scientific knowledge, but as we grasp them from within. Gestalt psychology observed that they are not explicitly known in perception itself – I have no explicit awareness of the convergence of my eyes or of apparent size while I perceive at a distance, they are not in front of me in the manner of perceived facts – and that nevertheless they intervene in the perception of distance, as the stereoscope and perspectival illusions show quite clearly.[31] From this, psychologists conclude that they are not signs, but rather conditions or causes of depth. We observe that organization in depth appears when a certain size of the retinal image or a certain degree of convergence is objectively 307
produced in the body; this is a law comparable to physical laws; it merely needs to be recorded, nothing more. But here the psychologist shirks his task: when he recognizes that apparent size and convergence are not present as objective facts in perception itself, he brings us back to the pure description of phenomena prior to the objective world, and he lets us catch a glimpse of a lived depth that is independent of all geometry. And this is when he interrupts the description in order to put himself back into the world and to derive organization in depth from a chain of objective facts. Can the description be restricted in this way? And, once the phenomenal order has been recognized as an original order, can the production of phenomenal depth be reassigned to a cerebral alchemy of which experience would be simply the registering of its results? There are two possibilities: either, following behaviorism, one refuses all sense to the word "experience," and one attempts to construct perception as a product of the scientific world, or one concedes that experience itself also gives us access to being, but then one cannot treat it as a by-product of being. Experience is either nothing, or it must be total.

Let us try to imagine what an organization in depth, produced by the physiology of the brain, might be. For an apparent size and a given convergence, a functional structure would appear somewhere in the brain homologous with the organization in depth. But in any case this would merely be a given depth, a factual depth, and would still need to be brought to consciousness. To have the experience of a structure is not to receive it passively in itself: it is to live it, to take it up, to assume it, and to uncover its immanent sense. An experience, then, cannot be tied to certain factual conditions as if to its cause,[32] and, if a consciousness of

distance is produced for a certain value of convergence and for a certain size of the retinal image, it can only depend upon these factors insofar as they figure within it. Since we do not have any *explicit* experience of them, we must conclude that we have a non-thetic experience of them. Convergence and apparent size are neither signs nor causes of depth: they
308 are present in the experience of depth, just as the motive – even when it is not articulated and separately thematized – is present in the decision. What is meant by a motive, and what does one mean when it is said, for example, that a journey is motivated? This means that the journey has its origin in certain given facts, not that these facts by themselves have the physical power to produce the journey, but insofar as they offer reasons for undertaking it. The motive is an antecedent that only acts through its sense, and it must even be added that it is the decision that confirms this sense as valid and that gives it its force and its efficacy. Motive and decision are two elements of a situation: the first is the situation as a fact; the second is the situation taken up. Thus a death motivates my journey *because* it is a situation in which my presence is required, whether to comfort a grieving family or to pay my "final respects" to the departed; and by deciding to undertake this journey, I validate this motive that is proposed and I take up this situation. The relation between motivating and motivated is thus reciprocal. Now, the relation that exists between the experience of convergence or of apparent size and the experience of depth is surely of this sort. They do not miraculously reveal, as "causes," the organization in depth; rather, they tacitly motivate this organization insofar as they already contain it within their sense and insofar as each of them is already a certain way of seeing at a distance. We have already seen that the convergence of the eyes is not the cause of depth, and that it itself presupposes an orientation toward the object at a distance. Let us now emphasize the notion of apparent size.

[iii. *Analysis of apparent size.*]*

If we gaze for a long time at an illuminated object that will leave an enduring image behind it, and if we then focus on screens placed at different distances, the after-image is projected upon them according to an apparent diameter that is proportionally larger as the screen is farther away.[33] The enormous moon at the horizon has long been explained by the large number of interposed objects that could render the distance

more perceptible and could *thereby* increase the apparent diameter. This is to say that the phenomenon "apparent size" and the phenomenon of distance are two moments of the overall organization of the field, that the former is to the latter neither in the relation of sign to signification, nor in the relation of cause to effect, and that, like the motivating and the motivated, they communicate through their sense. Apparent size as lived, rather than being the sign or indication of a depth that is itself invisible, is nothing other than a way of expressing our vision of depth. 309
Gestalt theory has, in fact, contributed to showing that the apparent size of an object that is moving away does not vary like the retinal image, and that the apparent form of a disc that is turning around one of its diameters does not vary as anticipated according to the geometrical perspective. The object moving into the distance diminishes less quickly, and the approaching object increases less quickly for my perception than does the physical image on my retina. This is why the train that approaches us in a film gets larger much more than it would in reality. This is why a hill that seemed quite elevated becomes insignificant in a photograph. Finally, this is why a disc placed diagonally in relation to our face resists the geometrical perspective, as Cézanne and other painters have shown in representing a soup plate in profile with the inside remaining visible. They were right to say that, if these perspectival deformations were given to us explicitly, we would not have to learn perspective.

But Gestalt theory talks as if the distortion of the diagonally placed plate were a compromise between the form of the plate seen straight on and the geometrical perspective, as if the apparent size of the object moving away were a compromise between its apparent size when within reach and its much smaller apparent size assigned to it by the geometrical perspective. They talk as if the constancy of form or size were a real constancy; as if there were, beyond the physical image of the object on the retina, a "psychical image" of the same object that could remain relatively constant when the physical image varies. In fact, the "psychical image" of the ashtray is neither larger nor smaller than the physical image of the same object on my retina, for there is no psychical image that can be, like a thing, compared to the physical image that has a determinate size in relation to it, and that acts as a screen between me and the thing. My perception does not turn toward a content of consciousness: rather, it turns toward the ashtray itself. The apparent size of the perceived ashtray is not a measurable size. When I am asked to specify the diameter

I see it as having, I cannot respond to the question so long as I keep both of my eyes open. I spontaneously close one eye, grab a measuring instrument, such as a pencil held at arm's length, and I mark on the pencil the size [of the visual field] cut off by the ashtray. By doing this, I must not simply say that I reduce the perceived perspective to the geometrical one,
310 that I change the proportions of the spectacle, that I make the object seem smaller if it is far off, or that I enlarge it if it is nearby. Rather, it must be said that by breaking apart the perceptual field, by isolating the ashtray, and by positing it in itself, I have revealed the size within something that, until then, had no size. The constancy of apparent size in an object that is moving away is not the actual permanence of a particular psychical image of the object that would resist perspectival deformations, like a rigid object that resists pressure. The constancy of a plate's circular form is not the circle's resistance to a flattening perspective, and this is why the painter, who can only represent it by a real trace upon a real canvas, amazes the public, even though he seeks to present the lived perspective. When I see a road in front of me that recedes toward the horizon, I must not say that the edges of the road are presented to me as convergent, nor that they are presented to me as parallel: they are *parallel in depth*. The perspectival appearance is not posited, but no more so is the parallelism. I *am directed toward the road itself*, through its virtual deformation, and depth is this very intention that thematizes neither the perspectival projection of the road, nor the "real" road.

– Nevertheless, is not a man two hundred paces away *smaller* than a man five paces away? – He becomes smaller if I isolate him from the perceived context and if I measure the apparent size. Otherwise he is neither smaller, nor for that matter equal in size: he is prior to the equal and unequal, he is *the same man seen from farther away*. All that can be said is that the man at two hundred paces is a less articulated figure, that he offers my gaze fewer and less precise "holds," that he is less strictly geared into my exploratory power. It can also be said that he occupies my visual field less completely, so long as we recall that the visual field is not itself a measurable area. To say that an object occupies a small part of my visual field is to say in the final analysis that it does not offer a rich enough configuration to exhaust my power of clear vision. My visual field has no definite capacity, and it can certainly contain more or fewer things to the extent that I see them "from far away" or "from up close." Apparent size, then, cannot be defined independently of distance: apparent size is implied

by distance just as much as it implies distance. Convergence, apparent size, and distance are read in each other, symbolize or signify each other naturally, are the abstract elements of a situation within which they are synonymous with each other, not because the subject of perception thematizes objective relations between them, but rather because he does not thematize them separately and thus has no need of explicitly reconnecting them. Consider the different "apparent sizes" of the object that is 311
moving away: it is not necessary to reconnect them through a synthesis if none of them has been made the object of a thesis. We "have" the object that is moving away, we do not cease "to hold" it and to keep a hold on it, and the increasing distance is not, as breadth appeared to be, an exteriority that increases. Rather, the increasing distance merely expresses that the thing begins to slip away from the hold of our gaze, and that it joins with it less strictly. Distance is what distinguishes this sketched-out hold from the complete hold we call proximity. Thus, we define distance as we have above defined the "straight" and the "oblique," namely, through the situation of the object with regard to the power of our hold on it.

[iv. *Illusions are not constructions, the sense of the perceived is motivated.*]

Above all, the illusions touching upon depth have accustomed us to considering depth as a construction of the understanding. They can be induced by forcing the eyes into a certain degree of convergence, such as with the stereoscope, or by presenting a perspectival drawing to the subject. Since here I believe I see depth where there is none, is it not because false signs have brought about an hypothesis, and because in general the alleged vision of distance is always in fact an interpretation of signs? But the presupposition is clear: it being assumed that it is impossible to see what does not exist, and that vision is thus defined by the sensory impression, the original relation of motivating is missed and is replaced by a relation of signification. We have seen that the disparity between retinal images that brings about the convergence movement does not exist in itself; disparity only exists for a subject who seeks to fuse the monocular phenomena of the same structure, and who tends toward synergy. The unity of binocular vision, and along with it the depth without which this unity could not be realized, is thus there from the moment the monocular images are presented as "disparate." When I place myself in front of the stereoscope, a totality is presented in which

the possible order already takes shape and is already sketched out. My motor response takes up this situation. Cézanne said that the painter in front of his "motive" is about to "join together nature's straying hands."[34] The focusing movement when looking through the stereoscope is also a response to the question posed by the givens, and this response is enveloped within the question. It is the field itself that is oriented toward the most perfect symmetry possible, and depth is nothing but a moment of the perceptual faith in a unique thing. The perspectival drawing is not at first seen as a sketch on a plane, and subsequently arranged in depth. The
312 lines that recede toward the horizon are not at first given as diagonal, and subsequently conceived as horizontal lines. The whole drawing seeks its equilibrium by hollowing out into depth. The poplar along the road that is drawn smaller than a man only succeeds in genuinely becoming a tree by receding toward the horizon. It is the drawing itself that tends toward depth, like a falling stone that falls downward. If symmetry, plenitude, and determination can be obtained in several ways, then the organization will not be stable, as is seen in ambiguous drawings.

Such is the case in Figure 5, which one can perceive as a cube seen from below (with the face ABCD in front), as a cube seen from above (with the face EFGH in front), or finally as a mosaic of tiles consisting of ten triangles and one square. Figure 6, however, will almost inevitably be seen as a cube because that is the only organization that will put it into perfect symmetry.[35] Depth is born before my gaze because my gaze attempts to see *something*. But what is this perceptual genius at work in our visual field that always tends toward the more determinate? Are we not returning to realism? Let us consider an example. The organization according to depth is destroyed if I add to an ambiguous drawing not just any lines whatsoever (Figure 7 certainly remains a cube), but rather lines which break apart the elements of one plane and connect them to the elements of other planes (Figure 5).[36] What do we mean by saying that these lines themselves carry out the destruction of the depth? Are we not echoing associationism? We do not mean that the line EH (Figure 5), acting as a cause, breaks up the cube into which it is introduced, but rather that it induces a grasp of the whole that is no longer a grasp according
313 to depth. It is clear that the line EH itself only possesses an individuality if I grasp it as such, if I myself look it over and trace it out. But this grasp and this glancing over of the line are not arbitrary. They are indicated or recommended by the phenomena. The demand here is not a royal decree,



Figure 5



Figure 6


Figure 7

since it is indeed a question of an ambiguous figure, but in a normal visual field the segregation of planes and contours is irresistible, and, for example, when I walk along the boulevard, I am unable to see the intervals between the trees as things and trees themselves as the background. It is certainly I who have the experience of the landscape, but I am aware in this experience of taking up a factual situation, of gathering together a sense that is scattered throughout the phenomena, and of saying what they themselves want to say.[37] Even in cases where the organization is ambiguous and where I can make it shift, I do not achieve this directly: for the cube, one of its faces only shifts to the foreground if first I look at it and if my gaze leaves it in order to follow the edges to find the second face as an indeterminate background. If I see Figure 5 as a mosaic of tiles, this is only on condition of first bringing my gaze to the center, and subsequently distributing it equally across the whole figure at once. Just as Bergson waits for the morsel of sugar to dissolve, I am sometimes obliged to wait for the organization to produce itself.[38] This is even more the case in normal perception, where the sense of the perceived appears to me as instituted within it and not constituted by me, and the gaze appears as a sort of knowledge machine, which takes the things to where they need to be taken in order for them to become a spectacle, or that divides them up according to their natural articulations. Of course, the straight line EH can only count as straight if I glance over it, but this is not a question of an inspection of the mind, but rather an inspection by the gaze, that is, my act is neither originary nor constituting, it is solicited or motivated. Every focusing is always a focusing on something that presents itself as something to be focused upon. When I focus upon the face ABCD of the cube, this does not mean simply that I make it enter into a state of being clearly seen, but also that I make it count as a figure, and as closer to me than the other face; in short, I organize the cube, and

the gaze is this perceptual genius underneath the thinking subject who knows how to give to things the correct response that they are waiting for in order to exist in front of us.

– Finally, then, what is it to see a cube? Empiricism answers: it is to associate a series of other appearances to the actual appearance of the drawing, namely, those it presented when seen up close, seen in profile, or seen from different angles. But when I am seeing a cube, I do not find any of these images in myself, they are the leftovers of a perception of
314 depth that makes them possible, but that does not result from them. What then is this unique act by which I grasp the possibility of all appearances? Intellectualism answers: it is the thought of the cube as a solid constructed from six equal sides and twelve equal edges that are cut to right angles – and depth is nothing other than the coexistence of equal faces and equal edges. But here again we are offered a definition of depth that is merely a consequence of it. The six equal faces and twelve equal edges do not make up the whole sense of depth and, on the contrary, this definition is meaningless without depth. The six faces and twelve edges can only simultaneously coexist and remain equal for me if they are arranged in depth. The act that corrects appearances, giving acute or obtuse angles the value of right angles, or to deformed sides the value of a square, is not the thought of geometrical relations of equality and of the geometrical being to which they belong – it is the investment of the object by my gaze that penetrates it, animates it, and immediately makes the lateral faces count as "squares seen from an angle," to the extent that we do not even see them according to their diamond-shaped perspectival appearance. This simultaneous presence to experiences that are nevertheless mutually exclusive, this implication of the one in the other, and this contraction into a single perceptual act of an entire possible process are what make up the originality of depth; depth is the dimension according to which things or the elements of things envelop each other, while breadth and height are the dimensions according to which they are juxtaposed.

[v. *Depth and the "transition synthesis."*]

We cannot, then, speak of a synthesis of depth, since a synthesis presupposes or (like a Kantian synthesis) at least posits discrete terms, since depth does not posit the multiplicity of perspectival appearances that the analysis will make explicit, and finally, since depth only anticipates this

multiplicity against the background of the stable thing. This quasi-synthesis becomes clear if it is understood as temporal. When I say that I see an object at a distance, I mean that I already hold it or that I still hold it, the object is in the future or the past at the same time as in space.[39] It will perhaps be said that this is only the case for me: in itself, the lamp that I see exists at the same time as I do, distance is between simultaneous objects, and this simultaneity is included in the very sense of perception. Certainly. But coexistence, which in fact defines space, is not alien to time; rather, it is the adherence of two phenomena to the same temporal wave. With 315
regard to the relation between the perceived object and my perception, it does not connect them in space but outside of time: they are *contemporaries*. The "order of coexistents" cannot be separated from the "order of successives," or rather time is not merely the consciousness of a succession. Perception gives me a "field of presence"[40] in the broad sense that it spreads out according to two dimensions: the dimension of here–there and the dimension of past–present–future. The second dimension clarifies the first. I "hold" or I "have" the distant object without explicitly positing the spatial perspective (apparent size and form), just as I "still hold in hand"[41] the near past without any distortion and without any interposed "memory." If one still wishes to speak of synthesis, this will be, as Husserl says, a "transition synthesis,"[42] which does not link discrete perspectives, but which accomplishes the "passage" from one to the other.

