WriteNow@F$# $ # HLPTX\`dh45% Gray$ PH h \0~~$4 ~HHH@0~$4 ~HHH@0~$4 ~HHH@0@~$4 ~HHH@PP$ PP$ 0~H$4 ~ Table Style0~$,<HeaderS ~RHHH@/0 ~$,<FooterS ~RHHH@/(kY_lll @  lll @  r_lll @  lll @  Peirce g6_ lll @  xinwei@stanford.edu   /3 >ם_HHH@  >_qHHH@  ^n HH@ U (,, k `,0 `B'@'dPP6L  `td>@d>@dTk$dr0d1g<ىoxt@@0$$Q*}B  Cartesianism: 1. doubt 2. individual 3. single thread inference 4. many unexplained , matters of fact Peirce claims: 1. No Introspection, all internal knowledge of internal comes from external facts. 2. No Intuition. cognition comes from previous cognition by logic. 3. We can only think in signs. 4. No concept of incognizable. (p 57)  Logician's methodlogy: reduce to one type gneeral mental action.  Claims: valid inference is that which best follows external fact. SN (p 58) man acts syllogistically (requires change in notion of logic, and sign) Valid inferences: complete apodictic probable -- on nonexistnece of knowledge incomplete Elias was a man. Therefore he was mortal. omitted a premise object -- character Induction -- all objects known (with given char), is a statistical argument. example: stat analysis of letter distribution in texts A B C, ... add H Hypothesis -- all characters known (for given obj) SIGN feeling, image, conception, or other representation  to  some interpreting thought  for  an equivalanted object  in  some quality, connecting to its object, has 1. its own material characteristics 2. pure demonstrative application (eg weathercock) 3. representative function, relation to a thought (not object)  USES parallel language for describing thought on p 71.  W0(p 67) COGNITION process in which various thoughts surface, but are continuous! thoughts are atomic feelings are prima facie, thoughts and feelings are not  analyzable  (p 70) (p 78) Dreams -- whole scenarios -- are constructed from sparse data. There are in fact no entire images in perception. Argument: (p 79) If there were, we would have "an infinite amount of conscious cognition), which yet we never become aware of" Reality is that whioch becomes independent of me, you individuals, but requires a communicty (p 82) A reality that has no representation ... has no relation and no quality Mind: "the content of consciousness... is a sign resulting from inference" (p 83) "I think" the subject of this thoughht, is merely the consistency of the sign, but  every  sign signifies its own consistent. (p 84) man = word or sign word or sign is external => man is an external sign d>1 Date: Tue, 02 Feb 1999 12:29:27 -0800 Subject: Peirce reading From: "Bernadette Wegenstein" To: virtuality@lists.Stanford.EDU Dear Virtuality Folk (I like Xin Wei's greeting formula for our course), Here I am again not only after this horrible flue (have not had such a nasty illness in a long time...), but also with my wonderful new Powerbook G3 with which I am online for the first day. Hey, it's so cool ! hr I wanted to tell you that despite my absence I have been virtually with you and especially regarding our last reading. I have studied a lot of Peirce, but have never read this very article that I found extremely interesting. Here are some remarks and questions: I very much like the idea of the train of thought (continous process), in which the thought-sign is translated in a subsequent one and so on, but I have problems believing that the subsequent thought denotes what was thought in the previous one. The image of syntagmatic chains in which we think is probably very accurate and has been reaffirmed from both linguists and cognitive psycologists, but can we say that the relation-ship between the signs is a simple denotation ? I think it is more complex than that, given for instance contemplative thought-signs or even pathological ones, lacking a clear reference to "reality". What about substitution or any kind of a psychoanalytic explanation of signs replacing other signs (i.e. Lacan's signifieres that stand for other signifiers) ? Peirce says "there is nothing in the content of the thought which explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determinig thoughts" (p.12). The only way out of this non granting of psychological operations such as denial or repression is then to say that there are thoughts more complex than others. What would be an incomplex thought ? I can't think of any. Hence, Peirce's to my mind very scarse remarks on dreams and what they are all about. "Whenever man feels, he is thinking of something"... Peirce classifies passions without definite objects, such as melancholy and anciety (the ineffable) as complex thoughts. Melancholy tinges, as he says, the objects of thoughts. Well, as a good old Viennese I have to say that such "Stimmungen" that Peirce tries to describe are much more than tinging objects of thoughts, I believe. They can be the basis of a whole culture or cultural expression (think of Schubert and Mozart). Emotions produce "large movements in the body"... a great description, I think! But what kind of movements do you think are ment here? Where do they take place? The whole discussion of attention and its condition sine qua non for the thought-sign reminded me of our Leroi-Gourhan discussion. Did you go into further detail about that in class? I totally failed the "little experiment". First of all, I am a "she-reader" (but I really liked the appellation of the lector in fabula). Then, I was unable to think of an imaginery horse. I either had Blade Runner's Uniquorne in mind or those plastic ponies for children (there is a whole familiy...same like Barbie), you know, the ones with the long blond hair. Besides, I thought of it as white and not grey, bay or black... I loved the derisation of Hume's believe in the red book's colour... Peirce's philosophy of reality at the end of the paper seems to me so up to date. There has not really been said anything more or new about the construction of reality by all Media Studies throughout the 20th century (maybe wait for century 21?). His last pages and the "deconstruction" of the difference between man and thought on the one hand and man and the external sign on the other hand was just great. I have (re)learned a lot about what conscience means. ?] I wish everybody good luck for tonight's exams. I have to ("proudly") tell you that I also passed an exam: the CA driver's test (written so far) which was really a challenge for a semiotician like me... Now I understand why you guys (in the US) are always so nice when driving. It's a categoric imperative (" be courteous and treat others in the same way you want to be treated") for you ! Looking forward to seeing you next week, Bernadette PS: This Thursday (Feb. 4th) I have to fly to the Eastcoast for a funeral, but I will read "The semiotics of Zero" in the air. Sorry to miss class again, since I really like all of your contributions ! Maybe somebody will inform me via email about "Signifying Nothing"... *kREPLY TO Berna > > > I very much like the idea of the train of thought (continous process), >in which the thought-sign is translated in a subsequent one and so on, but >I have problems believing that the subsequent thought denotes what was >thought in the previous one. The image of syntagmatic chains in which we >think is probably very accurate and has been reaffirmed from both >linguists and cognitive psycologists, but can we say that the >relation-ship between the signs is a simple denotation ? I think it is 0 lGl@ Charles Sanders Peirce 1839-1914 geodesy Coast Survey 30 yrs 1869-1872 Harvard Observatory Object - Sign - Interpretant distinguished from both Berkeley's idealism, perception as well as materialism, which would be mere secondness: firstness: things in themselves secondness: relation between things -- causal thridness: representations Some Consequences of Four Incapacities 1868 thought has a material quality thought  is  a bodily state, is material p+$0q tGenevaIDSkia3< Helvetica>more complex than that, given for instance contemplative thought-signs or >even pathological ones, lacking a clear reference to "reality". What about >substitution or any kind of a psychoanalytic explanation of signs >replacing other signs (i.e. Lacan's signifieres that stand for other >signifiers) ? There's a pernicious problem common to all three of these notions: thought-signs denoting previous thought, syntagmatic chain, and substitution of signs, and that problem is what I call algebraic reductionism. Peirce gave a suggestive and lovely account of the  continuous  intertwining concurrent processes of consciousness, but this profoundly contradicts these algebraic accounts, which are based on the idea of determining an alphabet, then a system of production rules which convert given strings (sentences formed out of the alphabet) into new strings. Both the representation and the operation are discrete, which makes it a fundmentally different model of consciousness and experience. This algebraic model underlies just about every logico-linguistic model of language of consciousness, and seems to infect the first half of this essay, too. highlight this difference as clearly as possible: the algebraic model looks like , kb DISCRETE ALGEBRAIC MODEL T1(a1) = a2 T2(a2) = a3 T3(a3) = a4 ... i.e. we have a discrete sequence of transformations of  a finite sign into another finite sign within a sign-system. Alternatively, we have CONTINUOUS PROCESS MODEL F(t) where F is a multi-valued,  continuous ,  function of time t. We happen to live in a age where ye olde Turing model of computation on finite discrete sign systems has become naturalized to a fantastic extent. > Peirce says "there is nothing in the content of the thought >which explains why it should arise only on occasion of these determinig >thoughts" (p.12). The only way out of this non granting of psychological >operations such as denial or repression is then to say that there are .;=>Leroi-Gourhan discussion. Did you go into further detail about that in >class? would anyone like to comment here? > Peirce's philosophy of reality at the end of the paper seems >to me so up to date. There has not really been said anything more or new >about the construction of reality by all Media Studies throughout the 20th >century (maybe wait for century 21?). His last pages and the >"deconstruction" of the difference between man and thought on the one hand >and man and the external sign on the other hand was just great. I have i?