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Process and Difference

Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernisms

edited by

CATHERINE KELLER and ANNE DANIELL

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(i.e., to remain in God as a value) and the Buddhist notion of "emptiness," *sunyata.* Although *sunyata* is called "passing," "emptiness," or "nothing," etymologically it indicates also "the state of completeness or fullness of being" (483)—in a manner beyond self-enjoyment and egotistic incurvation.

99. "Perfection within God states—quite similarly as in Levinas—'self-forgetful transcendence'." Cf. Drischler, 107. Here, Levinas turns against the Odysseic paradigm, because Odysseus—after all his adventures—finds his aim only in his coming home. Drischler goes on: "Levinas läßt ein solches Denken hinter sich und kann, mit seiner Betonung der unmittelbaren Nähe des Anderen nicht ohne absolute Trennung denken zu können, das transzendentaltheologische Modell dahingehend hinterfragen, ob es diesem wirklich gelingt, das Phänomen der Unmittelbarkeit der Nähe Gottes und zum Nächsten zur Sprache zu bringen. . . ."

100. Whitehead's notion of eschatological "peace" indicates the overcoming of any form of self-concentration. Its "aim" is situated "beyond any personal satisfaction" (AI, 288) or "selfish happiness" (AI, 289). Cf. Suchocki (1975): "[T]he actual occasion in God is felt by God in terms of the highest relationship made possible by that actualization relative to every other actuality prehended by the divine nature. . . . [God] feels the occasion in its immediacy and yet transcends the occasion by relating it beyond its own finite vision to all others in the vision of God. In God, the occasion is itself, and others, and God" (5). The conception of "eschatological alterity," the perfection "beyond joy and sorrow" recalls strongly the Buddhist conception of *anatman.* In both, "the traditional view of the self breaks down"; as the corn-seeds of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. 15:36f., an event must disappear to live on.

101. For finite occasions the "everlasting union with their transformed selves" (PR, 347) promises an eschatological self-surrender with God: "the 'self' has been lost" (AI, 285). Cf. Suchocki, *The End of Evil: Process Eschatology in Historical Context* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 110, 118, 199–216.

102. According to Guy Emerson, this is what Whitehead thought of himself: "[Whitehead] likes Plato because he was always proposing, never finishing anything. It is always 'process,' not frozen finality." (MS Am. 1850 [14–15], from September 17, 1970, brought by Mrs. Guy Emerson.)

10

Beyond Conversation

The Risks of Peace

ISABELLE STENGERS

To intervene in an attempted "conversation" between two full-fledged products of the American tradition—"deconstructive" and "constructive" postmodernism—is a risky move for a French-speaking, European philosopher. The more so since the very word, *conversation,* is already a shifty one for me. Indeed, I am not only one of those perplexed French-speaking onlookers, wondering about the very possibility of bringing together Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan under the same label, as one party in the conversation. I am also someone passionately interested in a domain of human practices the value of which depends upon, or at least implies, eliminating the charms of conversation: the practices of experimental science.

What makes things easier, however, is that this hoped for conversation has not begun yet. We have not to accept the implied meanings of these terms, but are free to try to give them a speculative turn. Here, I feel more at ease, since I am unable to dissociate my own "speculative turn" from both Alfred North Whitehead and Deleuze—Deleuze being one of those French philosophers who for now seems to belong to "the others." The point is not, however, to start with boundary quarrels, to wonder for instance if Deleuze would not belong better to the "constructive" postmodernists. We deal with a stubborn, obstinate matter of fact. "Process people" in the United States know about Henri Bergson, but most likely not about the one French philosopher who was, already more than forty years ago, working and thinking with Bergson, and producing, as an outsider to any recognized trend, a new kind of "real togetherness," with new contrasts, new intensities and new appetites between Bergson, Benedict de Spinoza, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The fact is that most process people in the United States do not know that thirty years ago Deleuze

had already written of Whitehead in the two most extraordinary pages I can think of about him, as a "speculative nomad" (DR, 284–285).

This is not a matter of chance. While process philosophy was still in the process of situating itself in its relation with process theology, Deleuze, for everybody who read him (including probably himself, but nobody can know for sure), was the atheist philosopher par excellence, tracking down any shade of transcendence in philosophy, taking the triple ideals of contemplation (Plato), reflection (Immanuel Kant), and communication (including never-ending conversation) as the very traps philosophy must escape in order to think, that is, to create, that is, to resist. Accordingly, Deleuze did relate to Whitehead, but never to the world of process philosophy *and* theology.

This leads me to one of the challenges our "conversation" may have to meet, a challenge that probably bears on the famous modern/postmodern contrast at a very emotional level. Belonging, like Deleuze, to the French philosophical tradition, the very fact of having philosophers, theologians, theists, and Christian ministers working together, as it is usually done in process thought, was indeed for me a testing challenge, a situation very hard to understand, let alone to take seriously. It must be remembered that in our part of Europe, as a result of history's perhaps starting with religious wars, we do know very well indeed about the power of the church, but not about the many paths and risks associated with a multiplicity of churches. And while we know very well about the ever-recurring danger that a transcendent reference be introduced and produce a repartition between what it selects and what it rejects, we are unfamiliar with the possibility that the worship of God, if resolutely not taken as "a rule of safety" but as "an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable" (SMW, 192), could lead away from transcendent values and toward the production of new, immanent intensities for life and thought.

In fact, the very proposition "worship" is sufficient to mobilize an easy opposition, consolidating otherwise diverging, vital, emotional values about human life, history, and the world. However, as process people, we know that oppositions are never final, that producing the possibility of enjoying new contrasts where oppositions once ruled is the adventure of both hope and reason. This, by the way, is also far from easy to accept by those of the Nietzschean-Deleuzean lineage: for them, neither reason nor hope constitutes reliable common grounds, as this lineage emphasizes the "dark" emotions of struggle, power, and madness over against anything it can identify with a consensus of "reasonable people" or with an aspiration for a general, conciliatory goodwill.

How to turn an opposition into a possible matter of contrast? Obviously, this is not only a question of goodwill. My guess is that we may do so through the experimental extension of the specific risks that singularize each position. Giving a chance for contrasts to be created where oppositions rule implies producing a middle ground but not a medium or average mitigating differences. It should be a middle ground for testing, in order that the contrast evolve not from tamed differences but from creatively redefined ones.