Psychology became engaged in endless difficulties when it attempted to establish memory upon the possession of certain contents or memories, present traces (in the body or in the unconsciousness) of the abolished past, because beginning from these traces one can never understand the recognition of the past as past. Similarly, we will never understand the perception of distance if we begin from contents given in a sort of equidistance or a flat projection of the world, like memories considered as a projection of the past into the present. And just as we can only understand memory as a direct possession of the past without any interposed contents, here too we can only understand the perception of distance as a *being in the distance* that connects with it there, where it appears. Memory is established, step by step, upon the continuous passage from one instant into another, and upon the interlocking of each one, along with its entire horizon, within the thickness of the one that follows. The same continuous transition implies the object such as it is over there, with its "real" size – in short, such as I would see it if I were next to it – within the

perception that I have of it from here. Just as there is no discussion to be had over the "conservation of memories," but merely a certain manner of looking at time that renders the past manifest as an inalienable dimension of consciousness, neither is there a problem of distance, but rather distance is immediately visible, provided we know how to find the living present where it is constituted.

[vi. *Depth is a relation from me to things.*]

316 As we indicated at the beginning, we must rediscover beneath depth as a relation between things or even between planes (which is an objectified depth, detached from experience, and transformed into breadth) a primordial depth that gives the former one its sense and that is the thickness of a medium devoid of things. When we let ourselves be in the world without actively taking it up, or in an illness that encourages this attitude, planes are no longer distinguished from each other, colors no longer condense into surface colors, but rather diffuse around objects and become atmospheric colors (for example, one patient who writes on a sheet of paper must pierce with his pen a certain thickness of white prior to reaching the paper). This voluminosity varies with the color in question, and it is somehow the expression of its qualitative essence.[43] There is, then, a depth that does not yet occur between objects, that, *a fortiori*, does not evaluate the distance from one to another, and that is the simple opening of perception to a phantom of a thing that has hardly any qualities. Even in normal perception, depth does not apply initially to things. Just as up and down, or right and left are not given to the subject with the perceived contents, and are rather constituted at each moment along with a spatial level in relation to which the things arrange themselves, so too depth and size come to things from their being situated in relation to a level of distances and sizes that defines far and near, or large and small, prior to any object being taken as a standard of reference.[44] When we say that an object is enormous or tiny, or that it is far or near, this is often without any comparison, not even an implicit one, with any other object or even with the objective size and position of one's own body, but rather through a certain "scope" of our gestures, a certain "hold" of the phenomenal body upon its surroundings. If we attempted to deny this rootedness of sizes and distance, we would be sent from one reference object to another without understanding how there could ever

be sizes and distances for us. The pathological experience of micropsia or macropsia,[45] since it changes the apparent size of all the objects of the field, leaves no reference point in relation to which the objects could appear larger or smaller than normal, and can thus only be understood 317
in relation to a pre-objective standard of distances and sizes. Thus, depth cannot be understood as the thought of an acosmic subject, but rather as the possibility of an engaged subject.

[vii. *The same goes for height and breadth.*]

This analysis of depth connects with the one we attempted to establish for height and breadth. If we began this section by opposing depth to the other dimensions, this was merely because at first glance they seem to concern the relations of things among themselves, whereas depth immediately reveals the link from the subject to space. But in fact, we have seen above that the vertical and the horizontal are themselves defined ultimately by our body's best hold on the world. As relations between objects, breadth and height are derived, whereas in their originary sense they are also "existential" dimensions. We must not merely say, following Lagneau and Alain, that height and breadth *presuppose* depth because a spectacle on a single plane presupposes the equal distance from all of its parts to the plane of my face: this analysis only concerns breadth, height, and depth as already objectified and not in terms of the experience that opens these dimensions. The vertical and the horizontal, and the near and the far, are abstract designations for a single situated being and presuppose the same "relation" [*vis-à-vis*] between the subject and the world.

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* *

[C. Movement.]

[i. *Thinking about movement destroys movement.*]

Even if it cannot be defined in this way, movement is a displacement or a change of position. Just as we initially encountered a conception of position that defined it through relations in objective space, so too is there an objective conception of movement that defines it through

intra-worldly relations by taking the experience of the world as acquired. And just as we had to uncover the origin of spatial position in the pre-objective situation or locality of the subject who focuses upon his milieu, so too will we have to rediscover beneath the objective thought of movement a pre-objective experience from which it borrows its sense and where movement, still tied to the person who perceives, is a variation of the subject's hold upon his world. When we attempt to think movement or to undertake the philosophy of movement, we immediately place ourselves in the critical attitude or the attitude of verification: we ask ourselves what is actually given to us in movement, we prepare ourselves for
318 rejecting appearances in order to attain the truth of movement, and we fail to notice that it is precisely this attitude that reduces the phenomenon and that will block us from attaining it itself, because this attitude introduces – along with the notion of truth in itself – presuppositions capable of concealing from me the birth of movement.

I throw a stone. It crosses my garden. For a moment, it becomes a blurry meteorite and then, falling to the ground in the distance, it again becomes a stone. If I want to think the phenomenon "clearly," I must decompose it. The stone itself, I will say, is not in fact modified by the movement. I find again on the ground at the end of its trajectory the very same stone I held in my hand, and thus it is the same stone that moved through the air. Movement is but an accidental attribute of the moving object [*le mobile*], and it cannot somehow be seen in the stone. It can be nothing but a change in the relations between the stone and the surroundings. We can only speak of a change if the same rock persists beneath the different relations to the surroundings. On the contrary, if I assume that the stone is annihilated upon arriving at point P, and that another identical stone springs forth at point P', as adjacent to the first as one would like, then we no longer have a unique movement, but rather two movements. There is, then, no movement without a moving object that bears it uninterruptedly from the starting point right through to the end point. Since it is in no way inherent to the moving object and consists entirely in its relations to the surroundings, movement does not work without an external reference point, and, in short, there is no means of attributing movement exclusively to the "moving object" rather than to the reference point.

Once the distinction between the moving object and the movement has been made, there is then no movement without a moving object, no movement without an objective reference point, and no absolute

movement. Nevertheless, this conception of movement is in fact a negation of movement: to distinguish movement rigorously from the moving object is to say, strictly speaking, that the "moving object" *does not move*. If the moving-stone is not in some way different from the stone at rest, then it is never moving (nor at rest, for that matter). As soon as we introduce the idea of a moving object that remains the same throughout its movement, Zeno's arguments again become valid. The reply that movement must not be considered as a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements, would be in vain. For even if one considers two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and 319
whose differentiation would be merely nascent, the idea of an identical moving object throughout the phases of the movement excluded, as a mere appearance, the phenomenon of "blur" [*bougé*] and brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us, hence the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away. Even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions, no matter how proximate the ones we choose are. The result is that, if I attempt to gain a clear conception of movement, I fail to understand how it could ever begin for me or be given to me as a phenomenon.

[ii. *The psychologists' description of movement.*]

And yet I walk and I have an experience of movement despite the demands and the alternatives of clear thought, such that, against all reason, I perceive movements without an identical moving object, without an external reference point, and without any relativity. If we show a subject two lines of light, A and B, in succession, the subject sees a continuous movement from A to B, then from B to A, and so on, without any intermediary position or even without the extreme positions being given for themselves; we have a single line ceaselessly moving forward and backward. The extreme points, however, can be made to appear distinctly by accelerating or slowing down the cadence of the presentation. Stroboscopic movement thus



Figure 8

tends to become dissociated: at first the line appears locked into position A, then it suddenly frees itself and leaps to position B. If the cadence is accelerated or slowed down further, the movement ends and we see either two simultaneous lines or two successive ones.[46] The perception of positions is thus inversely related to the perception of movement. It can even be shown that movement is never the mobile object's successive occupation of all of the positions situated between two extremes. Whether colored or white figures are used against a black background to produce the stroboscopic movement, the space upon which the movement stretches out is, at no moment, illuminated or colored by it. If a short rod C is inserted between
320 the two extreme positions A and B, the rod is at no moment completed by the movement that passes by (Figure 8). We do not have a "passage of the line," but rather a pure "passage." If use is made of a tachistoscope,[47] then the subject often perceives a movement without being able to say what is moving. When it comes to real movements, the situation is no different: if I see workers unloading a truck and tossing bricks to each other, I see the worker's arm in its initial position and in its final position, and although I do not see it in any intermediary position I nonetheless have a vivid perception of its movement. If I move a pencil quickly across a sheet of paper where I have marked a reference point, at no moment am I aware that the pencil is above the reference point; I see none of the intermediary positions and nevertheless I have the experience of movement. Reciprocally, if I slow the movement down and if I succeed in never losing sight of the pencil, then it is at this very moment that the impression of movement disappears.[48] Movement disappears at the very moment when it conforms most closely to the definition given to it by objective thought. Thus, phenomena can be produced in which the moving object only appears as caught in the movement. For such an object, to move is not to pass through an indefinite series of positions successively; this object is only given as beginning,

carrying out, or completing its movement. Consequently, even in cases where a mobile object is visible, the movement is not for it an extrinsic denomination, nor a relation between itself and the exterior, and we will be able to have movements without reference points. In fact, if a consecutive image of a movement is projected upon a homogeneous field containing no objects and no contours, the movement takes possession of the entire space; the entire visual field moves, just as in the Haunted House at the fair. If the after-image of a concentrically turning spiral is projected upon a screen in the absence of any fixed frame, then it is space itself that vibrates and dilates from the center to the periphery.[49] Finally, since movement is no longer a system of relations external to the moving object itself, nothing prevents us now from acknowledging absolute movements, as perception actually gives it to us at each moment.

[iii. But what does this description mean?]

But against this description, one can still raise the objection that it is meaningless. The psychologist denies the rational analysis of movement, 321
and, when he is reminded that every movement – in order to be movement – must be a movement of something, he responds that "the claim has no basis in psychological description."[50] But if the psychologist is describing a movement, he must be referring to an identical something that moves. If I place my watch on the table in my room, and if it suddenly disappears just to reappear several minutes later in the neighboring room, I will not say there has been movement, there is only movement if the intermediary positions have actually been occupied by the watch.[51] Although the psychologist may show that the stroboscopic movement occurs without any intermediary stimulus between the extreme positions, and even if the line of light A does not journey through the space that separates it from B, even if no light is perceived between A and B during the stroboscopic movement, and finally even if I do not see the pencil or the worker's arm between the two extreme positions, it must nevertheless be the case, in one way or another, that the moving object was present in each point of the trajectory in order for the movement to appear, and if it is not there perceptibly, then this is because it is conceived as being there. What is true of movement is also true of change: when I say that the fakir transforms an egg into a handkerchief, or that the magician transforms into a bird upon the roof of his palace,[52] I do not mean simply

that an object or a being has disappeared and has been instantaneously replaced by another. There must be an internal relation between what is annihilated and what is born; the two must be both manifestations or appearances, or two phases of a single thing that is presented in turn beneath these two forms.[53] Likewise, the arrival of a movement at a point must be one with its "contiguous" point of departure, and this is only the case if there is a moving object that, in a single stroke, leaves one point and occupies another.

> A thing that is grasped as a circle would cease to count for us as a circle as soon as the "round" moment, or the equality of all of the diameters, which is essential to the circle, ceased to be present there. It does not matter whether the circle is perceived or conceived; a common determination must be present in each case that obliges us in both to characterize what appears to us as a circle and to distinguish it from every other phenomenon.[54]

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Similarly, when we speak of a sensation of movement, or of a consciousness of movement that is *sui generis*, or when, following Gestalt theory, we speak of a global movement, or of some phenomenon ϕ in which no moving object and no particular position of the moving object would be given, these are merely words, so long as we do not say how "that which is given in this sensation or in this phenomenon, or that which is grasped through them immediately stands out (*dokumentiert*) as movement."[55] The perception of movement can only be the perception *of movement* and recognize it as such if it apprehends it with its signification of movement and with all of the moments that are constitutive of it, and particularly with the identity of the moving object. Movement, responds the psychologist, is:

> one of those "psychical phenomena" that, as given sensible contents (color and form) are related to the object, appear as objective and not subjective, but which, in contrast to the other psychical givens, are not of a static nature, but are dynamic. For example, the typical and specific "passage" is the flesh and blood of movement, which cannot be formed through composition beginning from ordinary visual contents.[56]

It is indeed impossible to compose movement out of static perceptions. But this is not at issue, and the thought was not to reduce movement to

rest. The object at rest itself needs identification. It cannot be said to be at rest if it is annihilated and recreated at each moment, if it does not subsist through its different instantaneous presentations. The identity to which we are referring is thus anterior to the distinction between movement and rest. Movement is nothing without a moving object that traces it out and that establishes its unity. Here the metaphor of the "dynamic phenomenon" misleads the psychologist: it seems to us that a force guarantees its own unity, but this is because we always presuppose someone who identifies this force in the unfolding of its effects. "Dynamic phenomena" draw their unity from me who lives them, surveys them, and accomplishes their synthesis. Thus, we pass from a thinking of movement that destroys it to an experience of movement that attempts to ground it, but also from this experience to a thinking without which, strictly speaking, that experience would signify nothing.

[iv. *The phenomenon of movement, or movement prior to thematization.*]

Thus, we can side with neither the psychologist nor the logician, or rather we must side with both of them and find the means of recognizing both thesis and antithesis as true. The logician is correct when he demands a constitution of the "dynamic phenomenon" itself and a description of movement through the moving object whose trajectory we follow – but he is wrong when he presents the moving object's identity as an explicit identity, and he is obliged to acknowledge this himself. The psychologist, for his part, is forced against his will to place a moving object in the movement when he describes the phenomena more closely, but he regains the advantage through the concrete manner in which he conceives of the moving object. In the discussion we have just followed and that we used to illustrate the perpetual debate between psychology and logic, in essence, what is Wertheimer trying to say? He means that the perception of movement is not secondary in relation to the perception of the moving object, that one does not have a perception of the moving object here, then there, and subsequently an identification that would connect these positions in succession,[57] that their diversity is not subsumed under a transcendent unity, and finally, that the identity of the moving object bursts forth directly "from experience."[58] In other words, when the psychologist speaks of movement as a phenomenon embracing the starting point A and the end point B (AB), he does not mean that

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there is no subject of movement, but rather that in no case is the subject of movement an object A initially given as present in its place and stationary: insofar as there is movement, the moving object is caught in the movement.