>(re)learned a lot about what conscience means.   Yes, we noted Peirce's brilliantly reflexive use of "incomplete inference" to argue that man = sign, signs are external, therefore man is an external sign. He certainly anticipated the social part of the construction of reality. Too bad this was forgotten several times by subsequent anglo philosophers. There's a lot for us to work out here, isn't there? V0n>thoughts more complex than others. What would be an incomplex thought ? >I can't think of any. Peirce does claim that all feelings, and I believe, all thoughts are unanalyzable, meaning that they cannot be broken down into simpler consituent thoughts or feelings. It's true that Peirce does not deal with such notions here, but could it be that "psychological operations" like denial or repression are not thoughts nor feelings in Peirce's world? > Hence, Peirce's to my mind very scarse remarks on >dreams and what they are all about. "Whenever man feels, he is thinking >of something"... Peirce classifies passions without definite objects, such >as melancholy and anciety (the ineffable) as complex thoughts. Melancholy >tinges, as he says, the objects of thoughts. Is the object of a thought a thought? Not necessarily. Unless we apply Peirce's universal reagent in one stroke, and say that thought = sign, and also say that a sign of a sign is simply another sign. But, at one popint, Peirce seems to distinguish thoughts from the more primitive phenomena of feelings. ҆Zj Follesdal, in his lectures on phenomenology said, all thought has an object, all consciousness is intentional. What do you think? > Well, as a good old Viennese >I have to say that such "Stimmungen" that Peirce tries to describe are >much more than tinging objects of thoughts, I believe. They can be the >basis of a whole culture or cultural expression (think of Schubert and >Mozart). Emotions produce "large movements in the body"... a great >description, I think! But what kind of movements do you think are ment >here? Where do they take place? Good points all. Of course, Peirce left himself a very large back door by saying that the "conception of reality" involves the notion of "COMMUNITY," into which he could toss stuff like epistemes or weltanschauungen. I'm intrigued -- could you elaborate a bit on your examples Mozart and Schubert? > The whole discussion of attention and >its condition sine qua non for the thought-sign reminded me of our  2:d%<0Tkr1g`$;` ` Pn@> @ ;P#&`'`,,@4V@8W@0.`2D=R@@<2 @`@`x@T@(`'lp@<)d)))X)T)P)LDn)<~;2 cv=1 aiHHc Nd=1c@8Wxs@8Wxs?<?<?<YEk Follesdal, in his lectures on phenomenology said, all thought has an object, all consciousness is intentional. What do you think? What about Lao-Tze's "uncarved block"? > Well, as a good old Viennese >I have to say that such "Stimmungen" that Peirce tries to describe are >much more than tinging objects of thoughts, I believe. They can be the >basis of a whole culture or cultural expression (think of Schubert and >Mozart). Emotions produce "large movements in the body"... a great >description, I think! But what kind of movements do you think are ment ۰Լ>here? Where do they take place? Good points all. Of course, Peirce left himself a very large back door by saying that the "conception of reality" involves the notion of "COMMUNITY," into which he could toss stuff like epistemes or weltanschauungen. I'm intrigued -- could you elaborate a bit on your examples Mozart and Schubert? > The whole discussion of attention and >its condition sine qua non for the thought-sign reminded me of our >Leroi-Gourhan discussion. Did you go into further detail about that in >class? would anyone like to comment here? > Peirce's philosophy of reality at the end of the paper seems >to me so up to date. There has not really been said anything more or new >about the construction of reality by all Media Studies throughout the 20th >century (maybe wait for century 21?). His last pages and the >"deconstruction" of the difference between man and thought on the one hand >and man and the external sign on the other hand was just great. 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