The middle ground, as I will propose it, addresses what I would, in first approximation, call two parties: the "French tradition" (including Foucault; with Derrida and Lacan my imagination and hope come up against their limits) and "process people," be they philosophers or theologians. It would create a double test: for the French tradition, to accept the very hypothesis of a positive reference to reason and hope; and for process people, to realize that any reassuring, direct convergence between religion and speculative thought may, indeed, condemn the opposition to remain an opposition.

What are the stakes of this double test? But first of all, why privilege the Deleuzean stance when what we call "postmodern deconstructivism" includes so many other options? I would answer with three points. The first point is that I have no choice in the matter: this is the testing ground where I was created as a philosopher. The second point is a hypothesis: maybe those who belong to the constellation of "postmodern deconstructivism" did gulp down a rather dangerous fish when annexing Deleuze under their label. I do not know if the resulting "cracks" Catherine Keller describes in her chapter in this volume will extend far enough, but they are occasions that can be turned into opportunities. The third point is that, in this case, the conversation that could be invented would not be an academic conversation only, merely producing academic machinery to roll on new tracks. Rather, emotions, values, what it is to think or resist, what it is to hope, how to inherit and tell the modern story, and which kinds of ingredients to use, are all at stake not very far from the small, ugly world of academic niceties, comparative studies, and quasi-ethical "you wouldn't dare; look, I do."

Among those academic niceties, we can include what has been called the "science wars." In this case the pleasant ideal of urbane, civilized conversation did meet its limits. In fact, the very portrayal of conversation as an ideal was viewed as an insult, and the *Sokal Hoax*[1] can be read as the angry but petty revenge of offended scientists. Those scientists understood very well that conversation as an ideal excludes them. Indeed, the adequate subjects for an interesting, open conversation between well-behaved, sophisticated people should never be "real facts." This is a true oppostion: conversation needs facts to refer to a brute, meaningless matter of fact, the interpretation of which humans should be the only masters, while experimental scientists concentrate all their passion on the extraordinary attempt to give to this "mute," brute, free-for-all "reality" the power to minimize our freedom to interpret. Since the very principle of such an attempt troubles the conversation game, deconstructing the claim that scientists can succeed is part of the game.

Taken seriously, Whitehead's statement that any "proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character of the universe required for this fact" (PR, 11) explodes the limits of any conversation.

It implies a radical constructivism. For interpretations are not our own; they become "facts," adding universes upon universes. And if Whitehead's own proposition is to be taken as proposing the universe it requires, it is obviously pointless to try to justify it with reference to some kind of transcendent source of agreement. This last point is relevant for the struggle of the Nietzschean-Bergsonian-Deleuzean lineage against the three ideals of contemplation, reflection, and communication. Constructivist humor, happily celebrating that our speculative sentences can never define what they mean but always appeal for an imaginative leap—which produces the new contrasts—may free us from the temptation of an ironic-critical-deconstructive fascination with these ideals, as powerful traps needing ceaseless diagnosis and unmasking.

Conversely, the French Deleuzean "tradition" will always refuse any kind of settlement, conversational or otherwise, which excludes those who are already excluded, even if this exclusion *appears* to be an inclusion. As Deleuze said, to think (or create) is to think "in front of" or "for" "analphabets or dying rats or alcoholics." This does not mean addressing them, or helping them, or sharing hope or faith with them, but, rather, not insulting them with our power to justify everything. Thinking with them "in front of" us means thinking with the feeling and constraint that we are not free to speak in their name or even to side with them. In other words, philosophers belonging to this tradition will always demand that theologians think in front of the witches, pagans or what they call "fetishists"; that is, that theologians think against any possibility of justifying the destruction of pagan, idolatrous, or fetishist ways of worship. So, we must ask ourselves, What would count as a conversation "in front of" all the unknown people that our words so easily disqualify, in fact, even when those words outwardly speak of mutual appreciation, respect, and love?

The Deleuzean stance, with its built-in decision to think in front of the damned, is quite compatible with the ideal of conversation, but it may also be part of the "middle ground" I am trying to produce. This implies a double test indeed. Will it help process-people to "stammer" or "quake" when trying to produce the words for a sorely needed "relational worldview"? And will "Deleuzeans" accept a possible translation of this decision in typically Whiteheadian terms, that of a propositional (and not conversational) togetherness, the satisfaction derived from which would include experiencing the scars of its birth (PR, 226), including all its (nonacademic) absentees?

Envisaging such a possibility, I am taking a constructivist stance, since I take words to be "lures for feeling," not denouncing them because they would demarcate (we have no way to actually include fetishists, starving rats, or alcoholics), but demanding that those words be constructed with the aims of "clothing the dry bones" (PR, 85) of our demarcations with the vivid feeling of the presence of those absentees our demarcations cannot but push away. Away, not against.

Whatever their built-in demarcations, our words must be stammered out there, where "angels fear to tread," as Gregory Bateson would have said. Creating togetherness is an ideal seeking a satisfaction, and to renounce it would be to renounce the adventure of hope. To try to think together, while knowing that we are, should be, and must continue to present ourselves as unable to transcend the actual limitations of this togetherness or to escape toward some dreamed of universality, is, I would submit, the very stamp of a constructivist philosophy. Speculation thus becomes not the discovery of the hidden truth justifying reality, but a crucial ingredient in the construction of reality.

I will now attempt a more precise experimental step, the aim of which is and must be double, since it experiments with a middle ground. I will imagine "Deleuzeans" feeling that Whitehead's God cannot be dismissed as a "naive" American relic, and I will have "Whiteheadians" feeling the sort of weird interest that would arise from the Whiteheadian God if It were accepted by the "Deleuzeans." This indeed performs a double test, since for the first group it means actually disavowing any kind of socially comfortable, modernist *je sais bien mais quand même* about religious matters, while for Whiteheadians it may mean putting the already fragile alliance between philosophers, theologians, and ministers under dangerous stress. Well, it is the business of thought, as appealing to the future, to be dangerous.

I will center this experimentation not on Whitehead alone, but on Whitehead together with another great speculative philosopher and mathematician, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. And on the way we can hear more precisely this most daring of Leibniz's statements: Our world is the best of all possible worlds. This indeed is one of the touchstones: No "Deleuzean" would ever accept installing any kind of transcendent reference from which the world could be judged, even as the best. But every one of them would oppose as well Whitehead's apparently weaker claim. Whitehead described Leibniz's "best of all possible worlds" as an "audacious fudge" (PR, 47), but he himself wrote about an "inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God" (PR, 244). In order to address a problem, it is best taking it at its hardest: in this case, accepting as a matter of fact what would seem to provoke the objection. Let us accept, then, that there is a strong common element between the Leibnizian and Whiteheadian "Gods," as related to divine ordering, and let us experiment.