The psychologist would probably agree that there is in every movement if not a movable object [*un mobile*], then at least a *moving object* [*un mouvant*], given that we do not confuse this moving object with any of the static figures that one can obtain by stopping the movement at any
324 given point of the trajectory. And here is where he gains the advantage over the logician. For having failed to regain contact with the experience of movement beyond all unquestioned beliefs touching upon the world, the logician only speaks of movement in itself; he poses the problem of movement in terms of being, which ultimately renders it insoluble. Consider, he says, the different appearances (*Erscheinungen*) of movement at different points in the trajectory: they will only be apparitions of a single movement if they are appearances of a single movable object, of a single *Erscheinende* [appearance], or of a single something that appears (*darstellt*) through them all. But the movable object only needs to be posited as a separate being if its appearances at different points of the journey have themselves been actualized as discrete perspectives. In principle, the logician is only familiar with thetic consciousness, and it is this postulate or supposition of an entirely determinate world, of a pure being, that burdens his conception of the manifold, and consequently his conception of synthesis. The movable object [*le mobile*], or rather, as we have said, the moving object [*le mouvant*], is not identical *beneath* the phases of the movement; it is identical *in* them. It is not because I find the same stone on the ground that I believe in its identity throughout the course of the movement. On the contrary, it is because I perceived it as identical throughout the course of the movement – an implicit identity that remains to be described – that I go and collect it and that I find it. We must not actualize within the moving-stone everything that we otherwise know about the stone. The logician says that, if it is a circle that I am perceiving, then all of its diameters are equal. But in this account, it would be necessary to put into the perceived circle all of the properties that the geometer has discovered there or could discover there. Now, it is the circle as a thing of the world that possesses, in advance and in itself, all of the properties that analysis will discover there. Circular tree trunks already had, before Euclid, the properties that Euclid discovered. But in the circle as a phenomenon, such as it appeared to the Greeks prior to Euclid, the square of the tangent was not equal to the product of the secant completed by its exterior portion: this square and this product do not figure in the phenomenon, and neither did the equal radii necessarily figure there either. The movable object, as the object of an indefinite series of explicit and concordant perceptions, has properties, while the moving object merely has a style. It is impossible for the perceived circle to have unequal diameters or for the movement to exist without any moving object. But the 325
perceived circle no more has equal diameters because it has no diameters at all. It stands out for me, it makes itself recognized and distinguished from every other figure by its circular physiognomy, and not by any "properties" that thetic consciousness will later discover in it. Likewise, movement does not necessarily presuppose a movable object, that is, an object defined by a collection of determinate properties; rather, it is enough that it contains "something that moves," at the very most a "colored something" or "something luminous" without any actual color or light. The logician excludes this tertiary hypothesis: the rays of the circle must be either equal or unequal, the movement must either have a movable object or not. But he can only do this by taking the circle as a thing or the movement in itself. Now, as we have seen, this is ultimately to render movement impossible. The logician would have nothing to think about, not even an appearance of movement, if there were no movement prior to the objective world that might serve as the source of all of our claims touching upon movement, if there were no phenomena prior to being that can be recognized, identified, and of which we can speak – in short, phenomena that have a sense, even though they have not yet been thematized.[59] The psychologist leads us back to this phenomenal layer. We shall not say that it is irrational or anti-logical. This would only be the positing of a movement without a moving object. Only the explicit negation of the moving object would be contrary to the principle of the excluded middle. We must simply say that the phenomenal layer is, literally, pre-logical and will always remain so.

Our picture of the world can only be composed in part with being; we must also acknowledge the phenomenal within it, which completely surrounds being. We are not asking the logician to take into consideration experiences that reason takes to be merely non-sense or contradictory [*faux-sens*], we simply wish to push back the limits of what has sense for us and to put the narrow zone of thematic sense back into the zone

of non-thematic sense that embraces it. The thematization of movement ends in the identical moving object and in the relativity of movement, that is, it destroys movement. If we want to take the phenomenon of
326 movement seriously, we must imagine a world that is not merely made up of things, but also of pure transitions. The something in transit that we have recognized as necessary for the constitution of a change is only defined by its particular way of "passing by." For example, the bird that crosses my garden is, in the very moment of the movement, merely a grayish power of flight and, in a general way, we shall see that things are primarily defined by their "behavior," and not by static "properties." It is not I who recognize, in each point and in each instant passed through, the same bird defined by explicit properties; rather, it is the bird in flight that accomplishes the unity of its movement, it is the bird that changes place, and it is this feathery commotion still here which is already over there, in a sort of ubiquity, like the comet and its tail. Pre-objective being, or the non-thematized moving something, does not pose any other problem than the space and time of implication, a problem we have already touched upon. We have said that the parts of space, according to breadth, height, or depth, are not juxtaposed, that they rather coexist because they are all enveloped in the unique hold that our body has upon the world, and this relation was already clarified when we showed that it was temporal prior to being spatial. Things coexist in space because they are *present* to the same perceiving subject and enveloped in a single temporal wave. But the unity and the individuality of each temporal wave is only possible if it is squeezed between the preceding one and the following one, and if the same temporal pulsation that makes it spring forth still retains the preceding one and holds the one to follow in advance. It is objective time that is made up of successive moments. The lived present contains a past and a future within its thickness. The phenomenon of movement only manifests spatial and temporal implication in a more noticeable way. We know a movement and a moving something without any consciousness of the objective positions, just as we know a distant object and its true size without any interpretation, and just as at each moment we know the place of an event in the thickness of our past without any explicit recollection. Movement is a modulation of an already familiar milieu, and it brings us back once again to our central problem, which is to understand how this milieu, which serves as the background of every act of consciousness, is constituted.[60]

[v. *Movement and the thing moving.*]

The positing of a self-same movable object led to the relativity of 327
movement. Now that we have reintroduced movement into the moving object, it can only be interpreted in one sense: it begins in the moving object and unfolds into the field from there. I am not free to see the stone as immobile and the garden and myself in motion. Movement is not an hypothesis whose probability is measured through the number of facts 328
that it coordinates in the manner of a theory in physics. That would only give a possible movement. Movement is a fact. The stone is not conceived as moving, it is seen moving. For the hypothesis "it is the stone that moves" would have no proper signification, it would not distinguish itself in any way from the hypothesis "it is the garden that moves," if movement, in reality and for reflection, amounted to a simple change of relations. Movement, then, inhabits the stone. But are we going to side with the realism of the psychologist? Are we going to place movement into the stone as a quality? Movement presupposes no relation to an explicitly perceived object and it remains possible in a perfectly homogeneous field. Moreover, every movable object is given in a field. Just as we need a moving something in movement, so too do we need a background of movement. The claim that the borders of the visual field always provide an objective reference point was wrong.[61] Once again, the border of the visual field is not a real line. Our visual field is not cut out of our objective world, it is not a fragment with well-defined borders like the landscape that is framed by the window. In the visual field we see just as far as the hold of our gaze upon the things extends – well beyond the zone of clear vision, and even behind ourselves. When we reach the limits of the visual field, we do not go from vision to non-vision: the phonograph playing in the neighboring room and which I do not explicitly see still counts in my visual field; reciprocally, what we do see is always, in some respect, not seen: there must be hidden sides of things and things "behind us" if there is to be a "front" of things, or things "in front of us" and, in short, a perception. The limits of the visual field are a necessary moment of the organization of the world and not an objective contour. But finally, it is nonetheless true that an object travels through our visual field, that it changes place within it, and that movement has no sense 329
outside of this relation. Depending upon which part of the visual field we give the value of figure or the value of background, it appears to us

either in movement or at rest. If we are on a boat that skirts the coast, it is certainly true, as Leibniz said, that we can either see the coast flowing by us or take the coast as a fixed point and sense the boat moving.

[vi. *The "relativity" of movement.*]*

Do we thus side with the logician? Not at all, for to say that movement is a structural phenomenon is not to say that it is "relative." The very particular relation that is constitutive of movement is not *between objects*, and the psychologist does not ignore this relation, but rather describes it much better than does the logician. The coast flows by before our eyes if we keep our eyes fixed upon the ship's railing, while the boat moves when we stare at the coast. Of two luminous points in the dark, one immobile and the other moving, the one that we focus upon seems to be moving.[62] The cloud flies over the steeple and the river flows beneath the bridge when we stare at the cloud or the river. The steeple falls through the sky and the bridge slides over the congealed river when we stare at the steeple or the bridge. What gives the status "moving object" to one part of the visual field, and the status "background" to another is the manner in which we establish our relations with it through the act of looking. What could the words "the stone flies through the air" mean if not that our gaze, being established and anchored in the garden, is solicited by the stone and, so to speak, pulls on its anchors. The relation between the moving object and its background passes through our body. How should we conceive of this mediation by the body? How does it happen that the relations between the body and objects can determine the latter as either moving or at rest? Is not our body an object, and does it not also need to be determined under the relation of rest and of movement? It is often said that objects remain immobile for us during the movement of the eyes because we take into account the shifting of the eyes and because, finding it exactly proportional to the change in appearances, we conclude in favor of the immobility of the objects. In fact, if we have no awareness of the shifting of the eyes, such as in passive movement, then the object seems to move; if, as in the case of paresis of the oculomotor muscles, we have the illusion of a
330 movement of the eye without the relation of objects to our eye seeming to change, we believe we see a movement of the object. It seems at first that – the relation of the object to my eye, such as it is inscribed upon

the retina, being given to consciousness – we could obtain the rest or the degree of movement of objects through subtraction by bringing into the account the shifting or rest of our eye.

In fact, this analysis is entirely fictional and ideal for concealing from us the true relation from the body to the spectacle. When I transfer my gaze from one object to another, I have no consciousness of my eye as an object, as a globe suspended in its socket, of its shifting or of its rest in objective space, nor of what results upon the retina. The elements of the supposed calculation are not given to me. The immobility of the thing is not deduced from the act of seeing, it is rigorously simultaneous; the two phenomena envelop each other: they are not two elements of an algebraic sum, but rather two moments of an organization that encompasses them. My eye is, for me, a certain power for encountering things; it is not a screen upon which things are projected. The relation between my eye and the object is not given to me in the form of a geometrical projection of the object into the eye, but rather as a certain hold that my eye has upon the object – still vague in peripheral vision, more narrow and more precise when I focus upon the object. What I lack in the passive movement of the eye is not the objective representation of its moving within the eye socket, which is in no case given to me, but rather the precise gearing of my gaze to the objects, without which the objects are no longer capable of fixity, nor for that matter of true movements. For, when I press upon my eyeball, I do not perceive a true movement, it is not the things themselves that are moved, but merely a tiny film upon their surface. Finally, in the case of a paresis of the oculomotor muscles, I do not explain the constancy of the retinal image through a movement of the object, rather I experience [*j'éprouve*] that the hold my gaze has upon the object does not relax, my gaze carries the object along with it and shifts the object as it shifts. Thus my eye is never an object in perception. If we can ever speak of a movement without a moving object, then it is surely in the case of one's own body. The movement of my eye toward what it will focus upon is not the shifting of one object in relation to another object, it is a march toward the real. My eye is moving or at rest in relation to a thing that it is approaching or that flees from it. If the body provides the ground or the background to the perception of movement that perception needs to establish itself, it does so as a perceiving power, insofar as it is established in a certain domain and geared into a world. Rest and movement 331
appear *between* an object that is not in itself determined according to rest

and movement, and my body that, as an object, is no more determined in this way when my body becomes anchored in certain objects. As with up and down, movement is a phenomenon of levels, every movement presupposes a certain anchorage that can vary.

So that is what one can validly mean when speaking confusedly about the relativity of movement. But what exactly is anchorage and how does it constitute a background at rest? This is not an explicit perception. Anchorage points, when we focus upon them, are not objects. The steeple only begins to move when I leave the sky to peripheral vision. It is essential to the supposed reference points of movement not to be thematized in actual knowledge and to be always "already there." They are not presented directly to perception, they circumvent it and haunt it through a preconscious operation whose results appear to us as ready-made. Cases of ambiguous perception, where we can choose our anchorage as we please, are cases in which our perception is artificially cut off from its context and its past, in which we do not perceive with our entire being, in which we play with our body and with that generality that allows it to break at any time with all historical engagement, and to function on its own account. But even if we can break with a human world, we cannot prevent ourselves from focusing our eyes – which means that so long as we live we remain engaged, if not in a human milieu, then at least in a physical milieu – and for a given focusing of the gaze, perception is not facultative. It is even less so when the life of the body is integrated into our concrete existence. I am free to see my train or the neighboring train moving, whether I do nothing or whether I examine myself on the illusions of movement. But:

> When I am playing cards in my compartment, I see the train move on the next track even if it is in reality my own train which is moving, but when I am looking at the other train, searching perhaps for an acquaintance in the coach, then it is my own train that seems to be moving.[63]

The compartment where we take up residence is "at rest," its walls are "vertical," and the landscape passes by in front of us; on one side the fir trees seen through the window appear to us as diagonal. If we place ourselves at the window, we re-enter the large world beyond our small one, the firs straighten up and remain immobile, the train leans with the slope and speeds through the countryside. The relativity of movement is reduced to

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the power we have of changing domains within the large world. Once we are engaged in a milieu, we see movement appear before us as an absolute. On condition of taking into account not only explicit acts of knowledge or *cogitationes*, but also the more secret act, always in the past, by which we take up a world, and on condition of acknowledging a non-thetic consciousness, we can accept what the psychologist calls "absolute movement" without falling into the difficulties of realism and we can understand the phenomenon of movement without our logic destroying it.

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[D. *Lived Space.*]

[i. *The experience of spatiality expresses our being firmly set within the world.*]

We have until now only considered, as do classical philosophy and psychology, the *perception of space*, that is, the knowledge that a disinterested subject could have of spatial relations between objects and of their geometrical characteristics. And yet, even in analyzing this abstract function, which is far from covering our entire experience of space, we have been led to uncover the subject's being firmly set within a milieu and, ultimately, his inherence in the world as the condition of spatiality. In other words, we had to acknowledge that spatial perception is a structural phenomenon and is only understood from within a perceptual field that, as a whole, contributes to motivating it by proposing to the concrete subject a possible anchorage. The classical problem of the perception of space and of perception in general must be reintegrated into a larger problem. To ask oneself how spatial relations and objects with their "properties" can be determined in an explicit act is to ask a second-order question, it is to present an act that only appears against the background of an already familiar world as if it were originary, it is to admit that one has not yet become conscious of the experience of the world. In the natural attitude, I have no *perceptions*, I do not posit this object as next to that other one along with their objective relations. Rather, I have a flow of experiences that implicate and explicate each other just as much in simultaneity as they do in succession. For me, Paris is not a thousand-sided object or a collection of perceptions, nor for that matter the law of all of these

perceptions. Just as a human being manifests the same affective essence in his hand gestures, his gait, and the sound of his voice, each explicit
333 perception in my journey through Paris – the cafés, the faces, the poplars along the quays, the bends of the Seine – is cut out of the total being of Paris, and only serves to confirm a certain style or a certain sense of Paris. And when I arrived there for the first time, the first streets that I saw upon leaving the train station were – like the first words of a stranger – only manifestations of a still ambiguous, though already incomparable essence. In fact, we hardly perceive any objects at all, just as we do not see the eyes of a familiar face, but rather its gaze and its expression. There is here a latent sense, diffused throughout the landscape or the town, that we uncover in a specific evidentness without having to define it. Ambiguous perceptions are the only ones to emerge as explicit acts, that is, the ones to which we ourselves give a sense through the attitude that we adopt, or the ones that respond to questions that we pose. They cannot, however, be of any use in the analysis of the perceptual field since they are drawn out of it, since they presuppose it, and since we obtain them precisely by making use of the structures we acquired in our regular dealings with the world. An initial perception without any background is inconceivable. Every perception presupposes a certain past of the subject, and the abstract function of perception – as the encounter with objects – implies a more secret act by which we elaborate our milieu.

Under the influence of mescaline, sometimes objects appear to shrink as they approach. A limb or a part of the body (hand, mouth, or tongue) appears enormous and the rest of the body is no longer anything other than an appendage to it.[64] The walls of the room are 150 meters from each other, and above them there is but a vast and deserted expanse. The extended hand is as high as the wall. External space and bodily space break apart to the point that the subject has the impression of eating "from one dimension into the other."[65] At certain moments, movement is no longer seen and people are transported in a magical way from one point to another.[66] The subject is alone and abandoned to an empty space, "he complains of only seeing clearly the space between things, and this space is empty. Objects are still there in a certain way, but not as they should be . . ."[67] Men seem like puppets, and their movements are accom-
334 plished with a magical slowness. The leaves of the trees lose their framework and their organization: each point of the leaf has the same value as all others.[68] One schizophrenic says:

> a bird is chirping in the garden. I hear the bird, and I know that it is chirping, but that this is a bird and that it chirps are two things so far removed from each other . . . there is an abyss . . . as if the bird and the chirping had nothing to do with each other.[69]

Another patient can no longer "understand" the clock, that is, first the passing of the hands from one position to another and above all the connection of this movement with the thrust of the mechanism or the "workings" of the clock.[70]

These disturbances do not have to do with perception as a knowledge of the world: the enormous parts of the body or the nearby objects that are too small are not posited as such; the walls of the room are not, for the patient, as distant from each other in the manner of the two ends of a soccer pitch for a normal person. The subject knows quite well that his food and his own body reside in the same space, since he picks up his food with his hand. Space is "empty," and yet all of the objects of perception are there. The disturbance does not bear upon the information that one can draw out of perception, and it reveals a deeper life of consciousness beneath "perception." Even when there is a lack of perception [imperception], as happens with regard to movement, the perceptual deficit seems to be merely an extreme case of a more general disturbance that has to do with the structuring of the phenomena with each other. There is a bird and there is some chirping, but the bird no longer chirps. There is a movement of the hands and a movement of a mechanism, but the clock no longer "works." Similarly, certain parts of my body are disproportionately large and the nearby objects are too small because the ensemble no longer forms a system. Now, if the world falls to pieces or is broken apart, this is because one's own body has ceased to be a knowing body and has ceased to envelop all of the objects in a single hold; and this degradation of the body into an organism must be itself related to the collapse of time, which no longer rises toward a future, but rather falls back upon itself.