I leave outside the scope of this chapter the technical reasons why Leibniz's philosophy required the hypothesis of our world being the best possible, just emphasizing that he also stated in the strongest technical terms why nobody but God is able to define, or even approach, the function in terms of which our world can be first defined and then characterized as the best. As we know, Whitehead emphatically refused this "no way to know" solution. Metaphysics would then play the too easy trick of defining what is actual

through its limitations in contrast with a reality we should look for behind the scene (SMW, 178).

Accordingly, there is no access behind nor beyond with Whitehead: even God cannot possess any definition of what would be the best world. God may be in unison of becoming with every other entity, but It is everlastingly unsatisfied with any satisfaction, Its ever-present, everlastingly repeated question being not about the best of all worlds but "what is the best for *that* impasse." This difference does not create a beyond, going beyond the self-definition an actuality constitutes for itself, only the opportunity for an actual entity to get beyond. It answers the one major contrast between God and actual occasions: while every satisfaction has for its price negative prehensions, God's experience, derived from Its primordial, infinite, conceptual nature, is devoid of negative prehensions (PR, 345). Through the transformation of Its wisdom, all realizations may well be "saved," or "transform[ed] . . . into a reality in heaven," as they are freed from obstruction or inhibition, but it is also through this transformation that each satisfaction is positively felt as an impasse, both the satisfaction and the price it was paid for being felt together.

In fact, Whitehead's final metaphysical truth that "appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation" (PR, 348) celebrates the most radical divorce between God and any kind of omniscience, however limited. While the initial aim of an actual entity derives from the divine challenge or lure, conjecturally answering the divine question about an objective impasse, God does not possess any advanced knowledge about what the actual entity will or even can produce with this challenge. To me it is important indeed that the initial aim does not communicate with a hypothetical model God would entertain. If God had a model, this would entail the possibility of judging the satisfaction that will be actually achieved through a comparison with this divine model. When Whitehead writes that God is the great companion, the fellow-sufferer who understands, it seems to me important to take "understanding" as devoid of any paternalistic connotation. God does not understand in the sense of understanding why the actual entity missed the best its initial aim proposed, and excusing it because of love; It understands in unison of becoming.

However, this first contrast is not sufficient because it is built as a too easy defense: claiming that Whitehead escapes the menace that would follow from any proximity with Leibniz. I will turn now toward more dangerous, because common, grounds. Indeed the Leibnizian statement that our world is the best is not a metaphysical statement only. It also plays in Leibniz's philosophy the role of a Whiteheadian proposition, a lure, explicitly and mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. What it appeals to is succeeding in being or in becoming able to affirm the justice and wisdom of God while it would be so easy and so legitimate to hate both this world and the God who is responsible for its coming into existence. This does not make a difference at

the level of contents. It is not justified by any deduction from the world or human history as we observe them, and it does not allow for any explanation, any particular confidence, any prevision, any evaluation of particular matters of fact. But it makes a practical, vital difference, and furthermore it is a demanding, testing one. This test, as I will now try to show, is a proposition defining speculative philosophy as giving its chance to peace or, more precisely, as fabricating the conceptual possibility of peace in order for us to be existentially fabricated by it.

In *The Fold,* Deleuze emphasized that Leibniz's concepts provide a way to construct a subject who is not *in* the world (Heidegger and the phenomenological tradition) but *for* the world. In *What Is Philosophy?,* which we may take as a kind of philosophical testament (not will), Deleuze wrote, together with Felix Guattari,

> But, on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its possibilities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost the world, worse than a fiancée or a god). The problem indeed has changed. (WP, 74–75)

The "empiricist conversion" Deleuze alludes to has obviously nothing to do with turning back toward the academic playlets that are the common references for logical empiricism and many Wittgenstein followers. But it has a lot to do with "being for the world." Believing in this world was William James's great pragmatic theme, the one that makes a difference between habits as we always already have them, and experimental habits, be they moral, aesthetic, or conceptual—habits we experiment with in order to become capable of new experiences. It was also what Leibniz asked when asking us to succeed in accepting this world as the best. For Leibniz it made the very difference between salvation and damnation.[2] And finally, the relation between the "empiricist conversion" and "peace-fabricating" propositions is at the center of Whitehead's whole enterprise, beginning with his first struggle against the bifurcation of nature, that is from the statement that "all we know of Nature is in the same boat, to sink or swim together" (CN, 148), to the very definition of the demand for adequacy, which the categoreal scheme must satisfy, that is, it should induce an experience of the real togetherness of all experiences as they are reformulated through the scheme.

The Whiteheadian demand for adequacy and coherence, Leibniz's "best of all worlds," and James's "will to believe" have nothing to do with a matter

of fact, be it empirical or metaphysical. The *peace* they allude to is a fabricated peace, that is, a peace that does not preexist in any way, neither beyond, nor behind. It is a peace we should thus not conceive as both "natural" and somehow lost. What preexists is always selective, partial, specialized, and potentially conflictual.

Both Leibniz and Whitehead were mathematicians. I think this peace, the possibility of which they wanted to construct, exhibits the creativity of mathematicians who do not seek the solution *to,* but rather construct the possibility *of,* a solution to a problem. The problem comes first.

A correlative common feature is that the worst way to present both Whitehead's and Leibniz's concepts about the divine ordering of the world is to take them as expressing something that could be discussed as an opinion or even a description. If I state that "Leibniz thinks that our world is the best of all possible worlds" or that "He claims that our experience is that of monads without a window," I induce the response, "What a strange idea." If I state that for Whitehead there are eternal objects, the divine envisagement of which provides the "inevitable ordering of things" (PR, 244), I induce the hypothesis that it is only a matter of Plato's influence and that we could readily do without those objects, and probably without God as well. Again, both Leibniz and Whitehead were mathematicians. When a mathematician produces a strange hypothesis, such as that of irrational or complex numbers, it is not a matter of opinion. He or she has been constrained by the problem, and it is the problem that required, that demanded, the invention of those strange, nonintuitive numbers.

Concepts are required in the construction not of an opinion but of the possibility of a solution to a problem. Leibniz was the first to give crucial importance to the difference between prerequisite and condition. A prerequisite is always relative to a problem as it is formulated, and cannot claim to transcend this formulation. A condition, on the other hand, corresponds to a normative, purified, rational formulation of what must be conditioned; the double definition of the condition and of what this condition conditions claims to escape and transcend particularity to achieve authorized knowledge. In Whitehead's texts, "to require" or "to demand" are verbs that appear when decisive points are being made. They are the mathematician's answer to a situation. His or her job is not to impose conditions upon the knowledge situation in order for it to fit general norms of intelligibility, as Kant does in the name of the Copernican revolution. His or her job is to recognize and construct the situation as a challenge, and to make explicit what this challenge requires in order to achieve an answer.

Whitehead wrote that the categoreal scheme is a matrix (PR, 8). I think we have to understand "matrix" not in its biological sense, associated with some kind of inexhaustible source of novelty, but in its mathematical definition. In mathematics, a matrix in itself is mute. It does not describe anything

or produce anything. It is a tool for transforming one vector into another vector. In speculative philosophy, it is a tool for transforming one feeling into another feeling. Correlatively, the Whiteheadian scheme is to be logically consistent, but its terms refer to nothing we can observe; all that we observe and name must be described in terms of societies. Indeed, in Whiteheadian terms, all the problems we deal with are sociological ones; they address the problems of societies.

As a consequence, the propositions and contrasts we can imagine may well be constrained by the categories of existence, but they will never directly illustrate the nine categoreal obligations that articulate the self-consistency of the scheme. They may well exhibit, through the new contrasts they produce, the imaginative leap the categories of explanation suggest, demand, and appeal to, but they will never lead back to ultimate notions like creativity, many, and one. What the scheme defines are the prerequisites for an adequate and coherent formulation of our many experiences. Only the applications of the scheme, always relative to particular circumstances, experiences and questions, and always requiring the imaginative leap to which the concepts it articulates appeal, may test its adequacy. Whatever the situation, it should exhibit, as transformed through the application of the scheme, what I would call the "possibility of peace," a possibility that should owe nothing to purification (the "brilliant feat of explaining away") and everything to a more concrete description, which together takes into account the situation as it claims to be understood and what those claims require in order to be formulated in a way that is coherent and that does not transcend relations and particularities.

Thus, not only does Whiteheadian process philosophy refer, as does any philosophy, to what Charles Sanders Peirce called a "Third," an Interpretant, but his propositions, as well as the propositions of Leibniz, vitally depend upon this element of thirdness—of a creative, peace-producing interpretation—being actually felt as such. While the seductive power of any bifurcating description, distributing what belongs to mind and what belongs to nature, relies on eliminating the Third or interpretive element, the very point of both Whitehead's and Leibniz's speculative systems is that they are constructions explicitly meant to save all that exists together. They are openly artificial constructions, which fabricate the possibility of peace. And they are lures, mutely appealing for the unending adventure that would actualize this possibility.

I have just used the term *save.* This term belongs to theology but also to the history of Western knowledge, and as such it gives me the opportunity to make more precise the kind of emotional test the "saving" stance of speculative philosophy entails, bearing on values, historical memory, and social self-definition in a tradition that has linked truth with conflict. Here I am thus no longer "defending" the concepts of either Whitehead or Leibniz; instead I am using them in order to test the French inclination for despising the very idea of "saving" anything from conflict.

Ever since Galileo, to "save" has had heavy connotations, being associated with "to save only _____." Galileo refused to accept that his description of astronomical phenomena saved "only" those phenomena. He claimed that his science had to be recognized not as saving appearances through a convenient interpretation, whatever the definition of convenient, but as making the scientist the only right interpretant, the only one to be authorized by the phenomena themselves. All other interpretants, be they philosophers or theologians, should accept and submit to this "objective authority."[3] The "dark" greatness of the science Galileo initiated is the following: There is no place for a negotiated, peaceful agreement; either you submit to the authority of science as the exclusive interpretant or it means war. Still today many scientists not only demand that we respect their faith in a scientific portrayal of the world, but also demand that we share their conviction that physical laws testify to the very rules nature would obey—on pain of being denounced as relativists or even irrationalists.

Our historical memory celebrates Galileo's greatness, the heroic way he challenged the authority of the church, his *E pur si muove* celebrating the power of the facts to confirm his polemical truth and thereby defeat those who crushed him. It is also worthwhile to recall and emphasize that Leibniz's "Irenicism" was generally derided. *Herr Leibniz glaubt nichts,* it was said even before he died, at a time when trying to construct words and sentences that would create a possibility for peace between theology, science, and philosophy was already felt as some kind of a betrayal. Division, contradiction, and even war were already, as they are now, the name of the game. Whatever the faith, a "true faith" had to give to the faithful the power to denounce and hate.

Speaking as a philosopher belonging to the Western tradition, I would state that the way Leibniz was eliminated by scientists, philosophers, and theologians all belonging to this same tradition has created my access to this tradition, that is, created my standpoint; I wish to have for my enemies those who suspect that I would lead them to betray their faith, those who would accuse me of believing in nothing. This is why it is so important to underline that the construction of a peace-producing philosophy cannot be reduced to some kind of an objective description that should be accepted once misunderstandings and illegitimate extrapolations are cleared away. Indeed, peace as fabricated, not as discovered beyond distorting illusions, is a real test, a test that concerns us as we inherit a tradition that has so terribly confused truth and power.

A peace-producing philosophy is a test because it demands that we resist the satisfaction of power, that is, of legitimately explaining away (if not eliminating). And I would claim that it is not against specialized languages that peace must be constructed. It is against the value our Western tradition attributes to conflict as the very mark of truth. In speculative or constructivist terms, to construct "against" the value of conflict does not mean to enter into conflict; it means, rather, to positively feel the "scars of birth" of any experience promoting conflict as the mark of truth, and so to dispel its dark necessity.[4]

Sigmund Freud rightly characterized this experience when he made truth a trauma, a wound against our narcissistic images; his whole idea of psychoanalysis derives from this characterization. The seduction of the idea of a truth that should hurt and disenchant, which should go beyond illusions and destroy them, is exemplified each time a scientist or somebody speaking in the name of science promotes a version of the bifurcation of nature. And this seduction may well explain the very stability of the bifurcation theme. Be it when Galileo rejoiced in making the experimental fact (dealing only with the way heavy bodies fall in a frictionless world), the possibility and power of which he had just discovered, the ground for expelling philosophers and theologians from the new territory of science. Be it when Jacques Monod deduced from molecular biology and Darwinian selection the existential loneliness of humanity in a meaningless universe. Or be it each time thinking and feeling are reduced, in the name of science, to the blind interplay of neurons: What triumphs is emphatically not scientific objectivity but a strong affective association of truth with conflict and war.