> Before, I was a man, with a soul and a living body (*Leib*) and now I am nothing more than a being (*Wesen*) . . . now, there is no longer anything 335
> there but the organism (*Körper*) and the soul is dead . . . I hear and I see, but I no longer know anything, life has become a problem for me . . . now I live on in eternity . . . The branches on the trees sway, and

> others move about in the room, but for me time does not pass by . . . Thought has changed, there is no more style . . . What is the future? One cannot anticipate it . . . Everything is in question . . . Everything is so monotone, morning, noon, and night; past, present, and future. Everything always begins again.[71]

The perception of space is not a particular class of "states of consciousness" or of acts, and its modalities always express the total life of the subject, the energy with which he tends toward a future through his body and his world.[72]

[ii. *The spatiality of the night.*]

Thus, we are forced to broaden our research: once the experience of spatiality has been related to our being firmly set within the world, there will be an original spatiality for each modality of this anchorage. When, for example, the world of clear and articulated objects is abolished, our perceptual being, now cut off from its world, sketches out a spatiality without things. This is what happens at night. The night is not an object in front of me; rather, it envelops me, it penetrates me through all of my senses, it suffocates my memories, and it all but effaces my personal identity. I am no longer withdrawn into my observation post in order to see the profiles of objects flowing by in the distance. The night is without profiles, it itself touches me and its unity is the mystical unity of the *mana*. Even cries, or a distant light, only populate it vaguely; it becomes entirely animated; it is a pure depth without planes, without surfaces, and without any distance from it to me.[73] For reflection, every space is sustained by a thought that connects its parts, but this thought is not accomplished from nowhere. On the contrary, it is from within nocturnal space that I unite with it. The anxiety of neurotics at night comes from the fact that the night makes us sense our contingency, that free and inexhaustible movement by which we attempt to anchor ourselves and to transcend ourselves in things, without there being any guarantee of always finding them.

[iii. *Sexual space.*]*

– But the night is still not our most striking experience of the unreal: at night I can hold onto the structures of the day, such as when I feel my
336 way through my apartment, and in any case the night is located within

the general frame of nature; even in pitch black space there is something reassuring and worldly. During sleep, however, I only keep the world present in order to hold it at a distance, I turn toward the subjective sources of my existence, and the fantasies of dreams reveal even more clearly the general spatiality in which clear space and observable objects are embedded. Consider, for example, the themes of elevation and of falling, so frequent in dreams and, for that matter, in myths and in poetry. We know that the appearance of these themes in the dream can be related to concomitant respiratory events or to sexual drives, and a first step is made by recognizing the living and sexual signification of up and down. But these explanations do not get very far, for elevation and falling as dreamed are not in visible space in the manner of the waking perceptions of desire and of respiratory movements. We need to understand why, at a given moment, the dreamer lends himself entirely to the bodily facts of breathing and of desire and hence infuses them with a general and symbolic signification to the point of only seeing them appear in the dream in the form of an image – such as the image of a giant bird that glides and that, hit by a bullet, falls and is reduced to a small pile of burnt paper. We need to understand how respiratory or sexual events, which have their place in objective space, detach from that space in the dream and are established within a different theater.

We shall not reach this understanding if we do not grant the body an emblematic value, even in the waking state. Between our emotions, desires, and bodily attitudes, there is neither merely a contingent connection nor even a relation of analogy: if I say that in disappointment I fall down from my high, this is not merely because it is accompanied by gestures of prostration in virtue of the laws of the nervous system, or because I discover between the object of my desire and my desire itself the same relation as between an object placed up high and my gesture toward it. Rather, the movement upward as a direction in physical space and the movement of desire toward its goal are symbolic of each other because they both express the same essential structure of our being as a situated being in relation to a milieu, and we have already seen that this structure alone gives a sense to the directions up and down in the physical world. When one speaks of a high or low morale, one does not extend to the psychological domain a relation that could only have its full sense in the physical world; rather, one uses "a direction of signification that, so to speak, crosses the different regional spheres and receives

337 in each one a particular signification (spatial, auditive, spiritual, psychical, etc.)."[74] The fantasies of the dream, those of the myth, each man's favorite images, or finally the poetic image are not connected to their sense through a relation of sign to signification, such as the one that exists between a telephone number and the name of the subscriber. They genuinely contain their sense, which is not a notional sense, but a direction of our existence. When I dream that I am flying or that I am falling, the entire sense of the dream is contained in this flight or in this fall, so long as I do not reduce them to their physical appearance in the waking world and consider them with all of their existential implications. The bird that glides, falls, and becomes a handful of cinders, does not glide and does not fall in physical space; it rises and falls with the existential tide that runs through it, or again it is the pulsation of my existence, its systole and its diastole. The level of this tide at each moment determines a space of fantasies, as, in waking life, our commerce with the world that is presented determines a space of realities. There is a determination of up and down and, in general, a determination of "place" that precedes "perception." Life and sexuality haunt their world and their space.

[iv. *Mythical space.*]*

To the extent that they live within the myth, primitive persons do not transcend this existential space, and this is why dreams count for them as much as perceptions. There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities. For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan's encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks. Rather, to know this location is to tend toward it as if toward the natural place of a certain peace or a certain joy, just as, for me, knowing where my hand is involves joining myself to this agile power that is dormant for the moment, but that I can take up and discover as my own. For the augur, the right and the left are the sources from which the blessed or the ill-fated arrive, just as for me my right hand and my left hand are respectively the embodiment of my dexterity and of my clumsiness. In the dream, as in the myth, we learn *where* the phenomenon is located by sensing [*en éprouvant*] what our desire moves toward, what strikes fear in our hearts, and upon what our life depends.

[v. *Lived space.*]*

Even in waking life, things do not proceed otherwise. I arrive in a village for the holidays, happy to leave behind my work and my ordinary surroundings. I settle into the village. It becomes the center of my life. The low level of water in the river, or the corn or walnut harvest, are events 338
for me. But if a friend comes to see me and brings news from Paris, or if the radio and newspapers inform me that there are threats of war, then I feel exiled in this village, excluded from real life, and imprisoned far away from everything. Our body and our perception always solicit us to take the landscape they offer as the center of the world. But this landscape is not necessarily the landscape of our life. I can "be elsewhere" while remaining here, and if I am kept far from what I love, I feel far from the center of real life. Bovarism and certain forms of homesickness are examples of a decentered life. The maniac, however, centers himself everywhere: "his mental space is large and luminous, his thought, sensitive to all the objects that are presented, flies from one to the other and is drawn into their movement."[75] Beyond the physical or geometrical distance existing between me and all things, a lived distance links me to things that count and exist for me, and links them to each other. At each moment, this distance measures the "scope" of my life.[76] Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (*Spielraum*) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me. Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me. They envelop me like the night, and they rob me of individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe. I am possessed.[77] At the same time, the events gather together. One patient senses a cold draft, a scent of chestnuts, and the freshness of the rain. Perhaps, he says, "at this exact moment a person, suffering from suggestions like me, passed under the rain and in front of someone selling grilled chestnuts."[78] One schizophrenic, under the care of both Minkowski and the village priest, believes that they have 339
met to talk about him.[79] One elderly schizophrenic woman believes that a person who resembles another person must have known the latter.[80] The contraction of lived space, which no longer leaves the patient any leeway, no longer leaves any role for chance to play. Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects. The "short circuits"[81] of delirious causality and the long causal

chains of methodical thought express ways of existing:[82] "the experience of space is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens."[83] Clear space, that impartial space where all objects have the same importance and the same right to exist, is not merely surrounded, but also wholly penetrated by another spatiality that morbid variations reveal. One schizophrenic stops in the mountains and views the landscape. After a moment, he feels threatened. A particular interest arises in him for everything that surrounds him, as if a question had been posed from the outside to which he can find no answer. Suddenly the landscape is snatched away from him by some alien force. It is as if a second limitless sky were penetrating the blue sky of the evening. This new sky is empty, "subtle, invisible, and terrifying." Sometimes it moves into the autumn landscape, and sometimes the landscape itself moves. And during this time, says the patient, "a permanent question is asked of me; it is like an order to stay put or to die, or to go farther."[84] This second space permeating visible space is the one that composes, at each moment, our own manner of projecting the world, and the schizophrenic disorder consists merely in that this perpetual project is dissociated from the objective world such as it is still offered by perception, and it withdraws, so to speak, into itself. The schizophrenic patient no longer lives in the common world, but in a private world; he does not go all the way to geographical space, he remains within "the space of the landscape,"[85] and this landscape itself, once cut off from the common world, is considerably impoverished. This results in the schizophrenic questioning:
340 everything is amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-evident. If the natural space of classical psychology is on the contrary reassuring and evident, then this is because existence rushes into it and forgets itself there.

[vi. *Do these spaces presuppose geometrical space?*]

This description of anthropological space could be developed indefinitely.[86] The objection that will be raised by objective thought, however, is obvious: do these descriptions have any philosophical value? That is: do they teach us something concerning the very structure of consciousness, or do they merely give us the contents of human experience? Are

dream space, mythical space, and schizophrenic space genuine spaces, can they exist and be thought by themselves, or do they not presuppose geometrical space as the condition of their possibility, and along with it the pure constituting consciousness that deploys it? The left, the region of misfortune and of bad omens for the primitive person – or in my body the left as the side of my clumsiness – is only determined as a direction if I am first capable of conceiving of its relation with the right, and this relation ultimately gives a spatial sense to the terms between which it is established. The primitive person does not somehow aim at a space with his anxiety or with his joy, just as it is not with my pain that I know where my injured foot: lived anxiety, lived joy, and lived pain are related to a place in objective space where their empirical conditions are found. Without this agile consciousness, free with regard to all contents and deploying them in space, the contents would never be anywhere. If we reflect upon the mythical experience of space, and if we ask ourselves what it means, we will necessarily find that it rests upon the consciousness of objective and unique space, for a space that could neither be objective nor unique could not be a space, is it not essential for space to 341
be the absolute and correlative "outside," but also the negation of subjectivity, and is it not essential for space to embrace every being one could imagine, since everything one would like to posit outside of it would, for the same reasons, be in relation with it, and thus in it?

The dreamer dreams, and that is why his respiratory movements and his sexual impulses are not taken for what they are, and why they break the moorings that tie them to the world and drift before him in the form of the dream. But ultimately what does he really see? Shall we take his word for it? If he wants to know what he sees and to understand his dream himself, he will have to awaken. Sexuality will immediately return to its genital refuge, anxiety and its phantasms will again become what they always were: some respiratory obstruction in the ribcage. The dark space[87] that invades the schizophrenic's world can only justify itself as space and provide its spatial qualifications by linking itself to clear space. If the patient claims that there is a second space around him, we will ask him: but then *where* is it? By seeking to locate this phantom, he will make it disappear as a phantom. And since – as he himself admits – objects are still there, he still keeps, with clear space, the means of exorcising the phantoms and of returning to the shared world. Phantoms are the debris of the clear world, and borrow from it all the prestige they can have. Finally, in the same way,

when we attempt to establish geometrical space and its intra-mundane relations upon the originary existence of spatiality, it will be objected that thought only knows itself or things, that a spatiality of the subject is not conceivable, and that consequently our proposition is strictly meaningless. We shall respond that it has no thematic or explicit sense, and that it certainly disappears when placed before objective thought. But it does have a non-thematic or implicit sense and this is not a *lesser sense*, for objective thought itself sustains itself on the unreflected and presents itself as a making explicit of the unreflective life of consciousness, to the extent that radical reflection cannot consist in thematizing as parallel the world or space and the non-temporal subject who thinks them, but rather must catch hold of this thematization itself within the horizons of implications that give it its sense. If reflecting is to seek the originary, that by which the rest can be and can be thought, then reflection cannot enclose itself in objective thought, but must think precisely objective thought's acts of thematization and must restore their context.

In other words, objective thought refuses the supposed phenomena
342 of the dream, of the myth, and in general of existence because it finds them inconceivable, and because they mean nothing of which it can thematize. It refuses the fact or the real in the name of the possible and the evident. But it does not see that what is evident is itself established upon a fact. Reflective analysis believes that it knows what the dreamer and the schizophrenic experience better than the dreamer or the schizophrenic himself; moreover, the philosopher believes that he knows what he sees better in reflection than he knows it in perception. And it is on this condition alone that he can reject anthropological spaces as merely confused appearances of true, unique, and objective space. But by doubting the testimony of another person with regard to himself, or the testimony of his own perception with regard to itself, the philosopher strips himself of the right to declare what he grasps as evident to be absolutely true, even if, in this evidentness, he is conscious of eminently understanding the dreamer, the madman, or perception. There are only two options: either he who lives something knows at the same time what he lives, and then the madman, the dreamer, and the subject of perception must be taken at their word, and we must merely verify that their language expresses clearly what they live, or he who lives something is not the judge of what he lives, and hence the lived experience of evidentness [*l'épreuve de l'évidence*] can be an illusion.

In order to drain mythical experience, dream experience, or perceptual experience of all positive value, that is, in order to reintegrate these spaces into geometrical space, we must, in short, deny that one ever dreams, that one is ever a madman, or that one ever truly sees. As long as we acknowledge the dream, madness, or perception as, at the very least, absences of reflection – and how could we not if we want to maintain a value for the testimony of consciousness, without which no truth is possible – then we do not have the right to level out all experiences into a single world, nor all modalities of existence into a single consciousness. In order to do this, we would need to have available a higher authority to which one could submit perceptive consciousness and fantastical consciousness, a me more intimate to myself than me who thinks my dream or my perception when I limit myself to dreaming or to perceiving, a me who possesses the true substance of my dream and of my perception while I only have the appearance of this. But this very distinction between appearance and the real is made neither in the world of the myth, nor in the world of the patient or the child. The myth fits the essence into the appearance; the mythical phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence. The demon of the rain is present in each drop that falls after the incantation, just as the soul is present in each part of the body. Every "apparition" (Erscheinung)[88] is 343
here an embodiment and beings are not so much defined by "properties" as they are by physiognomic characteristics. This is what can be legitimately meant in speaking of an infantile and primitive animism: not that the child and the primitive person perceive the objects that they would like, as Comte says, to explain through intentions or consciousnesses, for consciousness as an object belongs to thetic thought, but rather because things are taken to be the incarnation of what they express, because their human signification rushes into them and is presented, literally, as what they mean. A passing shadow or a creaking tree have a sense; there are warnings everywhere, without anyone who is doing the warning.[89] Given that mythical consciousness does not yet have the notion of "thing" or of an objective truth, how could it accomplish a critique of what it thinks it experiences, where might it find a fixed point to pause and to notice itself as a pure consciousness and notice, beyond the phantasms, the true world?