I would state that Whitehead's speculative system, or more precisely the open set of propositions that are the applications of his scheme, may be defined as an active, constructive and noncritical antidote against our fascination with the power of truth. The ongoing discussions among process people about the relevance of maintaining an explicit reference to Whitehead's technical concepts when addressing cultural, religious, political, ecological, or social problems are, for me, a mark of the practical success of process philosophy as an antidote. The conceptual matrix has no authority of its own; it claims no authority to mobilize and fight in its name; instead, it works through insinuation and transformative effects as an infectious lure for new creative contrasts. You can propose what are indeed applications of the scheme without any explicit, open intervention by the concepts it articulates. Thus, as William James would have said, Whitehead's scheme verifies itself through its practical effects, by the way its saving operation produces a more interesting world and a more demanding thinking, by the way it inspires surprising syntactic transformations and suggests possibilities for escaping dramatic either/or dilemmas, devastating injunctions to choose and polemical standpoints demanding submission. It verifies itself first and foremost through confidence in reality, as if saying, "Do not be afraid; never will reality give to anyone the power to completely deny and reduce."

Whiteheadian speculative philosophy may help us—it has helped me—not to be afraid of all those who claim they have, one way or another, "reality on their side." This includes postmodern deconstructivist claims, for those claims play again on the old traumatic truth: They first of all address and crush anyone's hope to get outside, to escape the human-only lures for meaning, which are exhibited by conversation as they propose it. However, I would insist that the fabrication of peace-making propositions cannot be identified with peace as an experience. If indeed Whitehead's philosophy may be char-

acterized as the construction of a possibility for peace, this is because it can produce through its applications what I would call, a bit paradoxically, "peace fighters," and not because it would be a path naturally or inevitably leading to the experience of peace.

As is well known, Whitehead's *Adventures of Ideas* closes with the description of this experience. When I am teaching Whitehead, I feel the flickering of this experience. It happens, for instance, when students encounter and enjoy the possibility of acknowledging as harmonious experiences, interests, or values that they initially deemed contradictory; or the possibility of experiencing the divorce between reason and the power to judge; or again the possibility of recognizing as a contrast—which is as such part of the very construction of reality—something that they previously thought was merely an idea *about* reality. Just as Whitehead wrote that "(l)ife is lurking in the interstices of living societies" (PR, 105), I would say that the experience of peace lurks in the interstices of the many sociological applications of Whitehead's philosophy. But it is also very important not to overestimate this flickering, lurking experience, that is, not to make it the aim of the scheme, its final "application." I would claim that the *experience* of peace will never come into existence as an application of any philosophical system.

I am not producing some kind of new version of the "traumatic truth," but taking seriously and concretely into account the question of this historical tradition we call "philosophy." Other traditions, which have indeed cultivated wisdom as such—that is, have learned how to practice and stabilize an experience of peace—have produced no definition of rationality or the philosophical adventure. They do not lack it, however, and there is no point for us in paternalistically looking for their equivalent, as if it should well exist. As its very name recalls, philosophy is not wisdom. The philosopher calls herself a "friend of wisdom" (we could probably translate this as "friend of peace"), and the idea of such a "friendship relation" with "peace" is a specifically Western invention. Also, the link proposed by Whitehead between philosophy and the adventure of reason specifically designates "us" as those who belong to this tradition, since "reason," as such, is our own invention. And a fearful one, since it should well be recalled that it was first created in order to divide and disqualify.

Philosophical words and propositions are loaded with birth scars that mark the adventure of philosophy, and of rationality as defined by philosophy, as a polemical enterprise. If philosophy is indeed a set of footnotes to Plato, both Plato's text and many of its footnotes are polemical constructions addressed against those whom they would denounce as producers of illusions, starting with the Sophists, the poets, and the magicians. Paraphrasing Leibniz, I would say that the philosophical tradition is not criminal, but full of crimes.

Leibniz and Whitehead both experimented with the construction of peace-producing propositions inside the philosophical tradition, using for

their purposes the very same words that were created by this tradition to disqualify, oppose, and even destroy "others." This means that their work can be celebrated as proposed antidotes against certain poisons this tradition has invented or at least justified. And again, I mean first of all the power of fascination the Western tradition has, repeatedly and under many different guises, conferred upon truth—a purifying, polemical power that makes us proud to escape the deceptions of the world, leads us to associate progress with the purging of past illusions, and demands that we question traditional ways of cultivating meaning, togetherness, cooperation, and belonging, even at the price of destroying them. Peace-producing philosophies are antidotes against the poisons immanent in our tradition. We would build a speedway "where angels fear to tread" if we thought their words were something other than antidotes. We would turn the antidote into a new poison if we did not associate it with a very specific challenge: to succeed in conceiving it as resolutely and *appetitively* (not traumatically) divorced from any ambition to achieve the very dangerous self-definition we have inherited from our tradition. As antidotes, both Leibniz's and Whitehead's peace propositions produce lures for positively resisting, just as mathematicians resist what they call "trivial solutions," any formulation that would aim at unifying humanity beyond their diverging and conflictual definitions of cultivating the experience of wisdom.

Thus, it may happen that a philosopher experiments with the transformation of his or her philosophical concepts into words that would vectorize an experience of peace. This was the case for Spinoza's knowledge of the third kind, as it was for Whitehead at the end of both *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas.* We may celebrate these transformations as events, but we should keep in mind that these events, which did indeed happen for certain philosophers, are not achievements we could identify with the aim of the experimental adventure of philosophy—designing and redesigning its language, as Whitehead defined it (PR, 11).

This is why it is important to affirm the strongest distinction between peace as a philosophical, problematic proposition and peace as an experience. The first is our specific responsibility, since our tradition has turned so many words into justifications for holy wars waged in the name of traumatic truths. As to the second, our primary task is to recognize as *our* problem that the Western tradition, and I would stress the academic tradition therein, has not specifically cultivated the kind of practical wisdom probably needed in order to stabilize such an experience. We are the children of anxiety, and we should not anxiously disclaim this fact. I would add that Whitehead's and Leibniz's concepts of God both address this problem, since each in his own way is associated with "thinking with the hammer" or "hammer thoughts." This is a kind of thinking which, following Nietzsche, produces its own test. What these concepts demand is emphatically not a trauma, since it is never a question of tearing away from what would be only illusions, but an affective transforma-

tion of the one who takes them as effective lures for feeling and produces contrasts where oppositions once ruled.