One schizophrenic senses that a brush, placed close to his window, comes closer to him and enters into his head, and nevertheless at no

moment does he cease knowing that the brush is over there.[90] If he looks toward the window, he again perceives it. The brush, as an identifiable term of an explicit perception, is not in the patient's head as a material mass. But the patient's head is not, for him, this object that everyone can see and that he himself can see in a mirror; rather, it is that listening and look-out post that he senses at the top of his body, or that power of joining with all objects through vision and hearing. In the same way, the brush that falls under the senses is only an envelope or a phantom; the real brush, the stiff and prickly being that is embodied in these appearances and that is concentrated by the gaze, has left the window and has thus left behind merely an inert shell. No appeal to explicit perception can awaken the patient from this dream since he does not deny the explicit perception, but simply holds that it proves nothing against what he experiences [*ce qu'il éprouve*]. "You don't hear my voices?" one patient asks the doctor; and she concludes calmly: "so I am alone in hearing them."[91] What protects the healthy man against delirium or hallucination
344 is not his reason [*sa critique*], but rather the structure of his space: objects remain in front of him, they keep their distance and, as Malebranche said about Adam, they only touch him with respect. What brings about the hallucination and the myth is the contraction of lived space, the rooting of things in our body, the overwhelming proximity of the object, the solidarity between man and the world, which is not abolished but repressed by everyday perception or by objective thought, and which philosophical consciousness rediscovers. Of course, if I reflect upon the consciousness of positions and directions in the myth, the dream, and perception, if I thematize them and fix them according to the methods of objective thought, I discover in them the relations of geometrical space. It must not be concluded from this that these relations were already there, but inversely that this is not genuine reflection. In order to know what mythical or schizophrenic space means, we have no other means than of awakening in ourselves, in our current perception, the relation between the subject and his world that reflective analysis makes disappear. We must acknowledge "expressive experiences" (*Ausdruckserlebnisse*) as prior to "acts of signification" (*bedeutungsgebende Akten*) by theoretical and thetic consciousness; we must acknowledge "expressive sense" (*Ausdrucks-Sinn*) as prior to "significative sense" (*Zeichen-Sinn*); and we must acknowledge the symbolic "pregnancy" of form in content as prior to the subsumption of content under form.[92]

[vii. *These spaces must be recognized as original.*]

Does this mean that we must side with psychologism? Since there are as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences, and since we do not allow ourselves to set up the configurations of adult, normal, and civilized experience in advance within infantile, morbid, or primitive experience, do we not thereby enclose each type of subjectivity and, ultimately, each consciousness within its private life? In place of the rationalist *cogito*, which discovered a universal constituting consciousness within me, have we not substituted the psychologist's *cogito* that remains within the experience [*l'épreuve*] of its incommunicable life? Are we not again defining subjectivity through the coinciding of everyone with it? The examination of space and, in general, of experience in the nascent state prior to their being objectified, and the decision to ask experience itself for its own sense, in a word, phenomenology, does this not ultimately lead to the negation of being and the negation of sense? Are we not simply reintroducing appearance and opinion under the name "phenomenon"? Does phenomenology not place at the origin of precise knowledge a decision just as unjustifiable as the one that encloses the madman in his madness, and is not the final word of this wisdom to lead 345
back to the anxiety of idle and isolated subjectivity?

These are the equivocations that remain for us to clear up. Mythical or dreamlike consciousness, madness, and perception, despite all their differences, are not self-enclosed; they are not islands of experience without any communication and from which one cannot escape. We have refused to locate geometrical space as immanent within mythical space and, in general, to subordinate all of experience to an absolute consciousness of that experience that would situate it within the totality of truth, because the unity of consciousness, conceived in this way, makes its variety incomprehensible. But mythical consciousness opens onto an horizon of possible objectifications. The primitive person lives his myths against a perceptual background that is articulated clearly enough such that the acts of daily life – fishing, hunting, or relations with civilized persons – are possible. The myth itself, as diffuse as it might be, has an identifiable sense for the primitive person, since it in fact forms a world, that is, a totality where each element has relations of meaning with the others. Of course, mythical consciousness is not a consciousness of a thing: that is, on the subjective side, mythical consciousness is a flow, and it does not

focus upon itself and does not know itself; on the objective side, mythical consciousness does not posit objects in front of itself defined by a certain number of separable properties and articulated in relation to each other. But neither does mythical consciousness carry itself into each of its pulsations, otherwise it would not be conscious of anything at all. It does not step back from its *noemata*, but if it passed away with each of them, if it did not anticipate the movement of objectification, then it would not crystallize in myths. We have tried to shield mythical consciousness from premature rationalizations that, as happens in Comte, for example, render the myth incomprehensible because they seek in the myth an explanation of the world and an anticipation of science. On the contrary, myth is a projection of existence and an expression of the human condition. But understanding the myth does not mean believing in it, and if all myths are true, this is insofar as they can be put back into a phenomenology of spirit that indicates their function in the emergence of self-consciousness and that ultimately grounds their proper sense upon the sense they have for the philosopher.

Likewise, when I demand an account of the dream, I certainly direct my question toward the dreamer that I was that night, but ultimately the dreamer himself recounts nothing, the waking person is the one who recounts the dream. Without the waking up, dreams would only ever be instantaneous modulations, and would not even exist for us. During the
346 dream itself, we do not leave the world behind: the space of the dream isolates itself from clear space, but it nevertheless makes use of all of its articulations – the world haunts us even in sleep, and we dream about the world. Similarly, madness gravitates around the world. To say nothing of those morbid fantasies or fits of delirium that attempted to build for themselves a private domain out of the debris of the macrocosm, the most advanced states of melancholy, where the patient settles into death and, so to speak, makes it his home, still make use of the structures of being in the world in order to do so, and borrow from the world just what is required of being in order to negate it.

[viii. *They are nevertheless constructed upon a natural space.*]*

This link between subjectivity and objectivity that already exists in mythical or infantile consciousness, and that always subsists in sleep or in madness, is found, *a fortiori*, in normal experience. I never live entirely

within these anthropological spaces; I am always rooted to a natural and non-human space. As I cross Place de la Concorde and believe myself to be entirely caught up within Paris, I can focus my eyes upon a stone in the wall of the Tuileries garden – the Concorde disappears and all that remains is this stone without any history; again, I can lose my gaze within this coarse and yellowish surface, and then there is no longer even a stone, and all that remains is a play of light upon an indefinite matter. My total perception is not built out of these analytical perceptions, but it can always dissolve into them; my body, which assures my insertion within the human world through my habitus, only in fact does so by first projecting me into a natural world that always shines through from beneath the others – just as the canvas shines through from beneath the painting – and gives the human world an air of fragility. Even if there is a perception of what is desired through desire, what is loved through love, what is hated through hate, this is always formed around a sensible core, as meager as it might be, and it finds its verification and its plenitude in the sensible.

We have said that space is existential; we could have just as easily said that existence is spatial, that is, through an inner necessity, it opens to an "outside," such that one can speak of a mental space and of a "world of significations and objects of thought that are constituted within those significations."[93] Anthropological spaces present themselves as constructed upon natural space, the "non-objectifying acts," to speak like Husserl, as constructed upon "objectifying acts."[94] What is new in 347
phenomenology is not that it denies the unity of experience, but that it establishes it differently than classical rationalism. For objectifying acts are not representations. Natural and primordial space is not geometrical space, and correlatively the unity of experience is not guaranteed by a universal thinker who spreads the contents of experience out before me and who ensures that I could have complete knowledge and complete power with regard to it. It is only indicated by the horizons of possible objectification, it only frees me from each particular milieu because it binds me to the world of nature or to the world of the in-itself that encompasses them all. We will have to ask how existence simultaneously projects around itself worlds that mask objectivity from me and yet sets this objectivity as a goal for the teleology of consciousness by making these "worlds" stand out against the background of a unique natural world.



Figure 8

tends to become dissociated: at first the line appears locked into position A, then it suddenly frees itself and leaps to position B. If the cadence is accelerated or slowed down further, the movement ends and we see either two simultaneous lines or two successive ones.[46] The perception of positions is thus inversely related to the perception of movement. It can even be shown that movement is never the mobile object's successive occupation of all of the positions situated between two extremes. Whether colored or white figures are used against a black background to produce the stroboscopic movement, the space upon which the movement stretches out is, at no moment, illuminated or colored by it. If a short rod C is inserted between
320 the two extreme positions A and B, the rod is at no moment completed by the movement that passes by (Figure 8). We do not have a "passage of the line," but rather a pure "passage." If use is made of a tachistoscope,[47] then the subject often perceives a movement without being able to say what is moving. When it comes to real movements, the situation is no different: if I see workers unloading a truck and tossing bricks to each other, I see the worker's arm in its initial position and in its final position, and although I do not see it in any intermediary position I nonetheless have a vivid perception of its movement. If I move a pencil quickly across a sheet of paper where I have marked a reference point, at no moment am I aware that the pencil is above the reference point; I see none of the intermediary positions and nevertheless I have the experience of movement. Reciprocally, if I slow the movement down and if I succeed in never losing sight of the pencil, then it is at this very moment that the impression of movement disappears.[48] Movement disappears at the very moment when it conforms most closely to the definition given to it by objective thought. Thus, phenomena can be produced in which the moving object only appears as caught in the movement. For such an object, to move is not to pass through an indefinite series of positions successively; this object is only given as beginning,

carrying out, or completing its movement. Consequently, even in cases where a mobile object is visible, the movement is not for it an extrinsic denomination, nor a relation between itself and the exterior, and we will be able to have movements without reference points. In fact, if a consecutive image of a movement is projected upon a homogeneous field containing no objects and no contours, the movement takes possession of the entire space; the entire visual field moves, just as in the Haunted House at the fair. If the after-image of a concentrically turning spiral is projected upon a screen in the absence of any fixed frame, then it is space itself that vibrates and dilates from the center to the periphery.[49] Finally, since movement is no longer a system of relations external to the moving object itself, nothing prevents us now from acknowledging absolute movements, as perception actually gives it to us at each moment.

[iii. But what does this description mean?]

But against this description, one can still raise the objection that it is meaningless. The psychologist denies the rational analysis of movement, 321
and, when he is reminded that every movement – in order to be movement – must be a movement of something, he responds that "the claim has no basis in psychological description."[50] But if the psychologist is describing a movement, he must be referring to an identical something that moves. If I place my watch on the table in my room, and if it suddenly disappears just to reappear several minutes later in the neighboring room, I will not say there has been movement, there is only movement if the intermediary positions have actually been occupied by the watch.[51] Although the psychologist may show that the stroboscopic movement occurs without any intermediary stimulus between the extreme positions, and even if the line of light A does not journey through the space that separates it from B, even if no light is perceived between A and B during the stroboscopic movement, and finally even if I do not see the pencil or the worker's arm between the two extreme positions, it must nevertheless be the case, in one way or another, that the moving object was present in each point of the trajectory in order for the movement to appear, and if it is not there perceptibly, then this is because it is conceived as being there. What is true of movement is also true of change: when I say that the fakir transforms an egg into a handkerchief, or that the magician transforms into a bird upon the roof of his palace,[52] I do not mean simply

that an object or a being has disappeared and has been instantaneously replaced by another. There must be an internal relation between what is annihilated and what is born; the two must be both manifestations or appearances, or two phases of a single thing that is presented in turn beneath these two forms.[53] Likewise, the arrival of a movement at a point must be one with its "contiguous" point of departure, and this is only the case if there is a moving object that, in a single stroke, leaves one point and occupies another.

> A thing that is grasped as a circle would cease to count for us as a circle as soon as the "round" moment, or the equality of all of the diameters, which is essential to the circle, ceased to be present there. It does not matter whether the circle is perceived or conceived; a common determination must be present in each case that obliges us in both to characterize what appears to us as a circle and to distinguish it from every other phenomenon.[54]

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Similarly, when we speak of a sensation of movement, or of a consciousness of movement that is *sui generis*, or when, following Gestalt theory, we speak of a global movement, or of some phenomenon ϕ in which no moving object and no particular position of the moving object would be given, these are merely words, so long as we do not say how "that which is given in this sensation or in this phenomenon, or that which is grasped through them immediately stands out (*dokumentiert*) as movement."[55] The perception of movement can only be the perception *of movement* and recognize it as such if it apprehends it with its signification of movement and with all of the moments that are constitutive of it, and particularly with the identity of the moving object. Movement, responds the psychologist, is:

> one of those "psychical phenomena" that, as given sensible contents (color and form) are related to the object, appear as objective and not subjective, but which, in contrast to the other psychical givens, are not of a static nature, but are dynamic. For example, the typical and specific "passage" is the flesh and blood of movement, which cannot be formed through composition beginning from ordinary visual contents.[56]

It is indeed impossible to compose movement out of static perceptions. But this is not at issue, and the thought was not to reduce movement to

rest. The object at rest itself needs identification. It cannot be said to be at rest if it is annihilated and recreated at each moment, if it does not subsist through its different instantaneous presentations. The identity to which we are referring is thus anterior to the distinction between movement and rest. Movement is nothing without a moving object that traces it out and that establishes its unity. Here the metaphor of the "dynamic phenomenon" misleads the psychologist: it seems to us that a force guarantees its own unity, but this is because we always presuppose someone who identifies this force in the unfolding of its effects. "Dynamic phenomena" draw their unity from me who lives them, surveys them, and accomplishes their synthesis. Thus, we pass from a thinking of movement that destroys it to an experience of movement that attempts to ground it, but also from this experience to a thinking without which, strictly speaking, that experience would signify nothing.

[iv. *The phenomenon of movement, or movement prior to thematization.*]

Thus, we can side with neither the psychologist nor the logician, or rather we must side with both of them and find the means of recognizing both thesis and antithesis as true. The logician is correct when he demands a constitution of the "dynamic phenomenon" itself and a description of movement through the moving object whose trajectory we follow – but he is wrong when he presents the moving object's identity as an explicit identity, and he is obliged to acknowledge this himself. The psychologist, for his part, is forced against his will to place a moving object in the movement when he describes the phenomena more closely, but he regains the advantage through the concrete manner in which he conceives of the moving object. In the discussion we have just followed and that we used to illustrate the perpetual debate between psychology and logic, in essence, what is Wertheimer trying to say? He means that the perception of movement is not secondary in relation to the perception of the moving object, that one does not have a perception of the moving object here, then there, and subsequently an identification that would connect these positions in succession,[57] that their diversity is not subsumed under a transcendent unity, and finally, that the identity of the moving object bursts forth directly "from experience."[58] In other words, when the psychologist speaks of movement as a phenomenon embracing the starting point A and the end point B (AB), he does not mean that

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there is no subject of movement, but rather that in no case is the subject of movement an object A initially given as present in its place and stationary: insofar as there is movement, the moving object is caught in the movement.

The psychologist would probably agree that there is in every movement if not a movable object [*un mobile*], then at least a *moving object* [*un mouvant*], given that we do not confuse this moving object with any of the static figures that one can obtain by stopping the movement at any
324 given point of the trajectory. And here is where he gains the advantage over the logician. For having failed to regain contact with the experience of movement beyond all unquestioned beliefs touching upon the world, the logician only speaks of movement in itself; he poses the problem of movement in terms of being, which ultimately renders it insoluble. Consider, he says, the different appearances (*Erscheinungen*) of movement at different points in the trajectory: they will only be apparitions of a single movement if they are appearances of a single movable object, of a single *Erscheinende* [appearance], or of a single something that appears (*darstellt*) through them all. But the movable object only needs to be posited as a separate being if its appearances at different points of the journey have themselves been actualized as discrete perspectives. In principle, the logician is only familiar with thetic consciousness, and it is this postulate or supposition of an entirely determinate world, of a pure being, that burdens his conception of the manifold, and consequently his conception of synthesis. The movable object [*le mobile*], or rather, as we have said, the moving object [*le mouvant*], is not identical *beneath* the phases of the movement; it is identical *in* them. It is not because I find the same stone on the ground that I believe in its identity throughout the course of the movement. On the contrary, it is because I perceived it as identical throughout the course of the movement – an implicit identity that remains to be described – that I go and collect it and that I find it. We must not actualize within the moving-stone everything that we otherwise know about the stone. The logician says that, if it is a circle that I am perceiving, then all of its diameters are equal. But in this account, it would be necessary to put into the perceived circle all of the properties that the geometer has discovered there or could discover there. Now, it is the circle as a thing of the world that possesses, in advance and in itself, all of the properties that analysis will discover there. Circular tree trunks already had, before Euclid, the properties that Euclid discovered. But in the circle as a phenomenon, such as it appeared to the Greeks prior to Euclid, the square of the tangent was not equal to the product of the secant completed by its exterior portion: this square and this product do not figure in the phenomenon, and neither did the equal radii necessarily figure there either. The movable object, as the object of an indefinite series of explicit and concordant perceptions, has properties, while the moving object merely has a style. It is impossible for the perceived circle to have unequal diameters or for the movement to exist without any moving object. But the 325
perceived circle no more has equal diameters because it has no diameters at all. It stands out for me, it makes itself recognized and distinguished from every other figure by its circular physiognomy, and not by any "properties" that thetic consciousness will later discover in it. Likewise, movement does not necessarily presuppose a movable object, that is, an object defined by a collection of determinate properties; rather, it is enough that it contains "something that moves," at the very most a "colored something" or "something luminous" without any actual color or light. The logician excludes this tertiary hypothesis: the rays of the circle must be either equal or unequal, the movement must either have a movable object or not. But he can only do this by taking the circle as a thing or the movement in itself. Now, as we have seen, this is ultimately to render movement impossible. The logician would have nothing to think about, not even an appearance of movement, if there were no movement prior to the objective world that might serve as the source of all of our claims touching upon movement, if there were no phenomena prior to being that can be recognized, identified, and of which we can speak – in short, phenomena that have a sense, even though they have not yet been thematized.[59] The psychologist leads us back to this phenomenal layer. We shall not say that it is irrational or anti-logical. This would only be the positing of a movement without a moving object. Only the explicit negation of the moving object would be contrary to the principle of the excluded middle. We must simply say that the phenomenal layer is, literally, pre-logical and will always remain so.

Our picture of the world can only be composed in part with being; we must also acknowledge the phenomenal within it, which completely surrounds being. We are not asking the logician to take into consideration experiences that reason takes to be merely non-sense or contradictory [*faux-sens*], we simply wish to push back the limits of what has sense for us and to put the narrow zone of thematic sense back into the zone

of non-thematic sense that embraces it. The thematization of movement ends in the identical moving object and in the relativity of movement, that is, it destroys movement. If we want to take the phenomenon of
326 movement seriously, we must imagine a world that is not merely made up of things, but also of pure transitions. The something in transit that we have recognized as necessary for the constitution of a change is only defined by its particular way of "passing by." For example, the bird that crosses my garden is, in the very moment of the movement, merely a grayish power of flight and, in a general way, we shall see that things are primarily defined by their "behavior," and not by static "properties." It is not I who recognize, in each point and in each instant passed through, the same bird defined by explicit properties; rather, it is the bird in flight that accomplishes the unity of its movement, it is the bird that changes place, and it is this feathery commotion still here which is already over there, in a sort of ubiquity, like the comet and its tail. Pre-objective being, or the non-thematized moving something, does not pose any other problem than the space and time of implication, a problem we have already touched upon. We have said that the parts of space, according to breadth, height, or depth, are not juxtaposed, that they rather coexist because they are all enveloped in the unique hold that our body has upon the world, and this relation was already clarified when we showed that it was temporal prior to being spatial. Things coexist in space because they are *present* to the same perceiving subject and enveloped in a single temporal wave. But the unity and the individuality of each temporal wave is only possible if it is squeezed between the preceding one and the following one, and if the same temporal pulsation that makes it spring forth still retains the preceding one and holds the one to follow in advance. It is objective time that is made up of successive moments. The lived present contains a past and a future within its thickness. The phenomenon of movement only manifests spatial and temporal implication in a more noticeable way. We know a movement and a moving something without any consciousness of the objective positions, just as we know a distant object and its true size without any interpretation, and just as at each moment we know the place of an event in the thickness of our past without any explicit recollection. Movement is a modulation of an already familiar milieu, and it brings us back once again to our central problem, which is to understand how this milieu, which serves as the background of every act of consciousness, is constituted.[60]

[v. *Movement and the thing moving.*]

The positing of a self-same movable object led to the relativity of 327
movement. Now that we have reintroduced movement into the moving object, it can only be interpreted in one sense: it begins in the moving object and unfolds into the field from there. I am not free to see the stone as immobile and the garden and myself in motion. Movement is not an hypothesis whose probability is measured through the number of facts 328
that it coordinates in the manner of a theory in physics. That would only give a possible movement. Movement is a fact. The stone is not conceived as moving, it is seen moving. For the hypothesis "it is the stone that moves" would have no proper signification, it would not distinguish itself in any way from the hypothesis "it is the garden that moves," if movement, in reality and for reflection, amounted to a simple change of relations. Movement, then, inhabits the stone. But are we going to side with the realism of the psychologist? Are we going to place movement into the stone as a quality? Movement presupposes no relation to an explicitly perceived object and it remains possible in a perfectly homogeneous field. Moreover, every movable object is given in a field. Just as we need a moving something in movement, so too do we need a background of movement. The claim that the borders of the visual field always provide an objective reference point was wrong.[61] Once again, the border of the visual field is not a real line. Our visual field is not cut out of our objective world, it is not a fragment with well-defined borders like the landscape that is framed by the window. In the visual field we see just as far as the hold of our gaze upon the things extends – well beyond the zone of clear vision, and even behind ourselves. When we reach the limits of the visual field, we do not go from vision to non-vision: the phonograph playing in the neighboring room and which I do not explicitly see still counts in my visual field; reciprocally, what we do see is always, in some respect, not seen: there must be hidden sides of things and things "behind us" if there is to be a "front" of things, or things "in front of us" and, in short, a perception. The limits of the visual field are a necessary moment of the organization of the world and not an objective contour. But finally, it is nonetheless true that an object travels through our visual field, that it changes place within it, and that movement has no sense 329
outside of this relation. Depending upon which part of the visual field we give the value of figure or the value of background, it appears to us

either in movement or at rest. If we are on a boat that skirts the coast, it is certainly true, as Leibniz said, that we can either see the coast flowing by us or take the coast as a fixed point and sense the boat moving.

[vi. *The "relativity" of movement.*]*

Do we thus side with the logician? Not at all, for to say that movement is a structural phenomenon is not to say that it is "relative." The very particular relation that is constitutive of movement is not *between objects*, and the psychologist does not ignore this relation, but rather describes it much better than does the logician. The coast flows by before our eyes if we keep our eyes fixed upon the ship's railing, while the boat moves when we stare at the coast. Of two luminous points in the dark, one immobile and the other moving, the one that we focus upon seems to be moving.[62] The cloud flies over the steeple and the river flows beneath the bridge when we stare at the cloud or the river. The steeple falls through the sky and the bridge slides over the congealed river when we stare at the steeple or the bridge. What gives the status "moving object" to one part of the visual field, and the status "background" to another is the manner in which we establish our relations with it through the act of looking. What could the words "the stone flies through the air" mean if not that our gaze, being established and anchored in the garden, is solicited by the stone and, so to speak, pulls on its anchors. The relation between the moving object and its background passes through our body. How should we conceive of this mediation by the body? How does it happen that the relations between the body and objects can determine the latter as either moving or at rest? Is not our body an object, and does it not also need to be determined under the relation of rest and of movement? It is often said that objects remain immobile for us during the movement of the eyes because we take into account the shifting of the eyes and because, finding it exactly proportional to the change in appearances, we conclude in favor of the immobility of the objects. In fact, if we have no awareness of the shifting of the eyes, such as in passive movement, then the object seems to move; if, as in the case of paresis of the oculomotor muscles, we have the illusion of a
330 movement of the eye without the relation of objects to our eye seeming to change, we believe we see a movement of the object. It seems at first that – the relation of the object to my eye, such as it is inscribed upon

the retina, being given to consciousness – we could obtain the rest or the degree of movement of objects through subtraction by bringing into the account the shifting or rest of our eye.

In fact, this analysis is entirely fictional and ideal for concealing from us the true relation from the body to the spectacle. When I transfer my gaze from one object to another, I have no consciousness of my eye as an object, as a globe suspended in its socket, of its shifting or of its rest in objective space, nor of what results upon the retina. The elements of the supposed calculation are not given to me. The immobility of the thing is not deduced from the act of seeing, it is rigorously simultaneous; the two phenomena envelop each other: they are not two elements of an algebraic sum, but rather two moments of an organization that encompasses them. My eye is, for me, a certain power for encountering things; it is not a screen upon which things are projected. The relation between my eye and the object is not given to me in the form of a geometrical projection of the object into the eye, but rather as a certain hold that my eye has upon the object – still vague in peripheral vision, more narrow and more precise when I focus upon the object. What I lack in the passive movement of the eye is not the objective representation of its moving within the eye socket, which is in no case given to me, but rather the precise gearing of my gaze to the objects, without which the objects are no longer capable of fixity, nor for that matter of true movements. For, when I press upon my eyeball, I do not perceive a true movement, it is not the things themselves that are moved, but merely a tiny film upon their surface. Finally, in the case of a paresis of the oculomotor muscles, I do not explain the constancy of the retinal image through a movement of the object, rather I experience [*j'éprouve*] that the hold my gaze has upon the object does not relax, my gaze carries the object along with it and shifts the object as it shifts. Thus my eye is never an object in perception. If we can ever speak of a movement without a moving object, then it is surely in the case of one's own body. The movement of my eye toward what it will focus upon is not the shifting of one object in relation to another object, it is a march toward the real. My eye is moving or at rest in relation to a thing that it is approaching or that flees from it. If the body provides the ground or the background to the perception of movement that perception needs to establish itself, it does so as a perceiving power, insofar as it is established in a certain domain and geared into a world. Rest and movement 331
appear *between* an object that is not in itself determined according to rest

and movement, and my body that, as an object, is no more determined in this way when my body becomes anchored in certain objects. As with up and down, movement is a phenomenon of levels, every movement presupposes a certain anchorage that can vary.

So that is what one can validly mean when speaking confusedly about the relativity of movement. But what exactly is anchorage and how does it constitute a background at rest? This is not an explicit perception. Anchorage points, when we focus upon them, are not objects. The steeple only begins to move when I leave the sky to peripheral vision. It is essential to the supposed reference points of movement not to be thematized in actual knowledge and to be always "already there." They are not presented directly to perception, they circumvent it and haunt it through a preconscious operation whose results appear to us as ready-made. Cases of ambiguous perception, where we can choose our anchorage as we please, are cases in which our perception is artificially cut off from its context and its past, in which we do not perceive with our entire being, in which we play with our body and with that generality that allows it to break at any time with all historical engagement, and to function on its own account. But even if we can break with a human world, we cannot prevent ourselves from focusing our eyes – which means that so long as we live we remain engaged, if not in a human milieu, then at least in a physical milieu – and for a given focusing of the gaze, perception is not facultative. It is even less so when the life of the body is integrated into our concrete existence. I am free to see my train or the neighboring train moving, whether I do nothing or whether I examine myself on the illusions of movement. But:

> When I am playing cards in my compartment, I see the train move on the next track even if it is in reality my own train which is moving, but when I am looking at the other train, searching perhaps for an acquaintance in the coach, then it is my own train that seems to be moving.[63]

The compartment where we take up residence is "at rest," its walls are "vertical," and the landscape passes by in front of us; on one side the fir trees seen through the window appear to us as diagonal. If we place ourselves at the window, we re-enter the large world beyond our small one, the firs straighten up and remain immobile, the train leans with the slope and speeds through the countryside. The relativity of movement is reduced to

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the power we have of changing domains within the large world. Once we are engaged in a milieu, we see movement appear before us as an absolute. On condition of taking into account not only explicit acts of knowledge or *cogitationes*, but also the more secret act, always in the past, by which we take up a world, and on condition of acknowledging a non-thetic consciousness, we can accept what the psychologist calls "absolute movement" without falling into the difficulties of realism and we can understand the phenomenon of movement without our logic destroying it.

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[D. *Lived Space.*]

[i. *The experience of spatiality expresses our being firmly set within the world.*]

We have until now only considered, as do classical philosophy and psychology, the *perception of space*, that is, the knowledge that a disinterested subject could have of spatial relations between objects and of their geometrical characteristics. And yet, even in analyzing this abstract function, which is far from covering our entire experience of space, we have been led to uncover the subject's being firmly set within a milieu and, ultimately, his inherence in the world as the condition of spatiality. In other words, we had to acknowledge that spatial perception is a structural phenomenon and is only understood from within a perceptual field that, as a whole, contributes to motivating it by proposing to the concrete subject a possible anchorage. The classical problem of the perception of space and of perception in general must be reintegrated into a larger problem. To ask oneself how spatial relations and objects with their "properties" can be determined in an explicit act is to ask a second-order question, it is to present an act that only appears against the background of an already familiar world as if it were originary, it is to admit that one has not yet become conscious of the experience of the world. In the natural attitude, I have no *perceptions*, I do not posit this object as next to that other one along with their objective relations. Rather, I have a flow of experiences that implicate and explicate each other just as much in simultaneity as they do in succession. For me, Paris is not a thousand-sided object or a collection of perceptions, nor for that matter the law of all of these

perceptions. Just as a human being manifests the same affective essence in his hand gestures, his gait, and the sound of his voice, each explicit
333 perception in my journey through Paris – the cafés, the faces, the poplars along the quays, the bends of the Seine – is cut out of the total being of Paris, and only serves to confirm a certain style or a certain sense of Paris. And when I arrived there for the first time, the first streets that I saw upon leaving the train station were – like the first words of a stranger – only manifestations of a still ambiguous, though already incomparable essence. In fact, we hardly perceive any objects at all, just as we do not see the eyes of a familiar face, but rather its gaze and its expression. There is here a latent sense, diffused throughout the landscape or the town, that we uncover in a specific evidentness without having to define it. Ambiguous perceptions are the only ones to emerge as explicit acts, that is, the ones to which we ourselves give a sense through the attitude that we adopt, or the ones that respond to questions that we pose. They cannot, however, be of any use in the analysis of the perceptual field since they are drawn out of it, since they presuppose it, and since we obtain them precisely by making use of the structures we acquired in our regular dealings with the world. An initial perception without any background is inconceivable. Every perception presupposes a certain past of the subject, and the abstract function of perception – as the encounter with objects – implies a more secret act by which we elaborate our milieu.

Under the influence of mescaline, sometimes objects appear to shrink as they approach. A limb or a part of the body (hand, mouth, or tongue) appears enormous and the rest of the body is no longer anything other than an appendage to it.[64] The walls of the room are 150 meters from each other, and above them there is but a vast and deserted expanse. The extended hand is as high as the wall. External space and bodily space break apart to the point that the subject has the impression of eating "from one dimension into the other."[65] At certain moments, movement is no longer seen and people are transported in a magical way from one point to another.[66] The subject is alone and abandoned to an empty space, "he complains of only seeing clearly the space between things, and this space is empty. Objects are still there in a certain way, but not as they should be . . ."[67] Men seem like puppets, and their movements are accom-
334 plished with a magical slowness. The leaves of the trees lose their framework and their organization: each point of the leaf has the same value as all others.[68] One schizophrenic says:

> a bird is chirping in the garden. I hear the bird, and I know that it is chirping, but that this is a bird and that it chirps are two things so far removed from each other . . . there is an abyss . . . as if the bird and the chirping had nothing to do with each other.[69]

Another patient can no longer "understand" the clock, that is, first the passing of the hands from one position to another and above all the connection of this movement with the thrust of the mechanism or the "workings" of the clock.[70]

These disturbances do not have to do with perception as a knowledge of the world: the enormous parts of the body or the nearby objects that are too small are not posited as such; the walls of the room are not, for the patient, as distant from each other in the manner of the two ends of a soccer pitch for a normal person. The subject knows quite well that his food and his own body reside in the same space, since he picks up his food with his hand. Space is "empty," and yet all of the objects of perception are there. The disturbance does not bear upon the information that one can draw out of perception, and it reveals a deeper life of consciousness beneath "perception." Even when there is a lack of perception [imperception], as happens with regard to movement, the perceptual deficit seems to be merely an extreme case of a more general disturbance that has to do with the structuring of the phenomena with each other. There is a bird and there is some chirping, but the bird no longer chirps. There is a movement of the hands and a movement of a mechanism, but the clock no longer "works." Similarly, certain parts of my body are disproportionately large and the nearby objects are too small because the ensemble no longer forms a system. Now, if the world falls to pieces or is broken apart, this is because one's own body has ceased to be a knowing body and has ceased to envelop all of the objects in a single hold; and this degradation of the body into an organism must be itself related to the collapse of time, which no longer rises toward a future, but rather falls back upon itself.