The "best of all worlds" was indeed such a "hammer thought," actualizing what Leibniz identified with damnation, but so is the proposition that I have derived from Whitehead, that is, that God enjoys no concrete predefinition of what would be "the best" for any occasion. In other words, God depends on *us* for the creation of peace-propositions and the contrasts they entail. In both cases, as Deleuze might perhaps accept it, the point is not to believe "in God," but to accept as a problematic ingredient in our experience of the world the luring proposition of "God" being "for" the world. The point is, furthermore, to accept correlatively that the more a truth is "traumatic" or the more a proposition claims to possess universality in its own right, the more it may be transformed through God's experience into an interesting contrast, but one still loaded with negative prehensions.

I come back now to the idea of a (peaceful) "conversation" between the French tradition and process people. Whatever word we might propose instead of *conversation,* resisting the hammer thought of "God being for this world" would entail that the intended coming together embrace the challenge of not accepting the facile charms of academic conversation. It would further entail not requiring a select setting of only well-behaved, disenchanted, human-only partners who tiredly turn their backs on their own disappointing stories, and not sneering at oppositional, impolite formulations, but instead actively turning them into challenging contrasts. It would entail creating the difference between "peace" as an ironic rejection of any fanatic adhesion and "peace" as actively learning to produce and feel adhesions as a plurality of contrasted affirmations "for the world." This is what is at stake in the paradoxical term—*peace fighters*—I have introduced, leading to the idea that the aim is not agreement but alliance.

I have called "cosmopolitics" the kind of experimental togetherness that makes peace a challenge and not the condition for a polite conversation. "Politics" recalls that this proposition stems from our Western tradition that linked what it abstracted as "reason" with what it invented as "politics," which has meant, since Plato, the problem of who is entitled to speak and on what grounds when the question of our common destiny is at stake. The prefix "cosmo" takes into account that the word *common* should not be restricted to our fellow humans, as politics since Plato has implied, but should entertain the problematic togetherness of the many concrete, heterogeneous, enduring shapes of value (SMW, 94) that compose actuality, thus including beings as disparate as "neutrinos" (a part of the physicist's reality) and ancestors (a part of reality for those whose traditions have taught them to communicate with the dead).

Cosmopolitics defines peace as an ecological production of actual togetherness, where "ecological" means that the aim is not toward a unity

beyond differences, which would reduce those differences through a goodwill reference to abstract principles of togetherness, but toward a creation of concrete, interlocked, asymmetrical, and always partial graspings. To take the very example of what Deleuze calls a "double capture"—a concept Whitehead would have loved—the success of an ecological invention is not having the bee and the orchid bowing together in front of an abstract ideal, but having the bee and the orchid both presupposing the existence of the other in order to produce themselves.

In order to be a bit more concrete, I will conclude with a contrast organized around a group of very "impolite" people: those scientists who claim they represent reality and thus have no reason to converse with others (or even with each other) but believe instead that they should be listened to. While they would rightfully be considered as excluding themselves from any civilized conversation, they posed a major concern for Whitehead, right from the start. I will now attempt to convey how vitally I needed the Whiteheadian "do not be afraid" to envisage the possibility of becoming a "peace fighter" in this area. Such a becoming had for its condition that I would address those passionately impolite people as being able, because of their very passion, to accept the peace-proposition that I now call "cosmopolitics," in this case a proposition both celebrating the creativity of the sciences and syntactically transforming their claims into more concrete ones, thereby actively depriving them of the traditional abstract setting of the "science versus opinion" or "science versus conversation" war-game.

When Whitehead was writing *Science and the Modern World,* he was enjoying the hope that the epoch when the sciences sided with the bifurcation of nature was about to be closed. We know that he was overly optimistic in this matter: not only is the reductionist stance still dominant, but we have very good reasons *not* to believe, as he did, that scientific innovation as such might endanger it. The idea that science is at war with opinion, that its very advance means "progress" framed as, "everyone thought such and such before, but we (scientists) now know that, . . ." has proved stronger than all the revisions of what scientists may indeed claim to know. In other words, I would state that we must now accept the fact that the field of science needs a still more concrete description of the values it produces: not only its epistemological values but also its political values reproduce an opposition between a "rational," objective grasp of reality and an "irrational," subjective, culturally embedded opinion. As long as the "science against opinion" image is patiently accepted, infecting scientists and nonscientists alike, the bifurcation of nature will be produced again and again as both the condition for science and for its confirming result.

The point is not to oppose a "Whiteheadian interpretation of scientific facts" to the usual one, as if scientific facts were some kind of neutral ground to be equally shared by everybody. Nor is the point to deny the "power of sci-

entific facts." The point, rather, is to open up the knowledge-game and to disconnect it from any kind of generalist, "view-from-nowhere" model of authority. This indeed implies first and foremost the stance of "do not be afraid"; that is, it implies that we should not believe for one minute the scientific claims that "reality" has "factually" given science the power to deny or reduce.

Scientific, experimental facts offer no neutral ground. Scientists are right when they deny that a freewheeling conversation would give their facts whatever interpretation we would like. Indeed, these facts are produced by scientists for scientists, in terms of the values they are engaged in actualizing together. Here, by the way, I feel that process people should take better advantage of the contemporary so-called social studies of science[5] in order to describe the production of scientific facts in terms of process, that is, in terms of exhibiting rather obstructive, intolerant values and maintaining and depending upon the "patience" (SMW, 119) of its larger environment. Whitehead stated that an electron belonging to a living body is probably not "the same" as an electron belonging to a dead one. If we may accept such a statement, we should not be impressed or afraid upon hearing the dramatic accusation made against the social studies of sciences, that it would reduce scientific "facts" to mere social (read "irrational") constructs. If process philosophy is not an empty designation, it should demand that we never accept the kind of sad, either/or—*either* objective, neutral, having the power to disconnect itself *or* mere construction—alternatives upon which this accusation depends. We should recognize instead that the either/or proposition is a way for scientists to obtain limitless patience from their environment, where some "impatience" should well prevail.

I come now to the very power of scientific facts. How to save this power in peace-producing terms? How not to be (conceptually) afraid of the authority scientists derive from their "facts"? How to produce the possibility of a "cosmopolitical" grasp, celebrating those facts together with what they often seem to deny? Here I think we have first to complement Whitehead's analysis in order to exhibit that experimental facts are not privileged examples of what he called "stubborn facts." For me, examples of such stubborn facts would be the death of a loved one, the crash of an airplane, or the opportunity that was missed and never will return: those facts illustrate well that nothing will undo what is stubborn, but they also ask for interpretation, and will typically induce an open process of interpretation. The very specificity of experimental facts, on the other hand, is that while they undeniably "happen," they are nevertheless anticipated, thought before, paid for in advance. Furthermore, their happening one way and not another entails an extreme contrast between, on the one hand, those human beings who passionately cared for the issue and, on the other, all the others, who may well wonder why numbers can produce such dreams or such nightmares, such joys, or such disappointments.

Another aspect of experimental facts is even more surprising: on the one hand, experimental facts happen only in a highly conscious, critical, and

interpretative social environment, and the story of their coming into being requires a universe of intentional risks, of verbal statements and explicit contrasts, of passionate ambitions and controversies; on the other hand, the very success they are meant to achieve is to stop interpretation, to have ambitions bowing in front of an objective verdict, to promote reality against intentions, and to enforce the closure of until then free human controversies. The whole of human invention, imagination, intentionality, and freely engaged passion is here mobilized in order to establish that there is one interpretation only, the "objective one," owing nothing to invention, imagination, and passion. Through an experimental device, the experimental fact thus technically transforms some very select nonhuman societies in such a way that they fulfill rather strange and purely human demands: that the stories those nonhuman societies will tell about themselves both serve as an argument in human controversies and support the claim that they owe nothing to human subjective values or interpretations. This is quite an achievement indeed, a very demanding, selective one. The production of new kinds of experimental facts are true events, producing an open-ended difference between the future and the past.

However, when a scientist tells you, "that's a fact," the first thing to do is see who is talking. If the one who is talking belongs to a field in which the authority of facts is explicitly related to some kind of "objective methodology," we should remember all those factors in the environment that must have been eliminated in the name of this methodology. Many sociologically and psychologically reductionist facts are more remarkable by the negative prehensions they enact than by their innovative and relevant grasp of an aspect of reality. This is why they need as an ingredient of their "truth claim" an avowed relation with the progress of science as it is illustrated by the experimental sciences, that is, physics, chemistry, or molecular biology.

To freely engage in the enterprise, the aim of which is to have freedom of interpretation bowing down to "objectivity," is not a matter of methodology but of satisfying demanding tests. The tests experimental facts must satisfy in order to be recognized as facts, the very success of which conditions their existence as scientific facts, have one primordial goal: to demonstrate that the propositions they authorize have for their subject "a phenomenon as we are compelled to understand it." A phenomenon has been transformed into what can be called a "reliable witness," reliably testifying for one interpretation against others. Objectivity is not a general feature of science; it is an acquired feature of some select phenomenon—the feature that scientific facts acquire when they have survived the controversy that tested the possibility that the witness betray its representative, that the fact allows for distinct (competent) interpretations.

I had to add "competent," and this may seem very impolite. But I cannot leave out the reason why experimental scientists exclude themselves from civilized conversations. Indeed, controversies are doubly selective: only select facts can hope to survive them, and only select people are practically

and passionately interested in the difference to be created between facts as reliable or unreliable witnesses. The "force" of experimental facts relies on the coherence of this double selection, on the coincidence between "being passionately interested" and "being recognized as competent." Indeed, where the neutrino's mass, for instance, is concerned, nobody but the specialized scientist gives a damn whether the value is zero or very very small. But when a scientist uses so-called experimental facts against "opinion," the situation is quite different: as soon as a scientific statement claims to be interesting for "ordinary people" and denies, however, the competence of those same people, its force is lost. In other words, the selectivity of experimental facts is such that experimental knowledge may well complicate the formulation of human beliefs and convictions in the ecological sense of leading to the production of new contrasts and distinctions in order to take that knowledge into account; but never can a scientific proposition as such legitimately replace "opinion."

I would claim that the way I have just reframed the problem of the power of "experimental facts" produces the possibility of a "demanding peace" as a proposition that both respects the value scientists demand we recognize in what they call "objectivity" *and* demands from scientists that they enjoy scientific achievements as selective, inventive, social events, and not as a monotonous assaulting wave of objective rationality against human opinion. Furthermore, I would claim that we need here the full scope of Whitehead's concept of "society" in order for "social" scientific events to be construed also as "cosmological" events, going beyond the bifurcation of nature; celebrating new, enduring links between human questions and nonhuman societies; acknowledging each new kind of experimental fact as the coming into existence of a new kind of hybrid society.

But the peace propositions we may, as philosophers, derive from this understanding are also demanding ones, as demanding as Whitehead's decision when he proposed that time be atomic. The atomicity of time was the speculative price to be paid in order for philosophy to define itself "for" becoming, that is, never taking scientific explanations as final, as these explanations must privilege the continuity of the functions or patterns on which they depend. This price does not mean war, but it does mean maintaining a very determinate and stubborn distance. There is and there should be a strong contrast between the kind of question we will call "cosmologically relevant" and the type of question experimental facts have the power to decide. In other words, the Whiteheadian peace proposition will accept as an event in human history the successful granting to a nonhuman society the power to tell an objective story about itself, but it will exhibit this event as a successful selection and abstractive exhibition of this society, allowing scientists to explain away becoming.

Such a proposition will not be happily greeted by many speculative physicists, nor by philosophers fascinated by physics. According to this proposition, after all, it is a nightmare to dream of a direct "summit meeting" between the speculative risks of philosophy and, for instance, the adventures of

real and virtual particles, interactions, quantum void, or whatever exotic beings physics creates. No creature can be separated from its environment, and the two environments—experimental and speculative—owe their existence to diverging, noncontradictory values, "for" being and "for" becoming. Connections may exist, but no deduction from one to the other, just as between the Deleuzean bees and orchids.