> Before, I was a man, with a soul and a living body (*Leib*) and now I am nothing more than a being (*Wesen*) . . . now, there is no longer anything 335
> there but the organism (*Körper*) and the soul is dead . . . I hear and I see, but I no longer know anything, life has become a problem for me . . . now I live on in eternity . . . The branches on the trees sway, and

> others move about in the room, but for me time does not pass by . . . Thought has changed, there is no more style . . . What is the future? One cannot anticipate it . . . Everything is in question . . . Everything is so monotone, morning, noon, and night; past, present, and future. Everything always begins again.[71]

The perception of space is not a particular class of "states of consciousness" or of acts, and its modalities always express the total life of the subject, the energy with which he tends toward a future through his body and his world.[72]

[ii. *The spatiality of the night.*]

Thus, we are forced to broaden our research: once the experience of spatiality has been related to our being firmly set within the world, there will be an original spatiality for each modality of this anchorage. When, for example, the world of clear and articulated objects is abolished, our perceptual being, now cut off from its world, sketches out a spatiality without things. This is what happens at night. The night is not an object in front of me; rather, it envelops me, it penetrates me through all of my senses, it suffocates my memories, and it all but effaces my personal identity. I am no longer withdrawn into my observation post in order to see the profiles of objects flowing by in the distance. The night is without profiles, it itself touches me and its unity is the mystical unity of the *mana*. Even cries, or a distant light, only populate it vaguely; it becomes entirely animated; it is a pure depth without planes, without surfaces, and without any distance from it to me.[73] For reflection, every space is sustained by a thought that connects its parts, but this thought is not accomplished from nowhere. On the contrary, it is from within nocturnal space that I unite with it. The anxiety of neurotics at night comes from the fact that the night makes us sense our contingency, that free and inexhaustible movement by which we attempt to anchor ourselves and to transcend ourselves in things, without there being any guarantee of always finding them.

[iii. *Sexual space.*]*

– But the night is still not our most striking experience of the unreal: at night I can hold onto the structures of the day, such as when I feel my
336 way through my apartment, and in any case the night is located within

the general frame of nature; even in pitch black space there is something reassuring and worldly. During sleep, however, I only keep the world present in order to hold it at a distance, I turn toward the subjective sources of my existence, and the fantasies of dreams reveal even more clearly the general spatiality in which clear space and observable objects are embedded. Consider, for example, the themes of elevation and of falling, so frequent in dreams and, for that matter, in myths and in poetry. We know that the appearance of these themes in the dream can be related to concomitant respiratory events or to sexual drives, and a first step is made by recognizing the living and sexual signification of up and down. But these explanations do not get very far, for elevation and falling as dreamed are not in visible space in the manner of the waking perceptions of desire and of respiratory movements. We need to understand why, at a given moment, the dreamer lends himself entirely to the bodily facts of breathing and of desire and hence infuses them with a general and symbolic signification to the point of only seeing them appear in the dream in the form of an image – such as the image of a giant bird that glides and that, hit by a bullet, falls and is reduced to a small pile of burnt paper. We need to understand how respiratory or sexual events, which have their place in objective space, detach from that space in the dream and are established within a different theater.

We shall not reach this understanding if we do not grant the body an emblematic value, even in the waking state. Between our emotions, desires, and bodily attitudes, there is neither merely a contingent connection nor even a relation of analogy: if I say that in disappointment I fall down from my high, this is not merely because it is accompanied by gestures of prostration in virtue of the laws of the nervous system, or because I discover between the object of my desire and my desire itself the same relation as between an object placed up high and my gesture toward it. Rather, the movement upward as a direction in physical space and the movement of desire toward its goal are symbolic of each other because they both express the same essential structure of our being as a situated being in relation to a milieu, and we have already seen that this structure alone gives a sense to the directions up and down in the physical world. When one speaks of a high or low morale, one does not extend to the psychological domain a relation that could only have its full sense in the physical world; rather, one uses "a direction of signification that, so to speak, crosses the different regional spheres and receives

337 in each one a particular signification (spatial, auditive, spiritual, psychical, etc.)."[74] The fantasies of the dream, those of the myth, each man's favorite images, or finally the poetic image are not connected to their sense through a relation of sign to signification, such as the one that exists between a telephone number and the name of the subscriber. They genuinely contain their sense, which is not a notional sense, but a direction of our existence. When I dream that I am flying or that I am falling, the entire sense of the dream is contained in this flight or in this fall, so long as I do not reduce them to their physical appearance in the waking world and consider them with all of their existential implications. The bird that glides, falls, and becomes a handful of cinders, does not glide and does not fall in physical space; it rises and falls with the existential tide that runs through it, or again it is the pulsation of my existence, its systole and its diastole. The level of this tide at each moment determines a space of fantasies, as, in waking life, our commerce with the world that is presented determines a space of realities. There is a determination of up and down and, in general, a determination of "place" that precedes "perception." Life and sexuality haunt their world and their space.

[iv. *Mythical space.*]*

To the extent that they live within the myth, primitive persons do not transcend this existential space, and this is why dreams count for them as much as perceptions. There is a mythical space where directions and positions are determined by the placement of great affective entities. For a primitive person, knowing the whereabouts of the clan's encampment does not involve locating it in relation to some landmark: for the encampment is in fact the landmark of all landmarks. Rather, to know this location is to tend toward it as if toward the natural place of a certain peace or a certain joy, just as, for me, knowing where my hand is involves joining myself to this agile power that is dormant for the moment, but that I can take up and discover as my own. For the augur, the right and the left are the sources from which the blessed or the ill-fated arrive, just as for me my right hand and my left hand are respectively the embodiment of my dexterity and of my clumsiness. In the dream, as in the myth, we learn *where* the phenomenon is located by sensing [*en éprouvant*] what our desire moves toward, what strikes fear in our hearts, and upon what our life depends.

[v. *Lived space.*]*

Even in waking life, things do not proceed otherwise. I arrive in a village for the holidays, happy to leave behind my work and my ordinary surroundings. I settle into the village. It becomes the center of my life. The low level of water in the river, or the corn or walnut harvest, are events 338
for me. But if a friend comes to see me and brings news from Paris, or if the radio and newspapers inform me that there are threats of war, then I feel exiled in this village, excluded from real life, and imprisoned far away from everything. Our body and our perception always solicit us to take the landscape they offer as the center of the world. But this landscape is not necessarily the landscape of our life. I can "be elsewhere" while remaining here, and if I am kept far from what I love, I feel far from the center of real life. Bovarism and certain forms of homesickness are examples of a decentered life. The maniac, however, centers himself everywhere: "his mental space is large and luminous, his thought, sensitive to all the objects that are presented, flies from one to the other and is drawn into their movement."[75] Beyond the physical or geometrical distance existing between me and all things, a lived distance links me to things that count and exist for me, and links them to each other. At each moment, this distance measures the "scope" of my life.[76] Sometimes between me and events there is a certain leeway (*Spielraum*) that preserves my freedom without the events ceasing to touch me. Sometimes, however, the lived distance is at once too short and too wide: the majority of events cease to count for me, whereas the nearest ones consume me. They envelop me like the night, and they rob me of individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe. I am possessed.[77] At the same time, the events gather together. One patient senses a cold draft, a scent of chestnuts, and the freshness of the rain. Perhaps, he says, "at this exact moment a person, suffering from suggestions like me, passed under the rain and in front of someone selling grilled chestnuts."[78] One schizophrenic, under the care of both Minkowski and the village priest, believes that they have 339
met to talk about him.[79] One elderly schizophrenic woman believes that a person who resembles another person must have known the latter.[80] The contraction of lived space, which no longer leaves the patient any leeway, no longer leaves any role for chance to play. Causality, like space, is established upon my relation to things prior to being a relation between objects. The "short circuits"[81] of delirious causality and the long causal

chains of methodical thought express ways of existing:[82] "the experience of space is intertwined (. . .) with all other modes of experience and all other psychical givens."[83] Clear space, that impartial space where all objects have the same importance and the same right to exist, is not merely surrounded, but also wholly penetrated by another spatiality that morbid variations reveal. One schizophrenic stops in the mountains and views the landscape. After a moment, he feels threatened. A particular interest arises in him for everything that surrounds him, as if a question had been posed from the outside to which he can find no answer. Suddenly the landscape is snatched away from him by some alien force. It is as if a second limitless sky were penetrating the blue sky of the evening. This new sky is empty, "subtle, invisible, and terrifying." Sometimes it moves into the autumn landscape, and sometimes the landscape itself moves. And during this time, says the patient, "a permanent question is asked of me; it is like an order to stay put or to die, or to go farther."[84] This second space permeating visible space is the one that composes, at each moment, our own manner of projecting the world, and the schizophrenic disorder consists merely in that this perpetual project is dissociated from the objective world such as it is still offered by perception, and it withdraws, so to speak, into itself. The schizophrenic patient no longer lives in the common world, but in a private world; he does not go all the way to geographical space, he remains within "the space of the landscape,"[85] and this landscape itself, once cut off from the common world, is considerably impoverished. This results in the schizophrenic questioning:
340 everything is amazing, absurd, or unreal because the movement of existence toward things no longer has its energy, because it appears along with its contingency, and because the world is no longer self-evident. If the natural space of classical psychology is on the contrary reassuring and evident, then this is because existence rushes into it and forgets itself there.

[vi. *Do these spaces presuppose geometrical space?*]

This description of anthropological space could be developed indefinitely.[86] The objection that will be raised by objective thought, however, is obvious: do these descriptions have any philosophical value? That is: do they teach us something concerning the very structure of consciousness, or do they merely give us the contents of human experience? Are

dream space, mythical space, and schizophrenic space genuine spaces, can they exist and be thought by themselves, or do they not presuppose geometrical space as the condition of their possibility, and along with it the pure constituting consciousness that deploys it? The left, the region of misfortune and of bad omens for the primitive person – or in my body the left as the side of my clumsiness – is only determined as a direction if I am first capable of conceiving of its relation with the right, and this relation ultimately gives a spatial sense to the terms between which it is established. The primitive person does not somehow aim at a space with his anxiety or with his joy, just as it is not with my pain that I know where my injured foot: lived anxiety, lived joy, and lived pain are related to a place in objective space where their empirical conditions are found. Without this agile consciousness, free with regard to all contents and deploying them in space, the contents would never be anywhere. If we reflect upon the mythical experience of space, and if we ask ourselves what it means, we will necessarily find that it rests upon the consciousness of objective and unique space, for a space that could neither be objective nor unique could not be a space, is it not essential for space to 341
be the absolute and correlative "outside," but also the negation of subjectivity, and is it not essential for space to embrace every being one could imagine, since everything one would like to posit outside of it would, for the same reasons, be in relation with it, and thus in it?

The dreamer dreams, and that is why his respiratory movements and his sexual impulses are not taken for what they are, and why they break the moorings that tie them to the world and drift before him in the form of the dream. But ultimately what does he really see? Shall we take his word for it? If he wants to know what he sees and to understand his dream himself, he will have to awaken. Sexuality will immediately return to its genital refuge, anxiety and its phantasms will again become what they always were: some respiratory obstruction in the ribcage. The dark space[87] that invades the schizophrenic's world can only justify itself as space and provide its spatial qualifications by linking itself to clear space. If the patient claims that there is a second space around him, we will ask him: but then *where* is it? By seeking to locate this phantom, he will make it disappear as a phantom. And since – as he himself admits – objects are still there, he still keeps, with clear space, the means of exorcising the phantoms and of returning to the shared world. Phantoms are the debris of the clear world, and borrow from it all the prestige they can have. Finally, in the same way,

when we attempt to establish geometrical space and its intra-mundane relations upon the originary existence of spatiality, it will be objected that thought only knows itself or things, that a spatiality of the subject is not conceivable, and that consequently our proposition is strictly meaningless. We shall respond that it has no thematic or explicit sense, and that it certainly disappears when placed before objective thought. But it does have a non-thematic or implicit sense and this is not a *lesser sense*, for objective thought itself sustains itself on the unreflected and presents itself as a making explicit of the unreflective life of consciousness, to the extent that radical reflection cannot consist in thematizing as parallel the world or space and the non-temporal subject who thinks them, but rather must catch hold of this thematization itself within the horizons of implications that give it its sense. If reflecting is to seek the originary, that by which the rest can be and can be thought, then reflection cannot enclose itself in objective thought, but must think precisely objective thought's acts of thematization and must restore their context.

In other words, objective thought refuses the supposed phenomena
342 of the dream, of the myth, and in general of existence because it finds them inconceivable, and because they mean nothing of which it can thematize. It refuses the fact or the real in the name of the possible and the evident. But it does not see that what is evident is itself established upon a fact. Reflective analysis believes that it knows what the dreamer and the schizophrenic experience better than the dreamer or the schizophrenic himself; moreover, the philosopher believes that he knows what he sees better in reflection than he knows it in perception. And it is on this condition alone that he can reject anthropological spaces as merely confused appearances of true, unique, and objective space. But by doubting the testimony of another person with regard to himself, or the testimony of his own perception with regard to itself, the philosopher strips himself of the right to declare what he grasps as evident to be absolutely true, even if, in this evidentness, he is conscious of eminently understanding the dreamer, the madman, or perception. There are only two options: either he who lives something knows at the same time what he lives, and then the madman, the dreamer, and the subject of perception must be taken at their word, and we must merely verify that their language expresses clearly what they live, or he who lives something is not the judge of what he lives, and hence the lived experience of evidentness [*l'épreuve de l'évidence*] can be an illusion.

In order to drain mythical experience, dream experience, or perceptual experience of all positive value, that is, in order to reintegrate these spaces into geometrical space, we must, in short, deny that one ever dreams, that one is ever a madman, or that one ever truly sees. As long as we acknowledge the dream, madness, or perception as, at the very least, absences of reflection – and how could we not if we want to maintain a value for the testimony of consciousness, without which no truth is possible – then we do not have the right to level out all experiences into a single world, nor all modalities of existence into a single consciousness. In order to do this, we would need to have available a higher authority to which one could submit perceptive consciousness and fantastical consciousness, a me more intimate to myself than me who thinks my dream or my perception when I limit myself to dreaming or to perceiving, a me who possesses the true substance of my dream and of my perception while I only have the appearance of this. But this very distinction between appearance and the real is made neither in the world of the myth, nor in the world of the patient or the child. The myth fits the essence into the appearance; the mythical phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence. The demon of the rain is present in each drop that falls after the incantation, just as the soul is present in each part of the body. Every "apparition" (Erscheinung)[88] is 343
here an embodiment and beings are not so much defined by "properties" as they are by physiognomic characteristics. This is what can be legitimately meant in speaking of an infantile and primitive animism: not that the child and the primitive person perceive the objects that they would like, as Comte says, to explain through intentions or consciousnesses, for consciousness as an object belongs to thetic thought, but rather because things are taken to be the incarnation of what they express, because their human signification rushes into them and is presented, literally, as what they mean. A passing shadow or a creaking tree have a sense; there are warnings everywhere, without anyone who is doing the warning.[89] Given that mythical consciousness does not yet have the notion of "thing" or of an objective truth, how could it accomplish a critique of what it thinks it experiences, where might it find a fixed point to pause and to notice itself as a pure consciousness and notice, beyond the phantasms, the true world?