If accepted, however, those connections may be vitally important. This is what I have learned working with Ilya Prigogine, who devotes his life to the inclusion of the asymmetry of time in the so-called fundamental laws of physics. His ambition and the risks he accepts are those of a physicist, and his struggle to have all the physical laws that now exhibit time symmetry to no longer testify for a perfect understanding of time, but to an insufficient, too abstract version of physical causality, is impressive. It may well lead back to Whitehead's diagnosis: for Prigogine, time-symmetrical, physical descriptions indeed exhibit the "symptoms of the epicyclic state from which astronomy was rescued in the sixteenth century" (SMW, 135).[6] However, what is most interesting to me as a philosopher is that the more rigorously the risks and results of Prigogine's endeavor satisfy the demands and constraints of physics, the more they exhibit the demanding specificity of physics: they may well allude to becoming, but they are "for being." Indeed, what Prigogine now calls the "laws of chaos" explicitly define their object not as "reality" but as a grasping together of those aspects of a chaotic, nonconformal reality that build up a "conformal pattern" or "law." Prigogine's "laws" do not exhibit "reality" as satisfying the demand of lawful regularity; instead they abstract from reality the pattern that satisfies this demand. As a consequence, "laws of physics" would be divorced from "laws of nature," and, as a further consequence, a proposition like that of Prigogine vitally needs his colleagues to accept their laws as distinct from the laws reality would obey.

A "cosmopolitical," peace-fabricating interest in human practices has nothing to do with summit meetings. The problem of the power of experimental facts is not restricted to the great problems of "theoretical physics meets philosophy." Careful attention to the negative prehensions that turn a new contrast into an opposition should extend everywhere in a fractalized manner, that is, toward each problem whatever its scale, where a formulation may "mean war." The trust and hope to which this kind of attention attests actualize the Whiteheadian "do not be afraid" as a firm belief that never will reality side with a holy war. In order to exemplify this last point, I will offer a last example, very far from physics but quite relevant to the disqualifying power of modern rationality.

Modern, so-called rational, pharmacology presents itself as proof that the only rational way to understand the living body is the experimental way, in terms of the blind, interlocked concert of molecules and their interactions. Everything that may rationally intervene in such a concert must be a molecule, it claims, and devising new molecules is the only rational, objective way

to cure people. However, we also know that promising molecules must first satisfy clinical tests, mainly against "placebo effects," in order to be accepted as drugs. Furthermore, in the case of failure, the molecules return to a sad anonymity, while in the case of success, the need for the test is forgotten, while a new triumph of the success of "scientific molecules" in curing people is celebrated.

This scenario testifies for very interesting negative prehensions. It masks a crucial contrast. While the satisfaction of the clinical test is presented as verifying that the eventual cure has indeed its reason in the abstract encounter between the sick body and the molecule, those verifying cures are in fact obtained "against placebo": they do not "objectively" testify about the "encounter"; rather, they statistically testify that, one way or another, the successful molecule has contributed more specifically than a "mere placebo" in the induction of the healing process.

A peace-fabricating description of the whole situation would first rejoice in the severe tests we demand that our drugs pass, but would then emphasize that the very creation of these needed tests marks a true "social" transformation, going from an experimental environment to the complex environment of suffering-body-and-anxious-mind-with-physician. As the placebo itself testifies, the healing process cannot be abstracted from this environment. It may well be induced by nonmolecular means—means that cannot testify about themselves in the "objective" terms demanded by experimentation. Furthermore, those means cannot be explained away as a "mere placebo effect," since the abstract, measured placebo effect does not exist as such outside the purified clinical test setting. With the placebo, we meet under the guise of an irreducible residue (physicians must keep quite neutral in order for the statistics to be valid; they must even ignore whether they are distributing the molecule or the placebo) what is cultivated elsewhere. In different therapeutic practices, it is no longer a residue, as it is not only amplified and stabilized but may also be produced anew, as expressing, exhibiting, and producing different possibilities of healing, in different social environments.

Again, the development of Whitehead's concept of a society is urgently needed. Indeed, a Whiteheadian peace proposition would have to emphasize that the "social" processes that we call "disease" and "cure" do not (generally) satisfy true experimental demands (telling an objective story about themselves), which would authorize the reduction of the sick body to some molecular assembly. It would celebrate the clinical test as our way of rationally taking into account this irreducibility: we do not allow our molecular dreams to stand for reality. It would not solve the problem of how to relate our pharmacological tradition with other "traditional" ways of healing: even God does not "know" how before the event of an actual ecological togetherness. But the peace proposition may produce the appetitive envisagement of this possibility.

I have just exemplified the cosmopolitical enterprise as I inherited it from Whitehead's peace-fabricating proposition. Such an enterprise cannot converge into a conclusion, since it is an open-ended story, the end of which would coincide with the cessation of the unending list of destructive simplifications and disqualifying judgements we have produced in the name of truth as a traumatic power. This may seem a long way from the starting point of my text: the possible encounter between what I have called "process people" and the "French tradition." I started with a double test, resisting on the one side any direct convergence between religion and philosophy, while accepting on the other that we can maintain, or create, a positive reference to reason and hope while thinking "in front of" or "for" analphabets, dying rats, or alcoholics. I end with scientifically reliable witnesses, drugs, and healing processes. The point of this wide circuit is the construction, or exploration, of what I have called a "middle ground," where concepts produced through this double test could be created. If philosophy creates concepts, this very creation, Deleuze tells us, affirms or requires a plane that is nonphilosophical or prephilosophical. A plane, which primordially, should not be an academic one, should lure feelings "for" the world, and should not be defined in reference to such a "small world." Thus my conviction is that the encounter, as a risk and not as an exercise in comparative philosophy, needs some kind of physical enjoyment of the many concrete situations where the creation of new concepts is required: concepts that will affirm hope and reason "in front of" or "for" the many against whom crimes have been committed in the name of hope and reason.

Notes

1. The *Sokal Hoax* refers to the physicist Alan Sokal's submission of an article—which included much postmodern jargon and that he considered to be a "spoof"—to the journal *Social Text*. After it was published in the spring/summer, 1996 volume, Sokal revealed that it was a hoax.

2. Leibniz, *Confessio Philosophy,* French-Latin text (Paris: Vrin, 1970).

3. Isabelle Stengers, "Who Is the Author," in *Power and Invention: Situating Science, Theory out of Bounds* 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). See also Stengers, *L'invention des sciences modernes,* coll. "Champs" (Paris: Flammarion, 1995).

4. See Stengers, "Pour en finir avec la tolérance," *Cosmopolitiques* 7 (Paris: La Découverte/Les empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1997).

5. Two major protagonists of this field, Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, have for their part already recognized the relevance of Whitehead.

6. See Stengers, "Breaking the Circle of Sufficient Reason," in *Power and Invention.*