One schizophrenic senses that a brush, placed close to his window, comes closer to him and enters into his head, and nevertheless at no

moment does he cease knowing that the brush is over there.[90] If he looks toward the window, he again perceives it. The brush, as an identifiable term of an explicit perception, is not in the patient's head as a material mass. But the patient's head is not, for him, this object that everyone can see and that he himself can see in a mirror; rather, it is that listening and look-out post that he senses at the top of his body, or that power of joining with all objects through vision and hearing. In the same way, the brush that falls under the senses is only an envelope or a phantom; the real brush, the stiff and prickly being that is embodied in these appearances and that is concentrated by the gaze, has left the window and has thus left behind merely an inert shell. No appeal to explicit perception can awaken the patient from this dream since he does not deny the explicit perception, but simply holds that it proves nothing against what he experiences [*ce qu'il éprouve*]. "You don't hear my voices?" one patient asks the doctor; and she concludes calmly: "so I am alone in hearing them."[91] What protects the healthy man against delirium or hallucination
344 is not his reason [*sa critique*], but rather the structure of his space: objects remain in front of him, they keep their distance and, as Malebranche said about Adam, they only touch him with respect. What brings about the hallucination and the myth is the contraction of lived space, the rooting of things in our body, the overwhelming proximity of the object, the solidarity between man and the world, which is not abolished but repressed by everyday perception or by objective thought, and which philosophical consciousness rediscovers. Of course, if I reflect upon the consciousness of positions and directions in the myth, the dream, and perception, if I thematize them and fix them according to the methods of objective thought, I discover in them the relations of geometrical space. It must not be concluded from this that these relations were already there, but inversely that this is not genuine reflection. In order to know what mythical or schizophrenic space means, we have no other means than of awakening in ourselves, in our current perception, the relation between the subject and his world that reflective analysis makes disappear. We must acknowledge "expressive experiences" (*Ausdruckserlebnisse*) as prior to "acts of signification" (*bedeutungsgebende Akten*) by theoretical and thetic consciousness; we must acknowledge "expressive sense" (*Ausdrucks-Sinn*) as prior to "significative sense" (*Zeichen-Sinn*); and we must acknowledge the symbolic "pregnancy" of form in content as prior to the subsumption of content under form.[92]

[vii. *These spaces must be recognized as original.*]

Does this mean that we must side with psychologism? Since there are as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences, and since we do not allow ourselves to set up the configurations of adult, normal, and civilized experience in advance within infantile, morbid, or primitive experience, do we not thereby enclose each type of subjectivity and, ultimately, each consciousness within its private life? In place of the rationalist *cogito*, which discovered a universal constituting consciousness within me, have we not substituted the psychologist's *cogito* that remains within the experience [*l'épreuve*] of its incommunicable life? Are we not again defining subjectivity through the coinciding of everyone with it? The examination of space and, in general, of experience in the nascent state prior to their being objectified, and the decision to ask experience itself for its own sense, in a word, phenomenology, does this not ultimately lead to the negation of being and the negation of sense? Are we not simply reintroducing appearance and opinion under the name "phenomenon"? Does phenomenology not place at the origin of precise knowledge a decision just as unjustifiable as the one that encloses the madman in his madness, and is not the final word of this wisdom to lead 345
back to the anxiety of idle and isolated subjectivity?

These are the equivocations that remain for us to clear up. Mythical or dreamlike consciousness, madness, and perception, despite all their differences, are not self-enclosed; they are not islands of experience without any communication and from which one cannot escape. We have refused to locate geometrical space as immanent within mythical space and, in general, to subordinate all of experience to an absolute consciousness of that experience that would situate it within the totality of truth, because the unity of consciousness, conceived in this way, makes its variety incomprehensible. But mythical consciousness opens onto an horizon of possible objectifications. The primitive person lives his myths against a perceptual background that is articulated clearly enough such that the acts of daily life – fishing, hunting, or relations with civilized persons – are possible. The myth itself, as diffuse as it might be, has an identifiable sense for the primitive person, since it in fact forms a world, that is, a totality where each element has relations of meaning with the others. Of course, mythical consciousness is not a consciousness of a thing: that is, on the subjective side, mythical consciousness is a flow, and it does not

focus upon itself and does not know itself; on the objective side, mythical consciousness does not posit objects in front of itself defined by a certain number of separable properties and articulated in relation to each other. But neither does mythical consciousness carry itself into each of its pulsations, otherwise it would not be conscious of anything at all. It does not step back from its *noemata*, but if it passed away with each of them, if it did not anticipate the movement of objectification, then it would not crystallize in myths. We have tried to shield mythical consciousness from premature rationalizations that, as happens in Comte, for example, render the myth incomprehensible because they seek in the myth an explanation of the world and an anticipation of science. On the contrary, myth is a projection of existence and an expression of the human condition. But understanding the myth does not mean believing in it, and if all myths are true, this is insofar as they can be put back into a phenomenology of spirit that indicates their function in the emergence of self-consciousness and that ultimately grounds their proper sense upon the sense they have for the philosopher.

Likewise, when I demand an account of the dream, I certainly direct my question toward the dreamer that I was that night, but ultimately the dreamer himself recounts nothing, the waking person is the one who recounts the dream. Without the waking up, dreams would only ever be instantaneous modulations, and would not even exist for us. During the
346 dream itself, we do not leave the world behind: the space of the dream isolates itself from clear space, but it nevertheless makes use of all of its articulations – the world haunts us even in sleep, and we dream about the world. Similarly, madness gravitates around the world. To say nothing of those morbid fantasies or fits of delirium that attempted to build for themselves a private domain out of the debris of the macrocosm, the most advanced states of melancholy, where the patient settles into death and, so to speak, makes it his home, still make use of the structures of being in the world in order to do so, and borrow from the world just what is required of being in order to negate it.

[viii. *They are nevertheless constructed upon a natural space.*]*

This link between subjectivity and objectivity that already exists in mythical or infantile consciousness, and that always subsists in sleep or in madness, is found, *a fortiori*, in normal experience. I never live entirely

within these anthropological spaces; I am always rooted to a natural and non-human space. As I cross Place de la Concorde and believe myself to be entirely caught up within Paris, I can focus my eyes upon a stone in the wall of the Tuileries garden – the Concorde disappears and all that remains is this stone without any history; again, I can lose my gaze within this coarse and yellowish surface, and then there is no longer even a stone, and all that remains is a play of light upon an indefinite matter. My total perception is not built out of these analytical perceptions, but it can always dissolve into them; my body, which assures my insertion within the human world through my habitus, only in fact does so by first projecting me into a natural world that always shines through from beneath the others – just as the canvas shines through from beneath the painting – and gives the human world an air of fragility. Even if there is a perception of what is desired through desire, what is loved through love, what is hated through hate, this is always formed around a sensible core, as meager as it might be, and it finds its verification and its plenitude in the sensible.

We have said that space is existential; we could have just as easily said that existence is spatial, that is, through an inner necessity, it opens to an "outside," such that one can speak of a mental space and of a "world of significations and objects of thought that are constituted within those significations."[93] Anthropological spaces present themselves as constructed upon natural space, the "non-objectifying acts," to speak like Husserl, as constructed upon "objectifying acts."[94] What is new in 347
phenomenology is not that it denies the unity of experience, but that it establishes it differently than classical rationalism. For objectifying acts are not representations. Natural and primordial space is not geometrical space, and correlatively the unity of experience is not guaranteed by a universal thinker who spreads the contents of experience out before me and who ensures that I could have complete knowledge and complete power with regard to it. It is only indicated by the horizons of possible objectification, it only frees me from each particular milieu because it binds me to the world of nature or to the world of the in-itself that encompasses them all. We will have to ask how existence simultaneously projects around itself worlds that mask objectivity from me and yet sets this objectivity as a goal for the teleology of consciousness by making these "worlds" stand out against the background of a unique natural world.

[ix. *The ambiguity of consciousness.*]

If the myth, the dream, and the illusion are to be possible, then the apparent and the real must remain ambiguous in the subject as well as in the object. It has often been said that consciousness, by definition, does not allow for the separation between appearance and reality, and this was understood in the sense that, in terms of our self-knowledge, appearance would be reality. If I think I see or sense, then I see or sense beyond all doubt, whatever may be true of the external object. Here reality appears in its entirety, to be real and to appear are one, and there is no other reality but appearance. If this is true, then it is impossible for illusion and perception to have the same appearance, for my illusions to be perceptions without an object or for my perceptions to be true hallucinations. The truth of perception and the falsity of illusion must each be marked by some intrinsic characteristic, for otherwise we would never have a consciousness of a perception or an illusion as such, given that testimony of the other senses, of later experience, or of other people – which would remain the only possible criterion of differentiating them – has become itself uncertain. If the entire being of my perception and the entire being of my illusion is contained within their manner of appearing, then the truth that defines the one and the falsity that defines the other must also appear to me. Thus, between them there will be a difference of structure. A true perception will be, quite simply, a genuine perception. Illusion will not be a genuine perception; certainty will have to be extended from vision or from sensation as conceived to perception as constitutive of an object. The transparency of consciousness entails the immanence and the absolute certainty of the object. Nevertheless, illusion essentially does not present itself as an illusion, and, even if I am unable to perceive an unreal object, I must here be able to at least lose sight of its unreality;
348 there must be at least an unconsciousness of the non-perception, an illusion must not be what it appears to be and, at least this once, the reality of an act of consciousness must be beyond its appearance. Shall we thus separate appearance from reality in the subject? But once this break is made, it cannot be repaired. The most clear appearance can from then on be deceptive, and this time it is the phenomenon of truth that becomes impossible.

– We do not have to choose between a philosophy of immanence or a rationalism that only accounts for perception and truth, and a philosophy

of transcendence or of the absurd that only accounts for illusion or error. We only know that there are errors because we have truths, through which we correct the errors and recognize them as such. Reciprocally, the explicit recognition of a truth is much more than the mere existence of an uncontested idea in us, or the immediate faith in what appears: it presupposes an examination, a doubt, and a break with the immediate, it is the correction of a possible error. Every rationalism admits of at least one absurdity, namely that it must be formulated as a thesis. Every philosophy of the absurd recognizes at least one sense in the very affirmation of absurdity. I can only remain within the absurd if I suspend every affirmation, if, like Montaigne or like the schizophrenic, I restrict myself to an interrogation that must not even be formulated (for in formulating it I would turn it into a question that, like every determinate question, would envelop a response), or if, in short, I oppose to truth not the negation of truth, but rather a simple state of non-truth or of equivocation, that is, the actual opacity of my existence. In the same way, I can only remain within absolute evidentness if I hold back every affirmation, if nothing is for me evident in itself, and if, as Husserl suggests, I stand in wonder before the world[95] and cease to be complicit with it in order to reveal the flow of motivations that carry me into it, in order to awaken my life and to make it entirely explicit. When I want to go from this interrogation to an affirmation and, *a fortiori*, when I want to express myself, I crystallize a collection of indefinite motives in an act of consciousness, I enter back into the implicit, that is, into the equivocal and the play of the world.[96] The absolute contact of myself with myself, or the identity of being and appearing, cannot be posited, but merely lived prior 349
to all affirmation. Thus, it is the same silence and the same void on both sides. The experience [l'*épreuve*] of absurdity and that of absolute evidentness are interdependent and even indiscernible. The world only appears absurd if a demand of an absolute consciousness at each moment dissociates the significations with which the world is teeming and, reciprocally, if this demand is motivated by the conflict between these significations. Absolute evidentness and the absurd are equivalents, not merely as philosophical affirmations, but also as experiences. Rationalism and skepticism sustain themselves upon the actual life of consciousness that they both hypocritically imply, without which they could be neither thought nor even lived, and in which one cannot say that *everything has a sense* or that *everything is non-sense*, but merely that *there is sense*. As Pascal says, if we only push them slightly, we find that doctrines are teeming with contradictions, and

yet they had the air of clarity, they had a sense at first glance. A truth against the background of absurdity, and an absurdity that the teleology of consciousness presumes to be able to convert into a truth, this is the originary phenomenon. To say that, in consciousness, appearance and reality are one, or to say that they are separated, is to render impossible the consciousness of anything, even as appearance.

And yet there is consciousness of something, something appears, there is a phenomenon – such is the true *cogito*. Consciousness is neither the thematization of self, nor the ignorance of self, it is *not hidden* from itself, that is, there is nothing in it that is not in some way announced to it, even though it has no need of knowing it explicitly. In consciousness, appearance is not being, but phenomenon. This new *cogito*, because it is prior to revealed truth and error, makes them both possible. The lived is, of course, lived by me; I am not unaware of the feelings that I repress and in this sense there is no unconsciousness. But I can live more things than I can represent to myself, my being is not reduced to what of myself explicitly appears to me. What is only lived is ambivalent; there are feelings in me to which I do not give a name, and also false joys to which I am not entirely committed. The difference between illusion and perception is intrinsic, and the truth of perception can only be read in perception itself. If I believe I see a large flat stone, which is in reality a patch of sunlight, far ahead on the ground in a sunken lane, I cannot say that I ever see the flat stone in the sense in which I will see the patch of sunlight
350 while moving closer. The flat stone only appears, like everything that is far off, in a field whose structure is confused and where the connections are not yet clearly articulated. In this sense, the illusion, like the image, is not observable, that is, my body is not geared into it and I cannot spread it out before myself through some exploratory movements. And yet, I am capable of omitting this distinction, and I am capable of illusion. It is not true that, if I hold myself to what I truly see, I never make an error, nor is it true that sensation, at least, is indubitable. Every sensation is already pregnant with a sense, inserted into a confused or clear configuration, and there is no sensible given that remains the same when I pass from the illusory stone to the true patch of sunlight. The evidentness of sensation entails that of perception, and would render illusion impossible. I see the illusory stone in the sense that my entire perceptual and motor field gives to the light patch the sense of a "stone on the lane." And I already prepare to sense this smooth and solid surface beneath my foot. This is because

correct vision and illusory vision are not distinguished in the manner of adequate thought and inadequate thought: that is, in the manner of an absolutely full thought and an incomplete thought. I say that I perceive correctly when my body has a precise hold on the spectacle, but this does not mean that my hold is ever complete; it could only be complete if I had been able to reduce all of the object's interior and exterior horizons to the state of articulated perception, which is in principle impossible. In the experience of a perceptual truth, I presume that the concordance experienced up until now would be maintained for a more detailed observation; I put my confidence in the world. To perceive is suddenly to commit to an entire future of experiences in a present that never, strictly speaking, guarantees that future; to perceive is to believe in a world. It is this opening to a world that makes perceptual truth possible, or the actual realization of a *Wahr-Nehmung*,[97] and permits us "to cross out" the preceding illusion, to hold it to be null and void. I saw a large shadow moving on the periphery of my visual field and at a distance, I turn my gaze to this side and the phantasm shrinks and takes its proper place: it was only a fly close to my eye. *I was conscious of seeing a shadow and now I am conscious of having only seen a fly.* My belonging to the world allows me to compensate for the fluctuations of the *cogito*, to displace one *cogito* in favor of another, and to meet up with the truth of my thought beyond its appearance. In the very moment of illusion, this correction was presented to me as possible because the illusion
351 itself makes use of the same belief in the world, only contracts into a solid appearance thanks to this contribution, and hence, being always open to an horizon of presumptive verifications, the illusion does not separate me from truth. But, for the same reason, I am not protected from error since the world that I aim at through each appearance, and that rightly or wrongly gives it the weight of truth, never necessarily requires this particular appearance. There is an absolute certainty of the world in general, but not of any particular thing. Consciousness is distant from being and from its own being, and at the same time united to them, through the thickness of the world. The true *cogito* is not the private exchange between thought with the thought that I am having this thought, for they only unite through the world. The consciousness of the world is not *established* upon self-consciousness, but they are strictly contemporaries: there is a world for me because I am not unaware of myself; I am not concealed from myself because I have a world. This preconscious possession of the world in the pre-reflective *cogito* remains to be analyzed.